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Ph.D., Physics, Harvard University, 1971

ABSTRACT
Sheep growing constituted New Mexico’s leading industry for much of the territorial
period and had been of major importance over the preceding two centuries, since the days
of Spanish sovereignty. This work is a dedicated economic history of the industry during
the territorial period, a time during which sheep growing underwent a series of dramatic
changes from the traditional Spanish practices of open-range grazing and large trail
drives serving Mexican markets to capitalized sheep and wool production on managed
lands, serving vastly larger American markets. The herds multiplied tremendously, while
leadership and control of the industry shifted from a small cohort of wealthy, landed
Hispanic families to well-connected and well-capitalized Anglo merchants and growers,
recently arrived in the territory. This shift, how and why it came about, is the central
theme of this work. It is shown to be largely the result of impersonal economic forces, as
New Mexico was gradually absorbed, economically and socially, into the American
mainstream. The role of capital was central.
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Note on Terminology
A few words about terminology are appropriate here. All peoples of New Mexico
who were not American Indian, truly Spanish, or of Spanish-Indian mixed race were, and
still are, commonly called Anglos or Anglo-Americans and will be identified as such in
the text. Thus, the German Jewish merchants and the French and Italian priests who
arrived in New Mexico during the nineteenth century were, in this sense, considered
Anglos. The term Hispanic is used in the text to designate the Spanish-Indian mixed-race
population of New Mexico, the predominant demographic group during the territorial
period. In both scholarly and popular works, these people are sometimes called Native
New Mexicans, Hispanos, or Chicanos. In the past they were sometimes called SpanishAmericans, a misnomer. Anglos of the territorial era usually called these people
Mexicans, as they often called themselves, an accurate designation before the annexation,
but not after. For purposes of this study, Indians of all tribes except the sedentary
Pueblos are collected under the heading of Nomadic Tribes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

When Anglo-Americans began traveling to New Mexico over the Santa Fe Trail, the
first sign of life they saw upon approaching the settlements was often a herd of sheep on
a hillside, usually watched over by a lone flock master.1 This was hardly surprising since
sheep played a very important role in village life. As The New Mexico Bluebook
succinctly stated later in 1913, “The backbone of industrial husbandry in New Mexico for
at least 200 years has been sheep raising, and it is still chief among the income producing
occupations of the people.”2 In fact, sheep growing had been a leading commercial
activity from the Spanish colonial period until the twentieth century. A small cohort of
Hispanic mercantile families, over a period of many decades, had built the industry and
amassed considerable wealth, largely in the form of livestock. By the time of the U.S.
military occupation in 1846, they were exporting their stock to Mexican markets in
massive annual drives down the Camino Real.
Hispanic New Mexicans, having initiated and, over the years, succeeded in largescale sheep husbandry and the associated mercantilism under quite difficult conditions,
were seemingly well positioned to continue to dominate this enterprise, while extending
it to the much larger economic arena that opened up after the U.S. annexation. However,
Hispanic dominance did not persist. The territory’s sheep industry became linked to the
large and growing American market for mutton and an entirely new market for wool.
And while the human population of the territory essentially tripled over the half century
following the annexation, the sheep industry grew more than forty-fold, as measured by
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annual revenues.3

(See Fig. 3.1, Population of New Mexico, Fig. 3.2, New Mexico

Livestock Populations, and Fig. 5.1, Annual Earnings for Sheep and Wool, Cattle, and
Farm Crops.) In the process, well-connected Anglo merchants and growers assumed
leadership and came to control the bulk of the industry through their activities in
marketing, finance, and capital-intensive husbandry, even as Hispanic herders actually
tended most of the flocks and Hispanic sheepmen still owned a large fraction of the
territory’s sheep.4

Subject of the Thesis
At the human level, the sheep industry was an arena of New Mexico life that was, put
simply, taken over by Anglo-Americans. Characterized more accurately, Anglos and
American capitalism established hegemony over the industry. Economic
reconfigurations under unbalanced circumstances, as the situation here might be
described, are often seen as venality driven and massively unfair and detrimental to
native populations. The take-over of the New Mexico sheep industry, such as it was, was
arguably more subtle in its driving forces. Venality unquestionably was an issue. But
impersonal economic forces, about which little has been written, played a major role.
David Montejano has developed this line of thought in the context of his broad-based,
economic and sociological history of Texas.5 The workings of these forces underlie the
central story of the thesis: the realignment of the New Mexico sheep industry from
Hispanic to Anglo dominance during the territorial period. How this came about will be
the focus of the work. At the heart of the various economic forces at work was capital,
largely from extra-territorial sources. It was essential not just to the growth and
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prosperity of the New Mexico sheep industry after the annexation, but to its very
survival.
The story of the sheep industry is complicated by the fact that, aside from the shift in
leadership and control, the industry underwent a multifaceted transformation that
contributed to, was even an integral part of, the shift. The markets not only grew
considerably but were widely scattered throughout the United States as the nation then
existed. Wool, once a quantity of minor economic importance, became a major territorial
export along with mutton. Rail shipment of wool, and later sheep, to market became the
norm. Open-range grazing, the tradition since Spanish colonial times, ultimately gave
way to farm production under controlled conditions. Scientific range management also
became a consideration. New Mexico sheep breeders became strongly tied to feeder
farmers throughout the Rocky Mountain-Great Plains region. And while it had initially
emerged from an agricultural subsistence economy, the sheep industry became capitalintensive. All of these developments, which may be seen collectively as a process of
modernization, were driven by extra-territorial forces. For better or for worse, those
forces all contributed in some way to the shift to Anglo control.
The developments in the sheep industry can be better understood by considering the
economic environment in which they occurred. The transformation of the New Mexico
sheep industry was part, in fact a very important part, of a broader economic
transformation in the territory that began with the opening of the Santa Fe Trail from
Missouri, continued through the territorial period, and played out largely in the earlier
decades of the twentieth century. American capitalism penetrated New Mexico and
brought about an economic evolution from a barter-based, agricultural production system
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mediated by a lord-serf hierarchy (patron-peon in Spanish), with an incipient capitalistic
export trade, to a recognizably modern, albeit embryonic, economic system of banks,
extra-territorial investors, national markets, written contracts, cash and credit
transactions, and impersonal labor-management relationships.6 New Mexico’s Hispanic
political and business leaders, many if not all connected with sheep in some way,
accepted the new economic order with equanimity, if not enthusiasm, as it manifested
itself.7 For Hispanic sheep growers, the immediate results of the changing conditions
were mixed. Some well-established Hispanics did indeed participate in, and profit
handsomely, from the expansion and modernization of their industry; others lost their
stake. In many ways, however, evolving market requirements, improved
communications and transport capabilities, advancing agricultural technology, and
increased competition, all tied to the rise of capital in some way, favored well-connected,
Anglo risk takers, both sheepmen and merchants. Their rise to hegemony was a complex
and somewhat amorphous process, spanning several decades, and is a matter of general
interest. The history of sheep in territorial New Mexico is a story of what can happen
when a capitalist economic system meets a comparatively small, natural-resource based,
mostly-barter economy. Our study can provide points of comparison for considering
similar processes elsewhere in the world.
The incorporation of New Mexico’s traditional agricultural and livestock economy
into the industrializing United States, incomplete as it was through the territorial period,
is a sub-theme for the thesis. The sheep industry, because of its importance in the
territorial economy, provides a meaningful vantage point for considering the
incorporation process. The industry even played a significant role in that process.
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Developments within the industry help clarify how this economic coupling got underway
and illuminate some of the gains and losses of Hispanic New Mexicans.
Sheep growing held a position not only of major importance in New Mexico
throughout the territorial period, but after the Civil War, it took on considerable western
regional importance and even increased national importance. New Mexico figured into
this extra-territorial expansion of the industry in an important and rather unique way
when it provided seed stock for numerous western herds.
This study will be structured so as to form a comprehensive narrative of the New
Mexico sheep industry, viewed as an important aspect of territorial life that also had
national implications. The investigation will, furthermore, try to place the evolution of
the New Mexico sheep industry within the context of important nineteenth-century social,
cultural, and economic visions and developments, Manifest Destiny and the nineteenthcentury westward movement in particular. Anglo-Hispanic interplay will thread its way
though the entire treatment. Extra-territorial matters will be considered in some detail
when they are relevant to the New Mexico sheep industry.

Review of Existing Work
A considerable body of work has already been produced concerning New Mexico’s
livestock industry in one way or another, so much that one might conclude that its history
has already been written. This body of work, however, has significant limitations. In
fact, little rigorous investigative work has been dedicated to New Mexico’s economic
history during the territorial period and even less to its sheep industry specifically. This
void is surprising, considering that the period was quite dynamic economically and the
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sheep industry played an important role, early on, in the integration of New Mexico into
the mainstream U.S. economy. To date, no serious, dedicated investigation of the
economic underpinnings of sheep growing in the territory has been undertaken. In taking
up this subject, the present work is an attempt to shed light on the economic and, by
extension, social integration, which has left its imprint on today’s New Mexico.
The shift from Hispanic to Anglo leadership in the sheep industry was part of the
integration process. More generally, the matter of Anglo influence and imposition on
Hispanic New Mexico has been a source of continuing discourse and controversy. A
considerable body of emotion-laden literature has decried a perceived degradation of
Hispanic life by Anglo dominance in the political, economic, and social rhelms, but this
work provides little indication as to how or why such dominance may have come about.
The present work will attempt to shed light on how and why Anglo dominance indeed
came about in one important field of endeavor, the sheep industry.
The existing work concerned with livestock growing in the nineteenth-century West,
and New Mexico in particular, is largely descriptive, often providing only simplistic or
otherwise incomplete explanations of important developments and why they unfolded as
they did. Consideration of historical context is often inadequate, and little attention is
generally devoted to how the livestock industry actually functioned. Exceptions to this
are Gene M. Gressley, Bankers and Cattlemen and John Clay’s classic, My Life on the
Range.8 Both these works provide considerable insight into how western livestock
operations were tied to eastern and European capital but are largely dedicated to the cattle
industry. The existing work usually treats ranching as an isolated phenomenon, and, in
particular, provides little insight into how New Mexico’s livestock industry was coupled
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to, and often driven by, regional and national developments. Significantly, the work is
quite fragmented, a loose patchwork with many missing pieces.
Some excellent works are available as points of departure for the present
investigation. Howard Roberts Lamar’s The Far Southwest, 1846-1912: A Territorial
History provides a valuable general framework for considering New Mexico, and
Colorado, territorial history.9 The finest, and arguably most important, existing work on
the New Mexico sheep industry is John O. Baxter’s, Las Carneradas, Sheep Trade in
New Mexico, 1700-1860.10 This treatment concentrates largely on the development of the
industry during the Spanish and Mexican periods. It ends just as the Civil War was about
to disrupt and then significantly alter the territory’s sheep business, which had been
evolving moderately since the annexation. The present study will to pick up the story,
with a bit of overlap for continuity, where Baxter’s account ends.
A rather small collection of additional noteworthy works directly relevant to sheep in
New Mexico merits attention. The short list includes Charles Weyland Towne and
Edward Norris Wentworth, Shepherd’s Empire; Edward Norris Wentworth, Americas
Sheep Trails: History, Personalities; and Charles M. Sypolt, “Keepers of the Rocky
Mountain Flocks: A History of the Rocky Mountain Sheep Industry in Colorado, New
Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming to 1900.”11 These works address sheep growing over a
large geographical area, provide valuable general information about the industry, but do
not treat New Mexico in great detail. Numerous shorter treatments concerning aspects of
the New Mexico livestock industry include Alvar Ward Carlson, “New Mexico’s Sheep
Industry, 1850-1900: Its Role in the History of the Territory,” William J. Parish, “Sheep
Husbandry in New Mexico, 1902-1903,” and Ralph Charles, “Development of the
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Partido System in the New Mexico Sheep Industry,” a specialized treatment of one
important aspect of the industry.12 A few longer, more general works on New Mexico
history, address the grazing industry in some detail. This treatment takes the form of
stand-alone chapters in Erna Fergusson, New Mexico, A Pageant of Three Peoples and
Frank D. Reeve, History of New Mexico.13 No one of these works even begins to cover
all the salient points in the history of sheep in New Mexico.
Useful regional studies devoted to the Texas sheep industry are also available,
notably Winifred Kupper, The Golden Hoof: The Story of the Sheep of the Southwest,
focused largely on sheep growing in West Texas, and V.W. Lehmann, Forgotten
Legions: Sheep in the Rio Grande Plane of Texas.14 These works provide scattered
insights into the operations of the New Mexico sheep industry, which are only partially
useful since the history of sheep in Texas diverges significantly from that in New
Mexico.
Some fine treatments of matters peripherally related to the New Mexico sheep
industry are available. These include accounts of the Santa Fe Trail, the conduit by
which New Mexico’s wool was first transported east. The work includes Susan Calafate
Boyle, Los Capitalistas: Hispano Merchants in the Santa Fe Trade15 and the primary
source Josiah Gregg, Commerce of the Prairies: or Eight Expeditions across the Great
Western Prairies, and a Residence of Nearly Nine Years in Northern Mexico. But this
work only concerns livestock indirectly and ends with the closing of the Trail midway
through the territorial period.
The mercantile community of New Mexico, which dealt extensively in both livestock
and wool in the post-Civil War era, is addressed in William J. Parish’s classic study, The
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Charles Ilfeld Company: A Study of the Rise and Fall of Mercantile Capitalism in New
Mexico.16 This work, by its very nature, covers only limited aspects of New Mexico’s
sheep industry. Other biographical works are more directly relevant. Notable is Frank H.
Grubbs, “Frank Bond, Gentleman Sheepherder of Northern New Mexico, 1883-1915.”17
This work, an outgrowth of a University of New Mexico masters thesis, is a detailed
corporate history of the Bond brothers’ innovative and profitable sheep-oriented
mercantile enterprises. It covers, of course, only a single merchant, whose business was
actually quite unique in its organization and did not reach full maturity until late in the
nineteenth century. Along these same lines is Sister Lucretia Pittman, “Solomon Luna:
Sheepmaster and Politician of New Mexico.”18 Luna was extraordinarily successful
sheep grower in New Mexico. His activities shed limited light on the great majority of
smaller operations.
Land has always been a critical issue for sheep husbandry in New Mexico. The
industry was started on mission lands and the Spanish and Mexican land grants. A
substantial body of literature has addressed land issues, particularly the loss of SpanishMexican land grants to Anglo-American speculators and to the U.S. public domain. The
ownership transfer occurred in the same general timeframe as the rapid developments in
the sheep industry. This highly controversial process was characterized by arbitrary legal
decisions, political preferment, and exploitation of Hispanic land owners. Important
works in this area include Malcolm Ebright, Land Grants and Lawsuits in Northern New
Mexico and John R.Van Ness and Christine M. Van Ness, eds., Spanish and Mexican
Land Grants in New Mexico and Colorado.19 This body of work is focused on land that
had been largely dedicated to sheep grazing, not on the grazing industry itself, and is
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concerned primarily with the legal history of the ownership transfer, a complex and often
confusing story. New Mexico land-grant historians generally interpret the land transfer
as a failure of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which included provisions intended to
secure the property rights of Hispanic land owners. The present study will attempt to shed
further light on the land transfer by placing more weight on its economic underpinnings.
The lands in question were, after all, primarily grazing lands of little value for cultivation
before the advent of mechanized irrigation.20
Land issues are discussed more generally in Victor Westphall’s two books, Mercedes
Reales: Hispanic Land Grants of the Upper Rio Grande Region and The Public Domain
in New Mexico, 1854-1891.21 The latter work is important because much of New
Mexico’s grazing was on the public domain. The spread of Hispanic settlers outward
from the Rio Grande Valley, which was driven in part by the need for new grazing lands,
is covered in D.W. Meining, Southwest: Three Peoples in Geographic Change, 16001970 and Richard L. Nostrand, The Hispano Homeland.22 A significant body of literature
addresses the controversial issue of incursions, Anglo and Hispanic, and illegal fencing
on the grants and the public domain. This includes Robert J. Rosenbaum, Mexicano
Resistance in the Southwest: “The Sacred Right of Self-Preservation.” 23 The aggregate
of this peripherally relevant secondary work fills some of the gaps in the dedicated
studies.

Time and Spatial Frame
New Mexico’s territorial period is a natural timeframe for a history of the sheep
industry. Throughout the Spanish and Mexican eras, the industry evolved comparatively
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slowly. The sheep population grew more or less steadily, grazing expanded outward
from the Rio Grande Valley, new markets for mutton in Mexico were opened, but
mercantile customs and methods of sheep growing changed little, if at all. The
annexation, in addition to introducing to the region a new political order and legal
system, initiated a new era of relative dynamism in the sheep industry. Changes and
increased complexity accelerated throughout the territorial period. The annexation is thus
a natural starting point for this study.
The study terminates roughly with statehood when further important changes were
coming to New Mexico. The sheep industry was losing its economic uniqueness at this
time, while agriculture was rapidly expanding. Sheep, still profitable, were being taken
up as one more crop on the growing number of farms in the state. By this time, mining
and cattle as well as agriculture were beginning to rival the sheep industry in annual
revenues. The transition to statehood thus constitutes a natural end point for the study.
Prior to Colorado territorial status, achieved in 1861, New Mexico territory extended
north into today’s Southeastern Colorado. Bounded on the north by the Arkansas River,
this area was an extension of the Hispanic homeland and a region of intensive sheep
grazing. This part of Colorado together with today’s New Mexico will thus constitute the
primary geographical boundaries for this investigation. The greater Rocky MountainGreat Plains region into which the sheep industry spread will come under discussion
when developments there become coupled with those in New Mexico.

Sources
This project draws on a variety of primary sources. A problem which arises
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immediately is the dearth of primary-source material from the early years of the territorial
era. Until about 1880, sheep growing in New Mexico was dominated by Hispanics,
following traditional practices. So pervasive were sheep that every citizen of the territory
was extremely familiar with them and how they were raised. As a result Hispanic
correspondence rarely gives them more than passing notice. Available documentation of
mercantile activities provides some rather unfocused information pertaining to sheep in
the early territorial period.
After about1880 with the arrival of the railroads and a significant influx of Anglo
immigrants, a much larger body of source material becomes available. U.S. government
documents address the western sheep industry in considerable detail. The annual reports
put out by the U.S. Bureau of Animal Industry are quite useful. Some sections of the
reports are devoted explicitly to New Mexico sheep grazing and others concern larger
western regions including New Mexico. These reports are authoritative, containing
articles on breeding, feeding, diseases, market conditions, and projections for the future
of the industry, which may be compared to what actually happened. After 1911, the
publication was subsumed in the Annual Reports of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
The U.S. Census Publications are also useful. They provide statistical information by
state and county about livestock populations, wool production, the size and value of land
holdings, and the number of farmers and ranchers. They also provide information on the
consumption of wool, domestic and imported, and the annual profits for the U.S. woolen
industry. These reports must be approached with care since the data collection was
crude, incomplete, and presented differently from decade to decade. Appendix A,
Interpretation of Census and Tax Assessment Data, discusses some of the problems
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associated with nineteenth-century data. In recognition of these shortcomings, some of
the census data relevant to open-range grazing were revised in later decades. After the
turn of the twentieth century, the census bureau publications contain, in addition to the
basic statistics, more detailed discussions of grazing and agriculture throughout the
United States. At the territorial level, the annual reports of the New Mexico governors to
the U.S. Secretary of the Interior, available at the New Mexico State Records Center and
Archives in Santa Fe, are useful. Rather sketchy in the beginning, they become
progressively more detailed with time and provide a running account of conditions in the
territory’s sheep industry from the standpoint of the Anglo political leaders. These
reports reflect the optimistic visions of politicians promoting the territory and must be
interpreted correspondingly. New Mexico Tax Records (County Assessment Rolls) are
of some value in investigating ownership of livestock and specific parcels of land, and
the assessed values of holdings. They provide information about flock sizes and numbers
and identities of active sheep growers. Hispanic versus Anglo ownership breakdowns
and settlement patterns, as indicated by surnames, can be extracted from them. The tax
assessments must be approached with care, as New Mexico livestock owners are known
to have underreported their holdings so as to minimize their taxes.24
Business correspondence and records of varying detail are available in the collections
at the Center for Southwest Research, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque.
Substantial files are available for Charles Ilfeld, Frank Bond, Montague Stevens, and
other prominent sheep merchants and growers. The Catron collection contains extensive
correspondence concerning the American Valley Company and Thomas Catron’s
ambitious attempt to establish a sheep ranch in western New Mexico. The Montague
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Stevens Papers contain a substantial collection of letters from Stevens to his friend and
business partner, Gen. Leonard Wood, concerning his sheep business in western Socorro
(later Catron) County. These letters are unmatched for their detail and clarity. Much of
the material contained therein has never been incorporated in any published work.
In 1884, an ambitious trade newspaper dedicated to grazing, The Stock Grower,
began publication in Las Vegas, New Mexico. It contains local, national, and
international news articles pertaining to the grazing industry. Its articles provide a
running, on-site account of the New Mexico livestock industry as it was perceived at the
time by its actual participants. Some of the articles can serve to tie national
developments, described by this and other sources, to New Mexico. The successors of
this publication are The Stock Grower and Farmer, 1889-1898, and The Las Vegas
Weekly Optic and Stockgrower, 1898-1906. City Newspapers, including the Santa Fe
Weekly Gazette and the Denver Rocky Mountain News, also published occasional articles
concerning sheep, which are useful. Newspaper stories must be approached with care.
They can be misleading, as they often deal with strictly local matters and conditions,
which are not necessarily applicable to the entire territory. And their reporting of extraterritorial matters was sometimes delayed.
A word about the Hispanic versus Anglo primary sources is in order here. Anglos left
behind a vastly larger body of material pertaining to the sheep industry and related
mercantile-capitalist activities. The Catron collection, for example, contains some 275
boxes covering a broad range of activities, including sheep ranching. In contrast,
Solomon Luna, despite his prominence in territorial politics and sheep growing, left
behind only a single box of material. Las Vegas political leader and sheepman
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Secundino Romero left a considerable body of correspondence pertaining largely to his
civic activities, which however, are interspersed with brief letters from his ranch
majordomo Ricardo Gauna, an interesting but limited correspondence. Government
livestock investigators in the late nineteenth century expressed frustration in their
attempts to establish communications and information exchange with Hispanic sheep
growers. The Anglo experience, motivations, and perceptions within the sheep industry
are often spelled out quite clearly and in detail in the primary sources, whereas Hispanic
visions emerge in a sketchy fashion, and, as often as not, were actually related by Anglo
writers, some rather unsympathetic. The danger here, besides inaccurate reporting of the
Hispanic side of the sheep business, is that the source imbalance can give an Anglo bias
to this work, a shortcoming the author has attempted to avoid.

Subject Limitations
The history of the sheep industry is multi-faceted. The present work, a master thesis,
is not complete. Rather than gloss over some matters that should rightfully be included in
an even more comprehensive history of the New Mexico sheep industry, this work
largely ignores them. Such matters include The wool tariff and its effects on New
Mexico growers. The ups and downs of the industry in times of national and regional
prosperity and crisis. Sheep growers’ organizations, including the New Mexico Sheep
Sanitary Board established in 1898. Navajo sheep husbandry and wool production.
Environmental matters as they pertain to the sheep industry are only touched upon here.
A complex subject, this area should probably be taken up in a dedicated study. Another
interesting investigation would compare the New Mexico sheep industry with that of
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Scotland in the same timeframe, as there are parallels.

Organization
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses briefly the Hispanic
foundations of the New Mexico sheep industry that predate the annexation. This
background material is needed for a full understanding of the developments that
followed. Chapter 3 discusses the American presence in New Mexico prior to the Civil
War and the various ways it influenced the later growth and modernization of the sheep
industry. The most dramatic developments during this period were the opening of the
Santa Fe Trail, the arrival of the U.S. Army, and the lucrative sheep trade with California,
which all promoted capitalized marketing operations that would be employed in the postCivil War period. Chapter 4 describes the birth and expansion of commercial wool
production in New Mexico in the post-Civil War period, an entirely new component of
the sheep industry. Anglos assumed a leadership role when they undertook breeding for
improved wool production. Chapter 5 discusses the massive shift under a multiplicity of
forces of the U.S. sheep industry from the East and Midwest to the Great Plains-Rocky
Mountain region. Of particular importance to this process was the employment of New
Mexico churro sheep to help stock the western ranges. Chapter 6 describes the post-Civil
War rise of mercantile capitalism in New Mexico as it pertained to the sheep industry. A
centrally important aspect of this process was the shift in industry leadership from the
producers of sheep and wool to the merchants who marketed it, which was hastened by
the advent of sheep feeding. Chapter 7 is devoted to the career of Frank Bond, the most
successful and influential of the sheep and wool merchants. His correspondence provides
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considerable insight into the financial operations of the industry. Chapter 8 discusses the
capitalization of sheep ranching in New Mexico in the late nineteenth-early twentieth
century timeframe. Chapter 9 focuses on the experiences of Western Socorro County
sheepman Montague Stevens and his innovative, capital-intensive operation. Stevens’
correspondence provides an insider’s view of what sheep ranching was like at the turn of
the twentieth century. Chapter 10 discusses the passing of open-range sheep ranching in
New Mexico, a transformative process in which sheep husbandry became a branch of
farming. Chapter 11 presents a summary of the entire work and the conclusions drawn
from it.
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Chapter 2
Hispanic Foundations of New Mexico’s Sheep Industry, 1540-1846

The sheep industry of territorial New Mexico was built on a foundation laid by
Hispanic ranchers and merchants, largely church affiliated in the beginning, during the
periods of Spanish and Mexican sovereignty. They followed Old World husbandry
practices little changed since ancient times, characterized particularly by open-range
grazing. For many years after its establishment in the late sixteenth century, the Spanish
colony teetered on the brink of collapse as it confronted unending cycles of drought,
hunger, political infighting, and Indian raids. However, sheep, which were well adapted
to the land, usually provided a reliable food source. Accounts of colonial New Mexico
have attributed its survival largely, or entirely, to its sheep herds.1 In the words of
Charles F. Lummis, sheep “rendered the territory possible for three centuries ….He made
its customs if not its laws.”2 Over time, the flocks grew, surplus production developed,
and sheep growing was commercialized. Sheep, along with some cattle and goats,
became the principal basis for New Mexico’s limited wealth and commerce until well
into the territorial era. Prior to the Pueblo Revolt of 1680, a large portion of New
Mexico’s sheep were owned by the church. The friars claimed to have fed many Pueblo
Indians and Spanish colonists from their livestock reserves in times of famine.3 In the
years following the Reconquest, and the social changes that accompanied it, particularly
after the mid-eighteenth century, sheep, and the wealth they engendered, became
concentrated in the hands of a small number of families, who were or became socially
and politically prominent.4 The majority of the populace, generally impoverished, lived
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under the protection of the patriarch of a wealthy, rico family. Some of these pobres,
their Spanish designation, were charged with the care of the rico’s flocks. Also, some
pobres owned small flocks, or at least a few head, of their own. The influence of sheep
thus pervaded every corner of the society, essentially from the time of the colony’s
founding.
The earliest Anglo-American sheep growers in the region arrived during the period of
Mexican sovereignty and took up the traditional range practices, even as they sought out
new markets for mutton and wool. Throughout the territorial period that followed, most
of the actual herding continued to be performed by Hispanics, who had learned the trade
from their forebears. Some aspects of their profession changed little as the sheep
industry transformed and modernized. And many tradition-bound Hispanic ranchers
remained active and productive during the territorial years. Spanish-Mexican range
traditions and business arrangements thus had a considerable influence on later
developments in the industry. It is not possible to fully understand the transformation of
the New Mexico sheep industry and the shift from Hispanic to Anglo leadership without
reference to the industry’s foundations. This chapter, a brief synthesis of existing work,
provides the minimally necessary information. Additionally, some general information
about sheep and their care that will be useful for following the main body of this work
will be provided in the appendices.

The Spanish Period, 1540-1821
Sheep were an essential part of life in New Mexico from the very beginning of the
Spanish period. Domestic livestock were brought into the region in the sixteenth century
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by the first European explorers, the Spanish Conquistadores. The earliest and most
ambitious of their explorations, the Coronado Expedition, 1540-1542, a search for gold
and silver numbering over one thousand individuals, included herds of cattle and sheep in
the line of march, forming a traveling commissary. According to a contemporary
account, there were 500 head of cattle and 5000 sheep, which were consumed during the
expedition.5 Some of the livestock were successfully driven all the way to central Kansas
and back again to the Rio Grande Valley of New Mexico, proving their robustness and
utility under semi-arid southwestern conditions.6 In the ensuing years, conquistadores
mounted additional expeditions, important for the information they gathered about the
Southwest and for their extending the Camino Real north into New Mexico. An astute
observer on one early exploration described the Galisteo-Pecos River area as “suitable for
sheep, the best for that purpose ever discovered in New Spain.”7
When the Spanish established their first permanent colony in New Mexico in 1598
under governor Don Juan de Oñate at the confluence of the Rio Grande and the Rio
Chama, ostensively to convert the Pueblo Indians to Christianity, they brought along
large herds of livestock: 1000 head of cattle, 1000 goats, and about 3000 sheep provided
by the governor, which were probably augmented with some privately owned stock.8
The colony’s friars, supported by coerced Pueblo labor, established a subsistence
economy based on stock-raising and farming, and they soon made for themselves the
important, but perhaps not unexpected, discovery that their newly claimed lands were
well suited for sheep.9 In the small villages, which grew up over the following years,
sheep provided meat, but also wool for clothing, as well as milk and tallow.10
From the colony’s founding onward through the U.S. territorial era, New Mexico’s
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sheep population greatly exceeded both its cattle and human populations; see Fig. 3.1 and
Fig. 3.2. Sheep offered several advantages over cattle besides a superior adaptability to
the land: Sheep were more difficult for Indian raiders to steal than cattle and horses,
which could be stampeded and readily driven away. Sheep move slowly and cannot be
stampeded like cattle. A quick raid often only scattered them, enabling their owners to
recover the animals after the raiders were gone. New Mexicans valued their churro
mutton highly and preferred buffalo meat to the beef produced by the cattle of the day. 11
Many useful cattle byproducts - hides, jerky, salted tongues, tallow - could be obtained
from the buffalo grazing on the eastern plains with no loss of quality. The Mexican
livestock markets in Nueva Vizcaya, particularly Chihuahua and Durango, provided a
commercial outlet for New Mexico’s sheep, which became the colony’s principal
export.12 Background information concerning the sheep raised in New Mexico is given
in Appendix B.
The church was a major factor in sheep growing prior to the Pueblo Revolt. The
friars established missions incorporating large tracts of land devoted to agriculture and
grazing near several of the Pueblo villages. And the civil government awarded grants of
land to the soldier-citizens for farming and stock-raising estancias, a more significant
precursor of future patterns of land tenure.13 Some of this land was forcibly taken from
the Pueblos, launching a continuity of land conflicts. The tremendous outlay of labor
necessary for working these lands, and insuring the survival of the colony, was imposed
upon the Pueblo Indians, enslaved by the Spaniards under the brutal encomienda
system.14 Over time, the livestock population grew, the largest holdings belonging to the
church which reportedly maintained flocks of 1000-2000 head managed by Pueblos.15
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This success proved the viability of large-scale, open-range sheep raising in New Mexico
using peasant or slave labor.
The colony grew slowly but steadily, numerous small settlements and haciendas
being established along the Rio Grande and its tributaries, mostly in the Rio Abajo.16
The capital was located at the site of Santa Fe around 1610. Mexican officials sent
occasional mission-supply caravans north to help sustain the fragile colony, which never
became self sufficient.17 In time, the colony’s herds grew to a point where church and
some civil officials began rather sporadically to export sheep, driving them down the
Camino Real for sale in Mexico.18 By the mid-seventeenth century, the caravans had
expanded and assumed a more commercial character.19 Few private citizens, however,
possessed the capital or the transport capabilities to engage in this trade.20 The principal
market for the sheep at that time was Parral, Mexico, seven-hundred miles south of Santa
Fe, where silver had been discovered in1631. A boom then ensued, and several mines
were quickly opened, drawing together a considerable population of miners. In a scenario
that would recur in future years, local produce was insufficient to meet the increased
demand for meat to feed the miners, hence imports from New Mexico. This livestock
trade, which was tightly controlled by Mexican government contractors to the detriment
of New Mexico producers, apparently grew substantially until the Pueblo Revolt.21 In
some years, the New Mexico sheep producers exported so many animals that the colony’s
mutton supply was seriously depleted.22 As indicated by the magnitude of this trade, the
livestock population of the colony increased considerably in the years 1620-1670.23 The
commercial viability of large-scale, long-distance sheep drives from the colony, across
harsh, dry expanses, to distant markets was established at this time; the large drives
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remained a fixture of the territory’s sheep industry until the arrival of the railroads in the
late nineteenth century. The human population also grew significantly in this
timeframe.24
The Pueblo Revolt caused only a temporary setback for the Spanish colonization
initiative. Since its founding, the colony had been dependent on coerced Indian labor and
was still unable to sustain itself. Not surprisingly, a smoldering conflict between the
colonists and the Pueblos persisted from the time of the colony’s founding.25 Suffering
and angry, the Pueblos, joined by some Apache factions, united briefly in 1680, killed or
took into captivity hundreds of colonists, and drove the rest, about 2000 individuals, out
of New Mexico.26 The survivors fled south to the small Spanish outpost of El Paso,
where they remained in exile for the next twelve years. Many of the Spanish settlers
from the Rio Abajo escaped with their herds, which helped sustain the exiled colony.
The Pueblo alliance did not last long; by 1692, it had fallen into disarray, and the
Spanish, fortified by a well-organized military force, executed a blood-soaked reconquest
of New Mexico of about four years duration.27 All the encomiendas were lost, however,
and the institution was never reestablished.
After the Reconquest, the Spanish leadership under Governor Don Diego de Vargas
quickly repopulated Santa Fe and the haciendas. Several outlying villages in both the Rio
Arriba and Rio Abajo were reoccupied, and the villages of Santa Cruz and Albuquerque
were established.28 The population of the colony was up to about 3,000 individuals by
the year 1700 and growing.29 The colony assumed a more secular character from this
time on. Missions were abandoned, and church leaders’ authority was reduced. The
settlers repopulating the colony were largely private subsistence farmers and stock
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growers, rather than soldiers. The encomienda system, a major cause of the Pueblo
Revolt, was replaced by the less onerous repartimiento.30 Sheep growing resumed
quickly. The invading army confiscated some 900 head of sheep from Cochiti Pueblo as
spoils of war, and the church imported an additional 1,500 sheep and some cattle to
reestablish the mission herds. The governor recruited additional colonists. To fend off
hunger and discourage a repeat of the Pueblo Revolt, the Spanish government provided in
1697 a large consignment of 4000 ewes, 170 goats, 500 cows, and 150 bulls from
Mexico, which the colonial officials allotted to the settlers on the basis of need, most
families receiving from 10-25 ewes and two or three cows.31 Capt. Fernando Duran y
Chaves received 38 ewes, which he drove to Bernalillo where his family had settled
before the revolt. This herd was the seed for a considerable family fortune. Chaves’
descendants would distinguish themselves as soldiers, political leaders, merchants, and
sheepmen.32 At this time, the principle role of the colony shifted to that of a military
buffer region to protect the Mexican interior from raiding nomadic Indians and foreign
incursions, the French colonies in New Orleans and Illinois being sources of particular
anxiety for the Spanish authorities.33
Besides livestock allotments, secular authorities adopted a land policy with long-term
repercussions. Several officers in de Vargas’ force received large tracts of land in
compensation for their military service, while every family received a land allocation of
some size.34 In later years many additional land grants were awarded to prominent, wellconnected individuals and to communities.35 Appendix C describes the basic features of
New Mexico land grants. By 1715, the new social structure, headed by a small, emergent
class of wealthy, patriarchal, land-owning families, was well defined. Several New
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Mexican families destined to be influential in later years, including the Chaves family,
began their rise at this time. These families justified their favored status by claims (true or
not) of pure peninsular Spanish ancestry.36 Wealth, however, was the ultimate basis for
social and economic leadership. It conveyed great honor in Spanish society.37 The elite
intermarried almost exclusively among themselves, maintaining their “Spanish” identity
while building a tight, closed web of mutually beneficial commercial alliances. They
performed almost none of the physical labor required for the colony’s survival. Never
constituting more than a few percent of the population, they came to possess most of the
colony’s wealth, which was primarily its livestock. From the time of the Reconquest
until well after the annexation, a small number of rico families dominated the sheep
industry, their lands recently granted or otherwise inherited. Acknowledged mestizos, the
overwhelming majority of the populace, were restricted by their mixed race to lower
socio-economic status, although many owned or had access to land and possessed a few
head of sheep. At the very bottom of the social order were the genizaros, detribalized,
Christianized Indian slaves, largely Apache, Ute, and Navajo, forcibly removed from
nomadic tribes.38 It has been estimated that by the late eighteenth century, genizaros
constituted one third of the colony’s population.39 Opportunity for social and economic
advancement was limited in colonial society. The pobres bore the brunt of the continuing
Indian raids and food shortages during times of drought.40
Not only were lands and livestock distributed and a new class structure emergent after
the Reconquest, but also a new allocation of labor took place. With forced Pueblo labor
curtailed, most of the colony’s physical work fell to mestizos and genizaros. They were
engaged largely in subsistence farming, working irrigated fields along the river
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bottoms.41 They lived under the protection of the patriarch of the dominant rico family
where they lived, a man they called patron. Some were occupied tending the growing
sheep herds of the rico families, which within a few decades surpassed the size of the
pre-Revolt mission herds.42 Commercial sheep growing was dependent on cheap labor,
such as the pobres provided, throughout the period of open-range grazing, which only
ended in the early twentieth century. The sheep herder’s life during the Spanish-Mexican
period is discussed in Appendix D.
Poor mestizos sometimes fell into debt to their patrones from which they were unable
to extricate themselves. They then became debt-peones and labored henceforth in the
service of the patron, ostensively to pay off their debt. To that end, the peon was credited
a small compensation from which he had also to support himself and his family.43 In an
economy of bare subsistence, one episode of ill fortune, one poor harvest, could send a
man, and by extension his family, into peonage. Freed genizaros may have been
particularly susceptible to this fate.44 It would be an understatement to say that peonage
could be quite oppressive. The institution was open to corruption, exploitation, and
physical abuse.45 Writing in 1893, Charles F. Lummis believed that 80% of New Mexico
Hispanics had once been peones, working for $5.00-8.00/month ($125-200/month in
2010 dollars), and that “peonage in disguise” then still existed.46 The emergence of a
peon class, which dates from the mid-eighteenth century, affected the sheep industry
because these people were sometimes employed herding sheep, their labor essentially
free.47 Their herding skills, and those of Hispanic and Indian pobres in general, came to
be valued by the Anglo sheepmen who emigrated to New Mexico and the Rocky
Mountain West after the Civil War. It is hardly a surprise that many skilled Hispanic
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herders abandoned their patrones and took up wage employment by Anglo sheepmen,
who paid $20-30/month ($500-750/month in 2010 dollars) plus board.
Open-range sheep growing was a land-intensive activity. On the average about five
acres of New Mexico grassland was required to raise a single sheep, although conditions
varied considerably throughout the territory. Individual flocks often contained about
1000 head. Land, therefore, was a major consideration for every sheepman. During the
Spanish and Mexican periods, most of the populated areas fell within land grants,
awarded by the state. Some grants were quite large encompassing several hundred
thousand acres, although their boundaries were generally somewhat indefinite.48 The
grants were situated along rivers or steams, which were used for domestic water needs,
irrigating crops, and, critical for sheep, watering livestock. The bulk of the grant areas,
the uplands extending away from the water courses and the irrigated fields were used
primarily for grazing, but also for hunting and gathering and as a source of rock and
wood. The unclaimed lands beyond the grant boundaries, public domain under the
Spanish and Mexican governments, were sometimes also used for grazing, either
continuously or seasonally. The grants remained intact well into the territorial period and
in a few cases into the twentieth century.
The colony stabilized and grew during the eighteenth century. The census of 1757
gave a population of over 5,000 individuals and nearly 50,000 sheep and goats.49 Over
half the population was congregated in and around the towns of Santa Fe, Albuquerque,
Santa Cruz, and El Paso; the remainder lived at the river haciendas, now grown to
settlements of more or less interrelated families and usually dominated by one or two
comparatively wealthy, sheep-growing patrones. The ricos lived predominantly in the
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Rio Abajo, ever the more prosperous part of New Mexico, where many of the private
grants were located. In contrast, the Rio Arriba was characterized by community grants,
smaller land holdings, and comparatively dense populations of small farmers, so as to
serve most effectively as buffers.
The flocks grew slowly during the years immediately following the Reconquest, a
result of both heavy internal demands upon them for food and frequent Indian raids.
However, treaties served to suppress the devastating Navajo depredations during the first
half of the eighteenth century, and herd expansion accelerated somewhat.50 By the mid1730s, New Mexico’s flocks had multiplied significantly, and the new class of sheepgrowing ricos began, at least sporadically, to export sheep and wool to Mexico.51 In this
timeframe, the trade caravans became annual affairs.52 Chihuahua, settled around 1707
and now the metropolis of New Spain’s northern frontier, was the principal trading
destination, rich silver deposits having been discovered in the area.53 Again, a relatively
concentrated population of miners materialized quickly, and local produce was
insufficient to feed it. New Mexico mutton helped reduce the shortfall. The size of the
New Mexico sheep exports apparently rose more or less steadily, and by the late
eighteenth century the sheep trade with Mexico seems to have been firmly established.54

The Partido System
As the flocks increased in the eighteenth century, labor shortages developed. Sheepowning families with their poorly compensated peon and genizaro herders were
sometimes hard pressed to manage their growing flocks. The growers, moreover,
generally lacked cash to pay their hired hands, their only capital asset being their
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livestock. Necessity drove them to adopt an ancient system of livestock management,
called the partido system in Spanish.55 A livestock leasing arrangement adapted to a
cash-scarce economy with plenty of open rangeland, it was basically a share-cropping
system. The earliest written record of a partido contract in New Mexico dates from
1766 and refers to an agreement made six years earlier.56
Under the partido system in its most basic form, an ambitious but poor man, the
partidario, would essentially rent a flock of sheep from his patron for a fixed period,
typically three to five years. The partidario was required to care for the sheep, often
about 1,000 head, and to return to his patron as rent a fixed number of lambs and wethers
each year, typically 20% of the number of ewes in the flock, and perhaps some fraction of
the annual wool output in later years. The partidario was entitled to retain the remaining
offspring and wool as compensation for his labor.57 For convenience, he might combine
his own small flock with that of his patron. At the end of the contract, the partidario was
required to return to the patron a replacement herd equivalent to the original rented herd,
i.e. the same numbers of ewes and wethers, each of the same ages and condition as the
original flock. If all went well, and this was a big “if” in New Mexico, a partidario
would, over a period of years, build up a significant herd of his own. Don Jose de
Escudero described such a situation as he saw it in 1849: the partidario
could construct a house, and take in other persons to help him care for and
shear the sheep…. The milk and sometimes the meat, from said sheep
provide him sustenance; the wool was spun by his own family into
blankets, stockings etc., which could also be marketed, providing an
income. Thus the wealth of the shepherd would increase until the day
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he became like his overseer, the owner of a herd. He, in turn, would let
out his herds to others after the manner in which he obtained his first
sheep and made his fortune.58
The widespread use of partido contracts over a one-hundred and fifty year period
suggests there may have been some truth in this favorable assessment. In a land where
sheep constituted the largest commercial industry, a partido contract offered one of the
few paths to upward social and economic mobility.
The system favored the patron. The partidario assumed most or all of the risk in
raising the sheep. In a surviving written contract from Bernalillo County in 1882
between patron Cristobal Armijo and partidario Jesus Armijo y Jaramillo and his wife
Altagracia Lucero de Armijo, the partidario received “two thousand new white sheep
without defect” for which he was to pay an annual rent to the owner of 2 lbs. of wool per
head, “clean and in honest conformity to the accepted customs.” He was also to
guarantee the 2000 ewes against all losses except the “invasion from Indians that are at
war against the United States.” As collateral for the loan of the ewes, Armijo y Jaramillo
was required to mortgage his “property, houses, lands, goods and furniture both present
and future, until the end of the last payment and to its fulfillment.”59 One harsh winter
storm or one devastating Indian raid might severely diminish or completely destroy a
leased flock, wiping out an entire years increase or worse. If the partidario was unable to
meet his obligations to his patron, he was liable to fall into debt peonage.60 It was the
opinion of Charles Lummis, on the basis of information he gathered in the late nineteenth
century, that this was the norm rather than the exception, and partidarios were almost
always reduced to peones. In his pessimistic view, this was the mechanism by which
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New Mexico society “…gradually fell apart into two classes—sheep owners and sheeptenders.”61 Whatever the case truly was, becoming a partidario was a calculated risk at
best. The practice served sheep owners well. In 1819, Bartolome Baca had 8000 sheep
out under contracts, providing him a yearly income of 1,500 pesos ($27,000 in 2010
dollars).62 For a pobre, it might have been a way to make a decent living, but it was
definitely not an easy path to upward mobility.
Through the years following the Civil War, when the sheep industry expanded rapidly
and genizaro and peon labor again became scarce, the partido system flourished and was
adopted in modified form by Anglo sheep growers and merchants. Acting, in part, as
patrones for the territory’s numerous small-scale sheep growers, Anglo mercantile
capitalists employed the system, much like their Hispanic forebears, to secure skilled
herders cheaply, while shifting the risk of actually raising sheep off their own shoulders
and onto their partidarios.

Improved Conditions
Living conditions in New Mexico seem to have improved somewhat by the beginning
of the nineteenth century, although successes were tempered with some failures. The
population of the colony in 1802 was reported to be 35,751, mostly farmers in the Rio
Grande Valley.63 By this time, however, the Pueblo population had been reduced by
multiple causes, including European diseases, to about 9,500, a quarter of its preConquest level so the Hispanics now greatly outnumbered the Pueblos.64 Sheep exports
increased markedly after about 1785. Some sheep were driven as far as Mexico City
where the price doubled between 1794 and 1809.65
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Markets in the towns of Sonora,

Coahuila, and Durango opened.
Governor Fernando de la Concha estimated that 15,000 New Mexico sheep were sold
in Chihuahua in 1788 for about 30,000 pesos ($540,000 in 2010 dollars).66

This figure

is corroborated by 1794 church documents indicating that 15,000-20,000 sheep were
being trailed south annually, with the numbers ranging up to 25,000 some years. Nine
years later, in his economic report of 1803, Gov. Chacon stated that 25,000-26,000 sheep
were being exported annually.67 A measure of economic advancement in the colony
during the eighteenth century is provided by the 1785 probate records for Don Clemente
Gutierrez, known as the King of the Chihuahua Traders. His estate included 7,000
yearlings and two-year olds being held for sale, 6,600 more sheep purchased from
neighboring ranchers for fall delivery, and another 13,000 ewes held under partido
contracts with twenty-four Rio Abajo citizens.68 Nevertheless, the colony was still not
self-sustaining and ran an annual trade deficit with Mexico.69 Sheep alleviated New
Mexico’s poverty, but did not eliminate it. Long of major importance to New Mexico’s
internal economy, they had yet to dominate the trade with Mexico, textiles and hides still
being more important. This soon changed.
By the early nineteenth century, the trade caravans had become well-organized annual
affairs. The New Mexico commerciantes congregated with their livestock and other trade
goods loaded on carretas and pack mules at La Joya de Sevilleta, the last Spanish
settlement north of the Jornada del Muerto, for departure in November.70 The caravans
now incorporated typically five-hundred men, including a military escort.71 The sheep,
however, were owned by a small handful of merchants. And the internal trade of New
Mexico, which included sale of the imports, was controlled by the rather small base of
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only 12-14 comerciantes.72
The sheep drives were not uniformly profitable for the New Mexicans because the
Spanish-born Chihuahua middlemen with whom they had to deal maintained a tight trade
monopoly and held sheep prices low. Some New Mexico traders became deeply indebted
to Mexican merchants who had advanced them credit against future deliveries. The
Chihuahua market also could be treacherous because of large, unpredictable price
fluctuations that could wipe out a New Mexican’s profit margin or worse. Additional
problems included misunderstandings of business agreements, sharp business practices,
and outright theft, all reflected in eighteenth-century litigation described in surviving
documents.73 The New Mexicans, continually buffeted by difficult market conditions
operated as best they could under the existing system; they were truly never in a position
to change it. Fortunately for them, the demand for sheep increased in the late eighteenth
century and into the early nineteenth century. A small group of New Mexico traders, the
smartest or luckiest, managed not only to stay out of debt but to realize substantial
profits.74
Farmers constituted the largest sector of the colony’s population, and by the early
nineteenth century their crops of wheat, corn, barley, and vegetables provided the citizens
a marginal self-sufficiency in food. But the great distances between population centers
combined with poor roads and a lack of adequate transport capabilities discouraged
agriculture on a commercial scale. The shortage of irrigable, defendable farm land,
insufficient labor and capital, and the persistence of Indian depredations were added
limiting factors.75 Agriculture never matured beyond the subsistence level in preannexation New Mexico. Sheep growing did not have the drawbacks of agriculture since

33

large flocks could be produced and profitably driven to distant markets. Towards the end
of the territorial period, a wave of immigrant Anglo farmers introduced commercial
agriculture for the first time, cf. chap. 10.
By the early nineteenth century, sheep became an external trade item of considerable
importance.76 About twenty elite families dominated the colonial economy, several being
engaged in the Mexican trade. Pino’s data indicate that the wealthy trading families,
controlled over 25% of the export trade considering sheep alone and perhaps much more
considering all other commodities.77 They traded imported goods with the Pueblos and
the general colonial population in exchange for their produce. They extended credit to
the cash-poor pobres against future deliveries of their crops and livestock, which were
sometimes pledged several seasons in advance, reducing some of those struggling
growers to peonage.78 The ricos’ ascent was expedited by the recognition of sheep as a
medium of exchange, capital on the hoof, as little hard currency was in circulation. All
items of merchandise in the colony were valued according to the number of sheep for
which they would trade.79 Dowries often took the form of livestock, entirely or in part.80
The small group of rancher-merchants that dominated the livestock trade was its primary
beneficiary. Conditions changed slowly for the remainder of the Spanish period. New
Mexico society was conservative, closed to outside influences, and largely ignored by an
overextended, decaying Spanish empire. The sharp rico-pobre class distinction, believed
more extreme than it had been before the Pueblo Revolt, became a defining feature of life
in New Mexico from the latter eighteenth through the nineteenth century. Against this
background, a substantial livestock population and a strong tradition of sheep husbandry
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were established, one of the Spanish colony’s most important legacies.

The Mexican Period, 1821-1846
Mexico won its independence from Spain in 1821 after a decade of instability and
armed conflict. Little is known about New Mexico commerce during this period. The
Camino Real trade definitely decreased overall and the Chihuahua sheep market
collapsed.81 Without the outlet provided by the Mexican market, New Mexico’s sheep
population increased dramatically. A livestock census conducted in 1827 gave a total of
240,000 sheep and goats in the colony, with 155,000 in the Albuquerque area, 62,000 in
the Santa Fe area, and 23,000 in the Santa Cruz area. In addition to the sheep, the colony
had 5,000 cattle, 2,150 mules, and 850 horses. The sheep were valued in New Mexico at
4 reales/head (about 50 cents), about half the value in Mexico during good times, and
accordingly constituted 54% of the total livestock valuation.82 The Rio Abajo became
firmly established as the colony’s dominant sheep-growing region. Sheep now
constituted an important source of income for those families living above the subsistence
level.
Under the new central government in Mexico City, the colony, never accorded much
government support, experienced even greater neglect than in the past. Political,
economic, and military unrest were endemic throughout the Mexican period. The
inadequate colonial military force was reduced, to the detriment of public safety. Peace
with the Navajos had ended in 1818, a particular blow to sheepmen whose flocks they
raided with regularity thereafter.83 Indian depredations intensified generally after 1821
when the impoverished Mexican government discontinued annual annuities to the

35

nomadic tribes.84 The wherewithal for violence increased in the following years when
American traders began selling guns and powder to the Indians.
While living conditions deteriorated, a tax revolt in 1837 turned into an all-out
insurrection. The insurectos murdered several government officials, including the
governor, and in the aftermath, Manuel Armijo, a shrewd, murderous thug, seized the
governorship. Later in 1841, a poorly-organized military force from the Republic of
Texas, intent on annexing New Mexico’s land area east of the Rio Grande, invaded the
colony. Armijo’s forces quickly captured the invaders and marched them to Mexico
City. The legacy of this brief incident had far-reaching consequences. At this time, most
New Mexicans took up a deep and lasting hatred for Texans, a sentiment that survives in
vestigial form down to the present. For their part the Texans already despised Mexicans,
a legacy of the Alamo and the Texas War of Independence from Mexico. The antipathy
stoked by the invasion helped keep New Mexico in the Union during the Civil War when
Texans, this time as part of the Confederate Army, invaded once again.85 Following the
Civil War, the Texas-New Mexico enmity contributed to the range conflict between cattle
and sheep interests, the sheep herders being Hispanic, and the cowboys being largely
Anglos from Texas.
After Mexican independence, New Mexico sheepmen faced the same, or even greater,
difficulties. On the large sheep drives to Mexico, trail expenses for the herders’ food and
compensation, such as it was, were significant, as in the past. And losses of stock from
poisonous weeds and bad water along the way were, likewise, expensive. For a period of
years starting in 1832, the Mexican government imposed onerous taxes on imported
livestock to the detriment of New Mexican ranchers.86 The government exacerbated the
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business climate by introducing high import duties on merchandise and a complicated
system of internal passports and shipping manifests. Those merchants caught without the
necessary papers, as determined by capricious government officials, were subject to
heavy fines, or even confiscation of their shipment.87 As in the past, many New Mexico
sheepmen were deeply indebted to Mexican merchant-middlemen. In otherwise good
years, their profits might be wiped out when a creditor called in long-standing debts.
Sometimes, the merchants foreclosed on entire herds to cover such debts, leaving the
New Mexican sheepmen with nothing to take back home. Also, large, unpredictable
price fluctuations in the Mexican sheep markets remained a perennial problem. In bad
years, the markets might be glutted so that there was no demand at all for New Mexico’s
sheep.88 An altogether unbalanced situation favoring the Mexican merchants prevailed.
Remarkably, the sheep industry not only survived but flourished during much of the
republican period. By the early 1830s, New Mexico sheepmen were delivering 15,000
head annually to Durango alone, selling them at nine reales/head. Mariano Chaves (y
Castillo), whose ancestor had received a substantial sheep allotment from de Vargas, set a
pre-annexation record for a single individual when he drove 30,000 head to Durango in
1832. The trade expanded so quickly that in 1835 alone 80,000 sheep were exported to
Mexico, almost half belonging to the Chaves family.89 Thereafter, prices and trade
volume fluctuated widely. For the remainder of the Mexican era, sheep prices in Mexico
never exceeding four reales/head. Nevertheless, between 1835 and 1840, New Mexicans
requested permits (guias) to export at least 204,000 head to Mexico. And into the
early1840s, New Mexicans appear to have been exporting 30,000-50,000 head in the
better years.90 About two thirds of these belonged to members of the Chaves, Otero, and
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Sandoval families, while most of the rest belonged to four other prominent families –
Ortiz, Pino, Perea, and Armijo.91 In total, only twenty-eight sheep owners from sixteen
families delivered substantial herds during this period.92 The United States-Mexico War
ended the Camino Real sheep drives, but high market volatility would remain a
characteristic feature of the New Mexico sheep industry throughout the territorial period.
Between 1826 and 1846, a total of some 400,000 head valued at about 200,000 pesos
were driven to Mexico. This constituted 47% of the measurable export value for the
period, enumerated by Boyle to be 422,907.71 pesos. The bulk of the merchants after
1832 were, however, small-scale businessmen, trading in a wide variety of New Mexican
and Indian products. They controlled only10% of the total trade, which, spread out
broadly and thinly as it was, benefited many New Mexican families more than the sheep
trade.93 Sheep did provide employment as herders for some New Mexico pobres, but
their compensation was always small.94 Partidarios, and other small producers might on
occasion sell a few head of their own to their patron to be driven south. Santa Fe trader
Josiah Gregg reported that the patrones paid these men 50-75 cents per head and sold the
stock in Mexico at 100%-200% profit.95
Class distinctions became even more pronounced. If only a handful of ricos profited
from the sheep business, at the opposite end of the social scale, peonage grew during the
Mexican period.96 Many Pueblo Indians and freed genizaros employed on haciendas and
ranchos fell into peonage.97 Large pobre families often lived in single-room adobe
dwellings, spending much of their lives out of doors, while extended rico families lived
in the relative comfort of sparsely-furnished three or four room structures. Genizaro
slavery persisted, although slavery had been outlawed by Mexico in 1824.98 The growing

38

New Mexico sheep industry rested, if anything, on an even narrower foundation than
during the Spanish period. With the opening of the Santa Fe Trail, new commercial
opportunities opened up for New Mexicans. Some Rio Abajo ricos entered the Santa Fe
trade and used the profits to purchase more grazing land, expanding further their large
sheep operations. More capital came into circulation. The most successful families grew
richer, a very few new families rose to prominence, while the great majority of New
Mexicans continued to live at the subsistence level.99
At the time of the annexation, the Hispanic population was roughly 50,000.100 Had
the colony’s entire sheep population at the time, estimated at about 377,000, been
distributed uniformly among its citizenry, each individual would have owned seven or
eight head, valued at no more than $4.00-6.00 ($120-180 in 2010 dollars).101 Sheep
being a major basis of the colony’s wealth, such as it was, New Mexico was clearly still
too poor to support a substantial middle class. Nor were the flocks numerous enough to
support a large dedicated work force, since a single, skilled herder and his dog could
readily tend 1,000 head. Year-around employment of as much as 1% of the Hispanic
population, be they partidarios, peones, or genizaros, would have been more than
sufficient. Most of the colonists were primarily engaged in subsistence farming.
During the Spanish and Mexican periods, sheep were raised on grant lands or
adjoining public domain, an arrangement that persisted after the annexation until the
1870s or later. During the Mexican period, these grazing lands continued to be owned or
controlled in large part by ricos, a result of government favoritism in the awarding of
land grants to the well-connected elite. This land policy surely limited more widespread
sheep ownership than would otherwise have been the case, an unintended
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consequence.102 This was particularly true in the late Mexican period when Gov. Armijo
awarded a few immense private grants to a handful of influential citizens.
If the government land distribution policy discouraged more widespread participation
in sheep ownership, Indian depredations stood in the way of further expansion of the
industry under any conditions. Writing in 1832, Licenciado Don Antonio Barriero noted:
The thousands of sheep raised in this territory have no parallel in the
republic [Mexico]. This stock increases from day to day in an incredible
manner. It may be said that, if New Mexico can establish a permanent
peace with the wild Indians, and if it will provide its people with knowledge
of the most advantageous methods of trading in sheep, the province will
prosper from the income of this branch of industry alone as much as
Chihuahua has profited from that of her mines. Happy the day when the
government will extend its protecting hand to this territory; then these fields,
at present uninhabited and desolate, will be converted into rich and happy
sheep ranches!103
The Mexican government, lacking in revenues and in a more or less continuous state of
chaos, never acted on Barriero’s suggestions. Later under American sovereignty, his
conditions were met with the help of the comparatively well-funded, well-equipped U.S.
Army. The dramatic expansion of the sheep industry throughout the Rocky Mountains
and Great Plains in the late nineteenth century was greatly expedited by the opening of
extensive areas beyond the territory’s borders, newly pacified by the army. And New
Mexico, aside from very significant moral considerations, indeed benefited from a
considerably expanded sheep industry. In the mean time it was not unusual for settled
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grants to be abandoned, at least temporarily, on account of Indian depredations.104 New
Mexican merchants insured that Indian attacks were rarely a problem on the Camino Real
because the caravans were large, incorporating hundreds of men, armed and ready to
defend themselves and their merchandise, not an option otherwise.
Through the entire quarter century when they controlled New Mexico, distracted
Mexican leaders, overwhelmed by serious internal problems, made no attempt to promote
New Mexico’s sheep industry. If anything, the opposite was the case. Onerous trade
regulations and restrictions, inadequate military protection, and restrictive land
distribution all conspired to suppress the full potential of the industry. The annexation
introduced a new economic order that removed these road blocks and enabled the
industry to evolve and grow at an unprecedented rate.

Sheep and Expansion of the Hispanic Homeland
Starting in the 1790s, Hispanic New Mexico underwent nearly a century of expansion
beyond the confines of the Rio Grande and its tributaries. A few words about that
expansion are in order here, since it was often led by sheepmen.105 Several factors
underlie this movement, which had long-term cultural consequences.106 One important
factor was the need for outlying, settled buffer areas to shield the older settlements, with
their growing populations, from nomadic raiders. However, population increase was
ultimately the critical factor. It had created a shortage of the essential waterfront sites for
settlers in established villages. Simultaneously, the growth of the flocks along with the
population had demanded that more sheep be placed on the grazing lands then in use.
However, good grazing areas were shrinking as the need for them increased. Nearly two
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centuries of grazing on the older grant lands had left many of those areas depleted of
forage, diminishing their stock-carrying capacity.107 It was thus imperative that new
lands be opened for settlement.
Sheepmen were attracted by the fine, seemingly limitless grazing lands with adequate
water in outlying, unsettled areas, hence their leadership of the expansion. However, the
nomadic tribes that occupied and used the lands for hunting and gathering resisted the
expansion and sometimes drove the intruders away.108 The expansion was thus was
controlled by a contest between the attraction of desirable new lands, essential for the
continued development of the northern Hispanic colony, and the resistance mounted by
the nomadic tribes, who’s survival was threatened.109 The Hispanics prevailed more
often than not. The expansion was generally expedited by an extended period of relative
peace starting in 1790 after twelve years of bloody warfare with the Apaches and
Comanches.110
In a pattern that repeated itself many times, the sheepmen would first move their
flocks on a seasonal basis to promising outlying public lands. After they became
convinced that those lands could be adequately defended, families in need of new homes
would relocate and establish permanent villages in the area. Eventually, many of these
new grazing areas would be incorporated in land grants, a step which formalized and
systematized the existing occupancy.111 On account of the large sheep holdings, the
partido system flourished on these newer grants. The first lands so settled were the
plains on the east side of the Sangre de Cristo Mountains in the Pecos River watershed,
areas in today’s San Miguel and Mora Counties. Particularly significant was the
establishment around 1803 of San Miguel del Vado, a community grant on the Pecos
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encompassing rich grazing lands. San Miguel, in turn, served as a staging area for the
establishment of several new satellite villages, Las Vegas in particular, sheepmen ever in
the vanguard. Freed genizaros constituted a significant component of the early
community grantees in the outlying areas.112 The expansion extended as far west as the
Bartolome Fernandez or San Miguel Grant, which had been awarded as early as 1767, on
the slopes of Mt. Taylor (called Mt. San Miguel by the Spanish).113 Ultimately the
expansion extended north into what became Southern Colorado.
The sheep industry evolved slowly during the Spanish-Mexican period and was
seemingly poised to persist indefinitely into the future with little change. Instead it would
be turned on its head by American growers and mercantile capitalists who began arriving
in New Mexico following Mexican independence from Spain. The influence of the first
Americans to settle in New Mexico is described in the following chapter.
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Chapter 3
The Americans Arrive, 1807-1860

The arrival of Americans brought great changes to New Mexico. The sheep industry
was an area that underwent a particularly dramatic evolution during the sixty-six years of
the territorial era that followed the annexation, and it was an important vehicle in drawing
New Mexico into the American economy. However, the incorporation of today’s
Southwest into the United States, sometimes thought to date from the military conquest
of New Mexico in 1846, had, in fact, begun on the economic front twenty-five years
earlier when the northern colony was opened to foreign trade under a newly-independent
Mexico. Prior to that, under Spanish sovereignty, trade between Mexico and the United
States was banned except through the tightly controlled port of Vera Cruz, nearly 2000
miles from Santa Fe. Foreigners apprehended in Spanish territory were subject to arrest,
imprisonment, and confiscation of their property. With the relaxation of trade restrictions
following Mexican independence, American fur trappers and traders, merchants, and
ultimately stockmen began arriving in New Mexico, their numbers and influence
increasing steadily throughout the Mexican period. This American presence did much to
pave the way for the military conquest that followed. Developments that would
ultimately transform the New Mexico sheep industry began to unfold during the Mexican
period. Communications and commerce with eastern U.S. markets were established,
foreign trade routes began to shift from North-South to East-West, and a handful of
Americans saw and began to appreciate the grazing potential of New Mexico.
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Pike, Beaubien, and Maxwell
The American experience in New Mexico dates back to an even earlier time,
however, when a small U.S. military reconnaissance mission under Lieut. Zebulon
Montgomery Pike was tasked with finding the headwaters of the Arkansas River and
learning something of the Spanish presence in the region. The party was discovered by a
Spanish militia detachment in 1807, taken into captivity, and marched to Santa Fe and
then on to Chihuahua for interrogation. Except for a few obscure lone adventurers, Pike
and his men were the first Americans to see New Mexico and report what they saw.1
Along the way south on the Camino Real, Pike observed a trade caravan destined for
Mexico which included 15,000 sheep. He conveyed this information back to Washington
in a comprehensive report which noted the importance of sheep in New Mexico’s
economy and estimated, accurately as it turned out, that 30,000 animals valued at
$1.00/head were being exported annually to Mexico, cf. chap. 2.2 It is difficult to assess
the impact of Pike’s reconnaissance, but it must have suggested to some Americans that
New Mexico was worth further consideration. According to Prince, the report generated
“much interest throughout the west,” and many men in the western border lands of the
United States became interested in retracing Pike’s path.3 Fergusson asserts that “The
real westward movement began after Pike’s book was published.”4
After the region was opened to U.S. trade, a small number of Americans, French
Canadians, and other foreign-born adventurer-entrepreneurs soon found their way into
New Mexico. These men were largely part of a wave of fur trappers, “mountain men,”
who had been operating in the Northern Rockies since days of Lewis and Clark. Around
the time New Mexico came under Mexican sovereignty, they began expanding their
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operations to exploit the untapped fur resources of the Southern Rockies. Native New
Mexicans had not previously developed a fur trade for lack of a satisfactory market to the
south.5 The Americans, however, had connections with St. Louis merchant-investors,
who in turn had connections with European markets. Many Anglo trappers established
their headquarters in the northern gateway town of Taos. And within a few years, Santa
Fe became an important base for traders dealing in an ever broadening range of wares,
although some men engaged in both fur trapping and trade.6 By 1840, a few hundred
American men are believed to have been living in New Mexico. Some of these men took
out Mexican citizenship, converted to Catholicism, married into prominent Hispanic
families, and became influential in public affairs. With their access to American markets,
their influence far exceeded their numbers. Anglo-American sheepmen and merchants
would later benefit similarly from their eastern connections. A few of the Anglo
newcomers became landowners and entered the livestock business, a move motivated by
the depletion of the fur resources after the 1830s and the collapse of the European fur
market.7
Some of the more enterprising Americans took advantage of a new land policy which
allowed foreigners who had taken up Mexican citizenship to partner with a native New
Mexican and apply for a private land grant. Several such private grants, some very
large, were awarded during the final years of Mexican sovereignty under Gov. Manuel
Armijo.8 These grants gave Americans their first foothold in New Mexico land
ownership.
The first of these grants was awarded in 1841 to Guadalupe Miranda, Gov. Armijo’s
collector of customs and Provincial Secretary of State, and French-Canadian Charles
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(Carlos) Beaubien, a prominent Taos merchant and one time mountain man.9 The
immense Beaubien-Miranda (Maxwell) Land Grant came to encompass some 1,700,000
acres northeast of Taos, straddling today’s Colorado-New Mexico border.10 The grantees
populated the grant with a combination of sharecroppers, day laborers, and peones.11
From the outset the area was apparently used for grazing, as it had been even before the
grant existed. The grantees introduced large permanent herds of sheep and cattle. The
exact nature of Beaubien’s participation in these grazing activities is unclear; for his part
Miranda was never more than a passive partner. However, Beaubien’s son-in-law, Lucian
B. Maxwell, acting as his majordomo, managed the agricultural and grazing resources of
the grant. He, with the support of his father-in-law, built a considerable frontier empire,
as the economy of the region expanded after the annexation.12 In the years after his
father-in-law’s death in 1864, he acquired the entire grant, which thereafter became
known as the Maxwell Land Grant, one of the largest estates, perhaps the largest, in the
United States at the time.13 Eventually, the grant grew to a population, by some
estimates, of five-hundred pobladores (settlers).14 Maxwell came to possess some 50,000
sheep, 10,000 cattle, 1,000 horses and mules, and farmed 5000 acres.15 By 1868, he had
an annual income of $50,000 ($800,000 in 2010 dollars), making him one of the
wealthiest men in New Mexico Territory.16 Maxwell assumed a role of patron, more or
less indistinguishable, except for his extraordinary success, from his Hispanic, grantholding cohorts. The key to his rise in wealth, social status, and influence was his 1844
marriage to Carlos Beaubien’s mixed-race, teenage daughter Luz.17 In the business
world, family connections were all important, and such intermarriages between Anglo
men and Hispanic women could, from a purely commercial standpoint, be quite
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beneficial to everyone concerned. The Anglo provided his Hispanic relatives needed
business know-how and access to American markets, while they, in turn, provided him a
bridge to the local agricultural and livestock supply network.18 In later years, however,
such dependence on family connections would place Hispanic stock growers at a
competitive disadvantage. But in the 1840s, American social influence was minimal.
Spanish customs were well adapted to the isolated lands, the people, the cash-scarce
economy, and the livestock production on the grants. Like his Hispanic cohorts, Maxwell
employed the partido system, mediated by a web of personal relationships, to raise his
livestock. He conducted his livestock operations on a barter and cash basis, without
recourse to bank loans, credit, or outside investors.19
Besides the the Maxwell Grant, other similarly large grants, awarded in 1843, were
the 1,000,000-acre Sangre de Cristo Grant in Colorado, awarded to Steven Luis Lee and
Carlos Beaubien’s mixed-race son, Narcisco, the 4,000,000-acre Las Animas Grant,
awarded to Taos fur trader-merchant Ceran St. Vrain and Cornelio Vigil, and the
1,000,000-acre Rio Don Carlos Grant awarded to French-Canadian Gervacio Nolan.20
Maxwell and his cohorts were the first Anglo stock growers in New Mexico.21
The Santa Fe Trade
At the same time that American fur traders were establishing outposts in New
Mexico, Americans on another front opened a general merchandise trade that would
impact the sheep industry even more directly.22 Their development of a trade route
between Santa Fe and St. Louis, the Santa Fe Trail, was an important precondition for the
expansion of New Mexico’s sheep industry. It became the principal conduit for
transporting the territory’s wool to eastern mills and remained so until the arrival of the
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railroads in the 1880s.
What came to be known as the Santa Fe trade started in 1821 when a pack train under
William Becknell out from Missouri and laden with goods intended for the Plains Indian
trade ended up by chance in New Mexico. The Americans sold their merchandise for a
handsome profit and returned to Missouri with news of a lucrative new market for
American manufactured goods.23 Mercantile flood gates between New Mexico and the
United States cracked open, and caravans of heavy, Pennsylvania-built freight wagons
were soon traversing the relatively easy, 800-mile trail.24
In the first years of the trade, the final destination was usually Taos, but that soon
shifted to Santa Fe. The Americans exchanged textiles, hardware, and liquor for the
traditional efectos del pais, but also livestock (oxen, horses and mules from California,
c.f. chap. 3.) and Mexican silver and gold.25 During the early years of the Santa Fe trade,
merchants began experimenting with wool as a backhaul, cf. chap. 4, providing the first
western wool to northeastern mills and giving birth to an industry that would grow to
major proportions in the Rocky Mountain-Great Plains region.
Relations with the United States were strictly commercial during the Mexican period.
The trade proved quite profitable for some, growing more than hundred-fold from an
annual value of $15,000 in 1831 to about $1,750,000 in 1846 ($50,000,000 in 2010
dollars), eventually providing employment for 5,000 men, 1,500 wagons, and over
17,200 horses, mules, and oxen.26 In the first years, fairly large shipments were
necessary to realize significant profits, limiting opportunities for those without substantial
capital backing.
Well positioned and well prepared to assume an important role in New Mexico’s
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commerce, the Santa Fe traders, had access to a broad range of American markets
through their business connections in Missouri. Besides being rugged frontiersmen,
some were reasonably well educated and possessed considerable communication skills.
Like Beaubien and Maxwell, they established mutually profitable business and social
connections with New Mexico’s elite, while they coupled, however weakly, the Mexican
province (later department) to the U.S. economy for the first time. Just as in the case of
the Taos fur trappers, some settled in New Mexico, assimilated into Hispanic society, and
became land owners.27 New Mexican ricos who had been dedicated to the Mexican trade
expanded their operations as the Trail opened up new opportunities. At first, a few native
New Mexican merchants joined in the growing trade on a small scale. Then, in the late
1830s, a substantial number became significantly involved, sometimes dealing directly
with wholesale suppliers on the East Coast, an initiative due in part to the decline in
Mexican sheep prices after 1836, cf. chap. 2. A few men who had prospered driving
sheep to Chihuahua made even larger fortunes in the Santa Fe trade.28 The base of
participation was, however, narrow in the sense that five families conducted 80% of the
Hispanic trade.29
If the Santa Fe trade was lucrative for some merchants, it was far less so for the great
majority of workers in their employ, many of whom were Hispanic. A skilled Anglo
mule packer was paid $25-30/month, while his Missouri-based employer might be
transporting tens of thousands of dollars worth of merchandise, to be sold at a
considerable profit. The Anglo merchant-traders paid their Hispanic packers at a lower
rate for the same work, typically about $15/month, although those men came to be highly
regarded for their skills and did most of the packing throughout much of the West.30 The
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Hispanic laborers were undoubtedly happy to have the work, even at the lower pay scale.
In comparison, as late as the 1860s, Hispanic merchants paid their employees only $68/month and sometimes much less, still an attractive wage. A peon living on a grant and
indebted to his patron might be credited with 2-5 pesos/month for his labor, usually the
lower figure, while a peon herder might receive even less than 2 pesos/month.31
Economic opportunity was largely limited to well-capitalized Anglo merchants and those
well-connected ricos, who owned or controlled large tracts of land and large herds of
sheep.32 The huge divide between laborer and owner was a constant and carried over into
the sheep industry as it evolved through the territorial period. And skilled Hispanic
herders often found the most lucrative employment with Anglo sheep ranchers.
The Santa Fe trade grew steadily for most of the Mexican period, a time of transition
during which New Mexico was importing goods from both the United States and Mexico,
but exporting sheep only to Mexico. For a brief period, St. Louis and Chihuahua
merchants were in close competition, the Missouri traders gradually breaking the
Mexican monopoly, with their cheaper, superior merchandise.33
Significantly, during this same period New Mexico’s rico families began sending
their sons east to American Catholic schools rather than south to Durango to complete
their education.34 This was critical for future success in business, law, and politics.
Fluency in English, the ability to move freely and easily in American society, a thorough
understanding of fee-simple land tenure and modern banking practices were all facilitated
by an American education. Such skills would be essential for successful large-scale
sheep ranching during the territorial period. Conversely, the general lack of educational
opportunities deterred the development of a broad Hispanic middle class in New Mexico
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and, particularly, the full participation of native stockmen in a sheep industry of
increasing sophistication, even as opportunities for sheep growing expanded.

Military Occupation
New Mexico’s nearly insuperable difficulties extended from the social, political, and
military fronts into the commercial arena. Impoverished Mexico did nothing to promote
commercial development and could not protect its citizens in the remote northern areas.
Under Mexico, widespread prosperity was simply out of reach. The pobladores to their
credit had built a cohesive, functioning society under nearly impossible conditions. The
growth of the sheep industry despite the barriers it faced is testament to the extraordinary
sheep-growing resources, both natural and human, of the northern settlements. But
conditions in New Mexico were about to change, much to the benefit of the sheep
industry. A new era for New Mexico began in the summer of 1846 with the arrival of the
U.S. “Army of the West” under Col. Steven Watts Kearny and the military occupation of
the Mexican department, the next phase of a conquest that had begun on the economic
front twenty-five years earlier. This is not to say that life in New Mexico changed much
in the early years of the American soverignity that followed. It did not, although the
Santa Fe trade continued to expand, particularly as the Mexican import taxes disappeared.
It was an easy victory for the American forces. After twenty-five years of political chaos,
inadequate military protection, ownerous trade restrictions, and general neglect, most
New Mexicans had lost any sense of allegiance to the Mexican government.35 Initiating
the five-year military occupation, Kearny imposed civil order, established a provisional,
if largely powerless, civil government and a legal system based on Anglo-American
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common law. Significantly, he promised New Mexicans that land ownership under
Spanish and Mexican sovereignty would be honored, a promise directly relevant to the
vast grazing tracts within the existing land grants and, by extension, the sheep industry.
This condition was incorporated into the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo of 1848 that ended
the United States-Mexico War.36
The annexation of New Mexico, and the large area that became the American
Southwest, under the treaty was a critical factor in opening vast new markets for New
Mexican produce, sheep and wool in particular, although this development advanced
slowly. More immediately, the presence of the U.S. Army, and the numerous outposts it
established, benefitted native New Mexicans by providing markets for a wide range of
local produce. Further afield, the mining districts of California and Colorado provided
important markets for sheep in the early years of American sovereignty. The integration
of New Mexico into the U.S. economy that the Santa Fe trade had begun in a small way
received an added impetus in the interwar years with the arrival of an emergent class of
professional mercantile capitalists who would deal in sheep and wool on a considerably
larger scale than in the past. Otherwise, except for a handful of stockmen, the territory
attracted few immigrants due to its lack of gold or silver, its well-deserved reputation for
Indian depredations, and its scarcity of arable land, the most desirable tracts having been
long since taken up by the pobladores.
Americans who did come to New Mexico were quick to recognize the importance of
sheep in the local economy. The sheep industry had grown considerably between its
seventeenth-century inception and the time of the annexation. And with its large sheep
population, the future territory became, by default, an important center of America’s
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western sheep industry, to be joined by California a decade or more later. (To assist
discussions throughout this work, the population of New Mexico versus time is plotted in
Fig. 3.1; and the Sheep and Cattle Populations are plotted similarly in Fig. 3.2.) In his
military reconnaissance report on Gen. Kearney’s traversal of New Mexico, Lieut. W.H.
Emory, Kearny’s chief engineer officer, noted the importance of sheep and stated his
belief that fine sheep-growing conditions existed throughout New Mexico.37 Ten
thousand copies of Emory’s report, combined with a couple of other related reports, were
printed by the Government Printing Office. Secretary of War William L. Marcy
employed the report to argue for, and secure, the inclusion of New Mexico in the
southwestern lands that were annexed by the United States.38 At the time of the American
invasion, however, livestock growing conditions were deplorable.
The entry of Kearny’s army gave rise to the first systematic documentation of New
Mexico’s state of security since the reports of Pino (1812) and Barreiro (1836). The
Americans found an extremely unsettled situation. The nomadic tribes, desperate to
retain control of their traditional hunting grounds, were severely harassing the villagers,
threatening both their public safety and their livestock herds. During the Spanish and
Mexican periods, Indians had killed, or taken captive, many pastores and their families
and driven off innumerable sheep, cf. chap. 2.39 At the time of the annexation, sheep
herding seems to have been more dangerous than ever. The prevalence and seriousness of
the Indian depredations is described in Emory’s report. When the U.S. Army marched
through Las Vegas in 1846, the villagers reported to the officers that “120 sheep and
other stock” had been stolen a few days earlier, either by Utes or Navajos. A few days
after that, a villager was murdered by Indians. Some weeks later, by which time
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Fig. 3.1. Total Population of New Mexico versus Year. The population increased at a
somewhat accelerated rate after 1880 and the arrival of the railroads. The population
increase was even more rapid after 1900 due significantly to the arrival of homesteaders
from the East. Data are taken from U.S. Census, 1850-1920.
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Fig. 3.2. New Mexico Livestock Populations versus Year. Series 1: Sheep.
Series 2: Cattle. The sheep population reached a maximum of over five-million in
the early 1880s, largely churros, and decreased thereafter to around three-million, as
smaller herds of bred up stock became favored. The sheep population always
substantially exceeded the cattle population. Data for 1850 are taken from U.S. Census,
1850, which is not considered particularly reliable. Data for 1860 are taken from U.S.
Census, 1900, which revised the data from U.S. Census, 1860. This is probably
reasonably reliable. Data for 1867 – 1920 are taken from New Mexico Agricultural
Statistics, 44. This report contains the most reliable data now available.
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the army was near Isleta Pueblo, Navajos attacked a nearby village and “killed one man,
crippled another, and carried off a large supply of sheep and cattle.” In an altercation
with the Indians shortly thereafter, six pobledores were killed and two wounded. A few
days later and further south, the Army passed through a town in which “all the horses and
cattle” had been stolen by Apaches the day before. A few weeks before that, the same
band was said to have attacked a village further north, taking both horses and fifteen or
sixteen women.40
In the years immediately following the annexation, a small U.S. military force
accompanied by an even smaller political contingent arrived, augmenting the Anglo
community of traders and merchants. Thus began a long period of pacification of the
nomadic Indian tribes. In the 1851-1861 timeframe, the average military force in New
Mexico was about 1,700 men at an annual cost of $3,000,000 in Washington dollars, a
considerable increase in both men and funding over the small Mexican garrison stationed
in the colony before the annexation. By the late 1850s, American troops were stationed
in twelve widely dispersed forts and other outposts.41 In contrast, in the early nineteenth
century, the Spanish government maintained a force of 121 paid soldiers at an annual cost
of 240 pesos/man, one seventh the cost per man of the U.S. military. This small
professional force was augmented by a 1,500-man, self-equipped militia in which the
men typically served forty-five-day terms of service without compensation.42 From the
standpoint of the Anglo and Hispanic citizens, the superior U.S. force was badly needed,
but even after it was put in place, public safety remained illusive. The army, yet
inexperienced in western Indian warfare, was ineffective in suppressing Indian
depredations at first.43 In the years 1846-1850, during the military occupation, Indians
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are reported to have run off 154,915 sheep from Bernalillo and Santa Ana Counties,
16,260 from Santa Fe County, 17,080 from Taos County, and 43,580 from Rio Arriba
County, 50,000 from San Miguel, and 171,558 from Valencia, for a total of 453,293 head
of sheep in little over four years.44 This was a horrendous loss for the impoverished land.
The depredations persisted through the Civil War period. There is evidence that Indians
escaped with over 6000 head in 1868.45 For their part the Indians were said to have
systematically avoided stealing an entire flock so as to leave behind some breeding stock
to replenish the herd for a future raid.46 With the financial backing of the U.S.
Government, the army, relatively well armed and well trained, eventually imposed
considerable public safety. The penetration of the railroads west of the Mississippi
provided the critical support the army needed in this endeavor. By about 1866, the army
had largely pacified the tribes in New Mexico except for the southern Apache.47 The
grazing industry, which expanded into the vast, newly pacified areas, benefitted
immensely. The pacification contributed to a confluence of additional favorable
developments for the industry, including new eastern markets and improved transport
facilities, commercial know-how, and financing that took hold in the latter decades of the
nineteenth century. The issue of Indian pacification, as it extended into the post-Civil
War period, is discussed in chap. 5.

The Growth of Trade
Under the military occupation after the annexation, the garrisons provided new
markets for New Mexico produce. By 1850, Anglos constituted nearly 16% of the
population of Santa Fe and at least 10% in the towns of Las Vegas, Albuquerque,
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Cebolleta, and Socorro. About half these Anglos were directly attached to the military.48
Grain, hay, and other farm products needed for both food and forage commanded high
prices at the forts. Lucian Maxwell became a prominent army contractor during the interwar period and, as such, a pioneer in an agricultural and grazing cash economy.49
Like Maxwell, many of New Mexico’s farmers and ranchers benefited from the
expanding domestic markets. However, they generally did not sell their produce directly
to the army, but rather dealt with fort sutlers, middlemen-expediters who linked
numerous small producers to a single army fort, launching an emergent cash economy in
the process. The sutlers were some of the first sedentary Anglo mercantile capitalists in
New Mexico. Anglo merchants later dealt extensively in live sheep and wool.
Trade over the Santa Fe Trail increased significantly during the 1850s, serving not
just the forts, but also mountain fur trading posts and, in the last years before the Civil
War, the Colorado gold camps.50 Santa Fe became the distribution center for imported
merchandise. According to Twitchell, the town saw more gold and silver in circulation
than ever before in this timeframe.51 Simultaneously trade in American manufactured
goods with Chihuahua and the south resumed, many newly opened mines in Mexico
purchasing supplies and machinery from the United States.
By the late 1850s, churro wool, despite its shortcomings, had become a profitable
return commodity over the Santa Fe Trail, the prohibitive shipping expenses of earlier
years to the east coast woolen mills having been overcome.52 In fact, the increased wool
shipments enabled the Santa Fe trade to continue unabated after the territory’s hard
currency had been seriously depleted from decades of unbalanced trade with the United
States.53 New Mexico wool thus displaced hard currency on the back-haul. Some New
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Mexico merchants were now purchasing all or most of their supplies on the east coast,
shipping them by rail to Pittsburgh and by steamboat to Kansas City, rivermen having
learned to navigate the treacherous Missouri River. The freight wagons now departed for
New Mexico from Kansas City, eliminating the expensive transport across Missouri.
Wool traversed the same route in reverse. Hispanic merchants were shipping about half
the merchandise over the trail by about 1860, the most prominent still largely from the
handful of rico families that had long dominated New Mexico’s economy, although a few
new families became involved as capital requirements to enter the trade decreased.54

Hispanic Sheep Growers – A Digression
The annexation, and the arrival of a small, but growing number of Anglo Americans,
brought no immediate change to the lives of sheepmen and herders or to most New
Mexicans. The more prominent Hispanic sheep growers retained their standing during
the inter-war years and beyond. Sheep remained an important basis of wealth and a
determinant for social and political leadership. Those Hispanic families that had profited
substantially from the Chihuahua and Santa Fe trades retained their interest in sheep and
continued to maintain the large ranches they had controlled for decades. To digress
somewhat, some comments about a few large-scale, sheep-growing rico families are
presented here.
Pedro Bautista Pino, arguably the leading citizen of New Mexico when his peers
selected him to represent New Mexico at the Spanish Cortez around 1810, was described
years later by Col. Francisco Perea as “probably the wealthiest man in Santa Fe, being the
owner of vast flocks of sheep and goats…” 55 Pino’s sons, Miguel, Facundo, and
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Nicolas, like their father sustained by large land and sheep holdings, carried on the family
tradition of political, social, and in their case also military leadership until well into the
territorial era.
The Chaves family, decended from Capt. Fernando Duran y Chaves who received a
sheep allotment from de Vargas, cf. chap. 2, is notable for, among other things, retaining
a particularly long-running prominence in the sheep industry. At the time of the
annexation, family leader Mariano Chaves was said to possess the largest hacienda on the
Rio Grande south of Albuquerque.56 His son J. Francisco Chaves drove large herds of
sheep to California in the 1850s and later had a distinguished military and political career
in New Mexico. Manuel Antonio Chaves, Mariano’s equally illustrious nephew,
established a substantial livestock business around 1848.57 In the early 1850s, he and his
brother-in-law, Lorenzo Labadie, acquired lands along the Rio Pecos extending south
from San Miguel through Puerto de Luna to Bosque Redondo and stocked them with
sheep.58 However, their operation was plagued by Indian depredations. Preoccupied
with other activities, they turned their stock over to majordomos.59 Later, around 1864,
Roman A. Baca, Manuel Antonio’s half-brother, acquired land for the family near the
San Mateo Peaks, in today’s Valencia County, notably the Bartolome Fernandes Grant.
He established a 40,000-head herd on the grant and sent large wool shipments to St.
Louis by ox teams over the Santa Fe Trail.60 Manuel Antonio joined Baca around 1876.
His son, Amado Chaves, had an illustrious career in law and New Mexico politics.
Educated at San Miguel College, Santa Fe, and National University, Washington, D.C.,
where he earned a law degree, he established a successful law practice, served in the
territorial legislature, and was appointed New Mexico’s first Superintendent of Public
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Instruction. Despite his success in the Anglo world of law and politics, he returned every
year to San Miguel Ranch to supervise the lambing and shearing of the family flocks, and
he undertook selective breeding experiments aimed at improved wool production.61
The Hispanic sheep-growing tradition continued into the twentieth century. From one
of the oldest rico families, Solomon Luna took over his family’s considerable sheep
operations when still a young man. He later established for himself a place in New
Mexico history when he assumed a leadership role in the successful campaign for
statehood and the writing of the state constitution.62

But for him sheep growing took

precedence over political advancement, which was well within his reach. At the turn of
the twentieth century, his sheep holdings were believed to be the largest in New Mexico.
In 1912 at the height of his political career, he was killed in a freak accident at a remote
sheep camp while overseeing a large dipping operation, cf. chap. 9.
Several other rico families remained prominent in sheep growing in the 1850-1880
timeframe. The Armijos of Bernalillo County were reported at one time to own 500,000
head.63 In the same period, the Otero and Perea families together are believed to have
owned another 500,000 head.64 Don Jose Leandro Perea let thousands of sheep out on
partido contracts in Bernalillo County and on the Ojo del Espiritu Grant on the Rio
Puerco in Sandoval County, land that, incidently, he damaged with overgrazing.65
Hispanic rico families remained active in sheep growing as economic conditions
evolved after the annexation. They were generally conservative in their business
initiatives; some ranchers were reluctant to adopt new, more efficient methods of sheep
husbandry when they were introduced.66 They clearly understood that land and livestock
provided them the greatest and most secure business opportunities under American
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sovereignty and were not inclined to take risks with unfamiliar operations. But they
would face great challenges in the years ahead, as sheep growing adapted to changing
markets and became capital-intensive, a development over which they had no control.

The California Sheep Trade, 1849-1860
If sheep growing and the families involved remained largely unchanged in the
aftermath of the annexation, significant changes in how sheep were marketed did occur.
These changes were harbingers of the financial and marketing practices that would come
to New Mexico’s sheep industry in the late nineteenth century. They came almost
immediately after the annexation in a dramatic way. Soon after the United States-Mexico
War ended the Camino Real sheep trade with Mexico, a new, far more profitable market
opened up in California, an unusually serendipitous development for New Mexico
sheepmen.67 And that market absorbed all New Mexico’s sheep exports.
The discovery of gold in California in 1848 and the gold rush it engendered brought a
massive influx of miners to the region and a concomitant demand for food far exceeding
local production capabilities. And it unleashed a frenzy of speculative activity in the
New Mexico sheep industry, the likes of which the sheepmen had never seen. Whatever
livestock existed in California at the beginning of the gold rush was quickly consumed by
the 49ers.68 Severe shortages of food, among a range of other shortages, quickly
developed and prices rose astronomically. The food shortage was exacerbated because
the once-great cattle and sheep herds of the California missions, which might have helped
feed the miners, had been decimated by the secularization of the missions between 1834
and 1836. The herds had been illegally sold off by their politically-connected
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overseers.69 Rumors of the high food prices filtered back to New Mexico, and it wasn’t
long before massive sheep drives were departing the territory for California. Once again,
New Mexico mutton would feed a quickly growing population of miners when local food
production proved inadequate.
Trade between New Mexico and California was not a completely new development.
Despite the long distances and poor trail conditions, it had been sputtering along for a
number of years. As early as 1829, New Mexico traders were traversing the Old Spanish
Trail and exchanging woolen goods (efectos del pais) for California horses and mules on
a small scale.70 Later, an 1841-1842 expedition of New Mexicans led by Francisco
Estevan Vigil drove some 4000 head of “stock”, almost certainly sheep, over the same
route, proving that such a drive was possible.71
The California trade differed in important ways from the Mexican trade. It was true
that the task of driving sheep to California, always an arduous undertaking, was similar to
driving them south into Mexico, although the trails were less developed, dryer in places,
and plagued by greater Indian dangers than the Camino Real. However, the business
arrangements were new. In the opening years, the trade did not involve Hispanic
livestock producers directly, but was undertaken by Anglo-American speculators who
amassed capital and purchased sheep from New Mexico growers, whose flocks had been
expanding since the close of the Camino Real trade. The Anglos employed the funds,
also, to purchase the needed supplies and hire armed guards and Hispanic herders. They
then supervised the drives themselves or employed experienced majordomos in that
capacity. All these initiatives bore some resemblance to the operating procedures of the
post-Civil War Anglo sheep and wool merchants. In the first years of the trade, the
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speculators sold their stock in California at huge profits and returned to New Mexico with
the proceeds from the sales, profiting entirely from the westward leg of their expeditions,
the opportunities for return trade being paltry in comparison.72
The trade started almost by accident in August, 1849, when a wagon train of gold
seekers heading west over the southern route to Los Angeles happened to stop in
Galisteo, New Mexico for a week to rest their teams and visit Santa Fe. One member of
the train, remembered only as “Old Roberts,” purchased 500 sheep for $250 (4
reales/head) and hired two men and a boy to assist his black slave in driving them to Los
Angeles when the train resumed its course. Sometime in early 1850, Roberts sold his
sheep, including lambs born on the trail, for $15-16/head, for a return of over $8,000 on
his $250 investment, a considerable amount of money at the time ($235,000 in 2010
dollars).73 This amounted to about thirty times what the sheep were selling for in
Mexico.
Hearing rumors of high California food prices, but probably ignorant of Old Roberts’
good fortune, a consortium of Anglo businessmen led by Santa Fe attorney William Z.
Angney and including Spanish business and political leader Manuel Alvarez, combined
forces in 1850.74 Angney purchased six-thousand sheep from New Mexico ranchers and
drove them to Los Angeles over the Old Spanish Trail. The drive was not without some
adventure; it was attended early on by the theft of about thousand head by rogue herders
and later had an unpleasant encounter with a Ute party. Upon his arrival, Angney turned
down offers of $8.00/head and drove his flock north to San Francisco expecting even
higher prices but instead discovered a dearth of cash buyers. He declined proffered
payments in bank drafts of dubious value, i.e. checks drawn on banks in New York and
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St. Louis. But after some delay, Angney sold his flock in 1851 and, having settled in
Califonia in the meantime, reinvested his profits in northern California real estate.75
Additional herds were soon on their way to the gold fields. Manuel Alvarez organized
another drive on his own in1851, purchasing 4,600 head from the Gallinas area near Las
Vegas and from the Perea family near Bernalillo at prices of about $1.25/head, over twice
the Durango market price before the United States-MexicoWar. He entered a partnership
with an experienced Spanish trader and mining entrepreneur who served as his
majordomo and borrowed equipment, mules, and cash from various Abiquiu ricos to
finance the drive, but unfortunately died along the way. The sheep were eventually
delivered to San Diego and sold at auction for about $20,000 ($590,000 in 2010 dollars),
making for a considerable profit.76 Angney and Alvarez were fortunate. In the same
timeframe, Joseph White, with a large herd from Chihuahua also bound for California,
lost a substantial part of his herd to desert heat and Yuma Indians.77

Other

inexperienced Anglo speculators lost entire flocks on the dry stretch across the Mojave
Desert.78
The speculative sheep drives continued through 1852, when three more departed New
Mexico for California. Sketchy documentation indicates that Manuel Antonio Chaves
participated in one of these drives, making him one of the first Hispanic sheepmen
involved.79 Perhaps the most audacious and dramatic of the early drives was that led by
fur trapper, frontier entrepreneur, and story teller Richens Lacy (Uncle Dick) Wotton.
Wotton joined forces with Taos businessman, Jesse B. Turley in 1852, raising $9,275
with which the men purchased 9000 head and the necessary outfit for the twenty-oneman party. They took a more northern route than Angney, going through Colorado, Utah,
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Nevada, and over the infamous Donner Pass into California. Their trek was, to say the
least, one of high adventure highlighted by an encounter with a band of angry Utes near
today’s Montrose, Colorado, at which point Wotton fought the Ute chief in hand-to-hand
combat for passage rights through Ute territory. Wotton won the contest and eventually
got his herd to Sacramento where he sold most of his stock at $8.75/head for a handsome
profit. He took one-third payment in gold and the balance in St. Louis bank drafts, taking
a chance Angney had refused the year before.80 That same year, 1852, Santa Fe trader,
Josiah Gregg, drove a herd of 9000 head to California.81 About the same time as
Wotton’s drive, Benjamin Franklin Coons, leading a 60-man outfit, successfully drove a
herd of 14,000 Chihuahua sheep to Los Angeles.82 Thereafter, Coons remained in
California, setting himself up as a livestock broker in which capacity he handled some of
the big New Mexico flocks that followed. Over the next few years, speculators profited
handsomely from the California trade.
Ambitious Hispanic sheepmen soon entered the trade. The first to undertake a drive to
California were Antonio Jose Luna, his brother Rafael, brother-in-law Miguel Antonio
Otero, about to embark on a notable political career, and associate Ambrosio Armijo, all
experienced sheepmen, who in 1852 oversaw the drive of 25,000 head from their homes
in the Las Lunas area through Apache country - the Gila River route - to Los Angeles.83
This was the largest drive to California up to this time. The leaders were ownermerchants. They unfortunately lost 11,000 head to quicksand, but sold the surviving
sheep in Los Angeles to Coons for $5.50/head and still ended up with a massive profit.
The New Mexicans returned home with $70,000 in coin and gold dust ($2,000,000 in
2010 dollars). According to tradition, Armijo received his share of the profits in fifty-
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dollar gold pieces minted in San Francisco, some of which he had sewn into his leather
vest for safe keeping on the journey home.84
In the early years of the California trade, no consensus on the best route having
developed, several different trails were followed until the southern Gila route, dipping
into Sonora, Mexico, came to be favored. In the winter of 1852-1853, flamboyant
French-Canadian pathfinder and Santa Fe trader, Francis X. Aubry assembled a 50-60
man crew, probably including Hispanic herders, and drove 5000 sheep he purchased in
the Santa Fe-Albuquerque area, along with 140-150 mules and 10 big freight wagons
over the Gila route to Los Angeles.85 True to his reputation, Aubry found a 150-mile
shortcut near Tucson, Arizona.86 The drive was well documented due to publicityconscious Aubry’s efforts. He sold 1000 head of sheep, some of his mules, and wool
shorn from the sheep in the Mormon colony in San Bernardino for $12,000 and sent the
rest on toward San Francisco, where they were sold, probably at $12/head. After also
selling his wagons and more of his mules and covering his expenses for the drive, Aubry
returned to New Mexico with nearly $60,000 ($1,700,000 in 2010 dollars), another
financial killing considering that he probably paid no more than $2-3/head, and possibly
much less, for his stock.87
In the meantime, another consortium, this time made up of former mountain men and
led by Lucian Maxwell, Kit Carson, and John L. Hatcher, assembled a total of 13,000
sheep, constituted a 33-man party, and headed out in early 1853 along Wotton’s northern
route, but detoured even further north to Ft. Laramie to avoid the Utes that had so
plagued Wotton. Each of the three principals apparently had acquired his own herd; on
the trail, they broke up into three widely-spaced sections. Carson, in financial partnership
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with Henry Mercure and John Bernavette, had purchased 6,500 churros in the Rio Abajo,
reportedly for less than fifty cents per head. After six months on the trail, they arrived in
northern California and sold their sheep in Sacramento, getting only $5.50/head.88 This
lower price still made for a handsome profit but was signaling the abatement of the
California meat shortage.
Francis Aubry arrived back in New Mexico in the fall of 1853, about the time
Maxwell and Carson were selling their stock in California. He was very satisfied with
the profits he had just realized and optimistic about the future of the California trade.
With Alvarez’ help, he quickly assembled another herd, 16,000 head this season, and by
early October was on his way back to California.89 According to Bergman, all of
Aubry’s herders from his first California drive signed up again. He speculates that Aubry
probably paid them as much for the 9-10 month period of the drive as they could earn in
4-5 years herding sheep for a New Mexico patron.90 This time, Aubry joined forces with
several large-scale Hispanic sheepmen to form a drive of some 50,000 head. Some of the
other participants were Francisco Perea (Bernalillo), with 10,000 head, Judge Antonio
Jose Otero (Los Lunas), 8,000 head, and twenty year old J. Francisco Chaves, with a
substantial herd.91 During this same season, another 50,000 head were driven to
California, including 15,000 head belonging to Nicholas Pino, Peter Bautista Pino’s son,
and 35,000 head in three bunches from Chihuahua, somewhat ahead of Aubry’s group on
the trail to Los Angeles.92 The size of the California drives had been growing steadily,
and this would have been the largest shipment up to that time. But, as Maxwell and
Carson had discovered some months earlier, the California prices had weakened.93
Demand had decreased due to the import of the flood of sheep not just from the
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southwest borderlands but also from as far away as Ohio and Illinois. Some of the New
Mexico ewes were used in reestablishing the California herds, which eventually were
sufficient to meet the demand for mutton in the gold fields, reducing the need for
continuing imports.94 Under rapidly evolving conditions, profits were smaller this
season. Aubry’s party took several months to sell all their stock.95

They returned

together to New Mexico in the summer of 1854, Aubry soon to be killed in a Santa Fe
barroom altercation.96
The character of the California trade changed at this point. California sheep prices
decreased as rapidly as they had risen. In the mean time New Mexico growers,
experiencing an increased demand for their produce from the speculators, jacked up their
prices.97 Profits were squeezed at both ends of the trade. After 1854, the California trade
was no longer a profitable arena for speculation, but, nevertheless, remained reasonably
profitable for growers. It was taken over entirely by Hispanic rancher-merchants.
The Perea, Otero, Luna, and Armijo families were all active in this continuing trade. 98
After returning home, J. Francisco Chaves turned around immediately for a return drive.
He assembled 18,000 head in late 1854 and drove them from the Rio Abajo via Los
Angeles to San Francisco, just as the Panic of 1853 was fully setting in. This was an
inopportune time to be marketing sheep, as the entire country was plagued with bank
failures and bankruptcies, discouraging large business transactions.99 Unable to
immediately sell his herd at a good profit, Chaves remained in California for the next
three years, dealing in livestock of various kinds, gradually selling off his own sheep, and
marrying before he finally returned to New Mexico. Even in the face of Indian raids and
desert losses, New Mexico sheep growers profited in the weakened market, if more
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modestly than the speculators, by selling their own produce as they had done in the
Mexican trade.
By 1856 conditions had apparently improved. That year members of the Luna and
Armijo families trailed 19,000 sheep to California, Luna conducting another successful
drive in 1857.100 Even later, in 1858, one of the largest drives up to that time, 100,000
head, departed New Mexico for California.101

The ownership breakdown of the herds

from Valencia and Bernalillo Counties, driven in two distinct groups, as provided by
sheepman “Santiago” [James Lawrence] Hubbell is given in TABLE 3.1.102 The sheep
__________________________________________________________
TABLE 3.1

Sheep Ownership,* 1858 California Drive

Joaquin Perea

22,000 head

Antonio Jose Luna

17,000

Senor [Jose] Jaramillo of Los Lunas 17,000
Antonio Jose Otero

11,000

Rafael Luna

10,000

Toribio Romero

9,000

Ramon Luna

7,000

Miscellaneous Persons

10,000

Total (Ewes and Wethers)

103,000

Ewes

20,000

*From Valencia and Bernalillo Counties.
____________________________________________________________
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may have sold for about $4.00/head. It will be noted that this stock was owned almost
entirely by a few wealthy Hispanic merchant-sheepmen from the same families that had
dominated the Mexican trade. This alignment would eventually change.
The last large California drive, which included 50,000 churros under the direction of
Francisco Perea and Jesus Luna, arrived in San Francisco in November of 1860, just as
Lincoln was elected to the presidency.103 California’s sheep population had by now
reached 1,000,000, and prices had dropped to $3-4/head. And by 1870, the sheep
population would reach 2,768,187.104 Trade with New Mexico ceased to be essential for
California. The situation for New Mexico sheepmen was exacerbated by the onset of the
Civil War when the U.S. Army troops that had suppressed Indian depredations in the
1850s along the heavily used Gila route to California, and other areas further north, were
withdrawn to eastern battlefields, giving the nomadic tribes a freer hand to attack the
herds.105

Low prices and increased Indian depredations shut down the trade that had

been so extraordinarily profitable. The drives to California were no longer worth the risk
for New Mexicans.
The California trade flourished for over ten years. According to the US Census of
1880, some 550,000 sheep were trailed from New Mexico to California before 1858. As
indicated above another 150,000 head were exported from New Mexico in the 1858-1860
timeframe, for a total in the range of around 700,000.106 This exceeded the entire 1850
New Mexico sheep population, estimated to be 377,000, as noted in chap. 2. The entire
trade over the ten-year period added up to $4,000,000 ($110,000,000 in 2010 dollars) and
brought to New Mexico a return of $500,000 in gold and convertible paper ($14,000,000
in 2010 dollars), increasing the short supply of hard currency in the territory. 107
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During

the 1850s, the annual sheep exports to California were generally larger, perhaps by a
factor of two or more, than the annual exports down the Camino Real during the final
twenty years of Mexican sovereignty. The trade was initiated by comparatively wellinformed Anglo speculators, who operated as middlemen between New Mexico sheep
growers and California buyers. They saw opportunity and took advantage of a severe,
but short-lived food shortage created by the gold rush. In later years, Anglo mercantile
capitalists would link the New Mexico sheep growers to national markets for sheep and
wool in similar fashion. The risks were considerable; in some cases entire herds were
lost. Wealthy Hispanic merchant-ranchers took up the trade after a few years. And as
California prices dropped, they took over the trade entirely and were able, without
middleman, to profit from it. Their continuing drives from the early 1850s through the
remainder of the decade accounted for considerably more of the exported livestock than
the early speculative efforts of Wotton, Aubry, Carson, Maxwell, and their cohorts.
On the negative side, the California trade broadened the rico-pobre divide in New
Mexico.108 While sheep prices remained comparatively high and volume increased, the
rico sheepmen made more money than ever. New Mexico’s pobres gained little. The
ownership base was narrow, just as it had been during the last years of the Camino Real
trade. A large fraction of the exported stock belonged to the same handful of growers.109
At the opposite end of the economic scale, the hired herders were drawn generally from
the lower classes and paid poorly.
As the California trade fell off, new opportunities appeared. An important sheep
market opened in the mining camps of Colorado, gold having been discovered in the
Pike’s Peak region in 1858. As had happened a decade earlier in California, another
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flood of men, the 59ers, pursuing dreams of instant wealth, poured into Colorado. And
once again, New Mexico churros fed a rapidly-assembled population of non-food
producers, another uncharacteristically serendipitous development for New Mexico
growers. For the next ten years and beyond, New Mexico sheepmen drove their sheep to
market over the relatively short distances to Pike’s Peak, Denver, and Boulder.110
An important new opportunity came to New Mexico sheep growers from the
development of the western wool industry during and after the Civil War. This is the
subject of the following chapter.
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Chapter 4
The Wool Initiative

Writing in 1857, W.W.H. Davis, former United States Attorney for New Mexico,
commented on the state of wool production in the territory:
Notwithstanding the great number of sheep in the country, wool has
never yet become become a staple item of trade. That produced is
a very coarse, inferior article, and at the ranchos does not sell for
more than four or five cents per pound, and but a small quantity has
found its way to the United States market….When New Mexico
shall have become connected with the States by rail-road, the woolen
manufacturers will find it to be in their interest to raise their own wool
there instead of importing so much from abroad.1
The New Mexico wool industry grew over the following decades, although not quite as
Davis may have envisaged.
At the turn of the twentieth century, the United States was the world’s third largest
wool producer, accounting for about 10% of the total production.2 Nine western states
and territories were producing nearly 60% of the nation’s wool.3 And New Mexico,
facing stiff competition from other western states, accounted for about 10% of the
western production.4 American wool production, now an important component of the
nation’s economy, was absorbed in its entirety by the domestic mills. The roughly 30%
of the wool that was imported was primarily carpet wool, like that produced by churros,
but no longer profitable for American growers. Overall, American mills were utilizing
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about 15% of the world’s production. By 1890, America’s consumption of wool,
estimated at 8.75 lbs. per capita, was the largest of any nation in the world.5
The fact that sheep provided both food and clothing had made them quite valuable in
the frontier society of the colonial and republican eras and had led to the establishment of
large herds. And, as described in the previous chapters, an export trade in live sheep
developed and was even flourishing by the time of the annexation. In contrast, wool
production was indeed undeveloped in New Mexico and also nationally. Prior to the
Civil War domestic wool production, then centered on small farms in the East and
Midwest, and woolen manufacture, which was developing in the Northeast, were of
secondary, if growing, commercial importance.6

That situation changed

precipitatiously. A national woolen industry, launched in large part by wartime cotton
shortages, grew rapidly in the post-Civil War years. Under the impetus of opening
markets in the eastern United States, the territory’s wool production grew dramatically
for the remainder of the nineteenth century, and wool took on major importance in the
export economy. The amount of wool produced in New Mexico is plotted versus time in
Fig. 4.1. A correspondingly rapid expansion of mercantile capitalism in the territory,
with which wool became strongly linked, occurred in the same timeframe, cf. chap. 6.
With an important export of national significance, the territory became more strongly
linked to the eastern U.S. economy.
Because mutton and wool are two otherwise unrelated market commodities, sheep are
normally bred for optimal production of one or the other. However, the churro produced
both commodities adequately during the colonial and republican
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Fig. 4.1. New Mexico Wool Production versus Year. Production is seen to have
developed quite slowly until 1870. Thereafter, production grew rapidly for the remainder
of the century, the western wool industry having been launched by the Civil War.
Production fell off modestly in the early twentieth century. Data are taken from U.S.
Census, 1850-1920.
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periods; selective breeding was not needed. The fact that the churro fleece was light,
weighing as little as a pound, was unimportant at the time. The processing was crude; the
wool was ripped off the sheep by hand or cut off with a knife, wasting about half the
fleece in the process.7 Throughout the colonial period, New Mexico’s sheep provided an
overabundance of wool. Because of its low-grease content, the churro wool could be
cleaned by beating, by the wind, or by hand without a great quantity of water, often a
scarce commodity. Churro wool was more easily combed and spun than finer wool. The
coarse, long, straight strands were spun and woven domestically and constituted the
major source of clothing for the lower classes. The churro’s fleece was also useful for
weaving blankets and carpets, if not for fine wool applications.8

However, most of the

colony’s wool simply went to waste. Colonial political leaders had dreamed of a New
Mexico weaving industry for manufacturing fine cloth and actually imported skilled
weavers from Mexico to teach their craft, but little came of the initiative.9 Wool
shortages that occurred in some areas of Mexico were never met by New Mexican wool.
The Navajos came to appreciate the utility of wool at an early date. Having acquired
sheep by raiding the pobladores’ flocks, they had become highly skilled at weaving by
the late eighteenth century. Writing in 1830 or 1831, mountain man and trader James O.
Pattie noted that the Navajos were producing wool products markedly superior to the
Hispanic output.10 Rightfully famous for their wool blankets and rugs, they preserved the
churro breed for those applications after Anglo and Hispanic sheepmen had graded up
their flocks for finer-quality, more copious wool production.11 The Navajo role in the
New Mexico sheep industry and woolen manufacture is an important subject that has
received considerable attention and will not be addressed here explicitly.
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During the Camino Real trade, churro wool was shipped sporadically to Mexico, but
it never constituted a major portion of the trade. After the live sheep were delivered,
however, their wool was sometimes harvested.12 Hand manufactured woolen products,
Hispanic and Indian, were on the short list of items, efectos del pais, shipped south in the
caravans, cf. chap. 2. But this woolen production was, and remains, a labor-intensive,
modestly-profitable cottage industry.
When Santa Fe trader Josiah Gregg first came to New Mexico in the 1830s, he saw a
potential for commercial wool production that the Hispanic sheepmen, perhaps in their
isolation, did not appreciate. Long before Davis, he was struck by the paradox of fine
grazing land and lackluster wool production. He was deeply critical of New Mexican
sheepmen for their failure to breed quality, wool-producing sheep, describing their flocks
as “wretchedly degenerate.”13 At this time, the traders usually returned to Missouri with
their wagons lightly laden, carrying only the hard currency generated by their trade and
low-profitability New Mexico produce including wool, then, as Davis noted, regarded as
inferior in quality. As it was, wool could be purchased for 3-4 cents/lb. in New Mexico
and sold in St. Louis for as much as 15 cents/lb. Describing conditions of the 1830s,
Gregg noted, however, that a wool backhaul “barely pays a return freight for the wagons
that would otherwise be empty.”14 He believed that a higher-quality product would
benefit New Mexico. Reporting on conditions in 1844, Santa Fe trader James Josiah
Webb corroborated Gregg’s assessment, also remarking on the poor quality of New
Mexico wool. Concerning the backhaul, he went on to say, “The only products, beyond
the immediate needs of the people, were wool (which would not pay transportation), a
few furs, a very few deerskins, and the products of the gold mines…”15 Several Anglo
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observers from the Mexican era onward were, like Gregg and Webb, critical of the lack
of productivity they perceived in the New Mexicans, their surviving writings sometimes
having an anti-Hispanic tenor.
The Americans were not the first to criticize New Mexican productivity in any case.
As early as 1803, Governor Fernando de Chacon wrote in his report on the state of the
colony’s economy that New Mexico’s “natural decadence and backwardness is traceable
to the lack of development and want of formal knowledge in agriculture, commerce, and
the manual arts.”16 The governor understood, to a considerable degree, the detrimental
conditions that were retarding New Mexico’s economic development. His observations
would remain essentially valid for decades and were pertinent to the sheep industry as it
evolved through the territorial period.
The wool trade grew slowly at first. As previously mentioned, New Mexico woolen
goods had been traded in California in the1830-1848 timeframe, cf. chap. 3.17 And some
New Mexico wool was shipped to Kansas City during the United States-Mexico War.
New Mexico’s annual wool clip had been growing for some time before the Civil War. It
increased from 33,000 lbs. in 1850, when wool production was a barely profitable
sideline for traders, to 493,000 lbs. in 1860, a fifteen-fold increase.18 See Fig. 4.1. As it
turned out, New Mexico was well positioned to take advantage of the growing demand
for wool created by the war. But wool industry growth was constrained by the slow,
expensive shipments over the Santa Fe Trail The situation was accurately described by a
government report of 1869 which described the transport problem faced by the industry
and advocated the construction of railroads into the territory. It stated, “This industry is
crippled, however, by the difficulty of getting it to market, transportation costing as much
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as the original value of the wool.”19 The wool industry would not begin to truly flourish
until the arrival of the railroads, cf. chap. 6, as Davis had suggested.

The Civil War Impetus
The establishment of large flocks in California and the decreased security on the Gila
trail caused a temporary loss of business for New Mexico’s sheepmen after the onset of
the Civil War. This did not last. The war profoundly affected the American wool market
and, in the process, revolutionized the sheep industry of New Mexico and the West. Up
to this time, America’s productive and profitable textile mills relied largely on the cotton
plantations of the South for their raw material, cotton fabric being the favored output. At
the outset of the Civil War, the South dominated the world cotton market, producing 85%
of the raw cotton consumed in the United States, Britain, and Continental Europe in
1851.20 In contrast, domestic production only supplied about half the wool employed by
nation’s woolen manufacturers, which constituted a smaller industry in any case; the
other half was imported.21 When the war started, the North effectively blockaded
southern ports, severely curtailing cotton exports from the South. This reduced the
supply and drove up the price of cotton, pricing it out of the market. New York prices
quadrupled between 1861 and 1864.22 The northern textile mills responded by
converting their looms from cotton to wool, launching a new demand for it. This was, in
fact, a world-wide phenomenon; mills everywhere were converted from cotton to other
fabrics, including both wool and linen. The increased demand for wool was enhanced by
the U.S. Army’s need to supply its soldiers with wool uniforms and blankets, which were
manufactured in the northeastern mills. Wool consumption in the United States more

81

than doubled during the war from 85,000,000 lbs./year to over 200,000,000 lbs./year,
while cotton consumption in the northern mills decreased to less than half the pre-war
amount.23
With the onset of the war, Rocky Mountain wool prices rose dramatically from 21-23
cents/lb. in 1860 to 35-45 cents/lb. in 1865, rendering the sale of western wool truly
profitable for the first time.24 Western sheepmen started shifting their focus toward wool
and away from mutton. In New Mexico, sheep and wool production continued their prewar increasing trend, which was mirrored by international production increases,
particularly in Australia, South America, and South Africa, as well as the American
Midwest. 25 In the 1860-1870 timeframe, the New Mexico range sheep population
increased steadily to reach about 1,700,000, mostly churros raised following traditional
Spanish methods.26 During the same decade, the total value of woolen products produced
in the U.S. textile mills surpassed the total value of cotton products for the first time and
would remain dominant for the next twenty years.27 The overall value of U.S. cotton and
woolen manufactures versus time is plotted in Fig. 4.2. Traders were soon transporting
larger wool shipments than ever over the Santa Fe Trail to Missouri commission
merchants, who forwarded them to the northeastern textile mills.28 Writing in 1866,
Acting New Mexico Gov. W.F.M. Arny reported that “millions of pounds” of wool were
being produced annually in New Mexico, while less than one quarter of the crop was
used in the territory, the bulk of the crop being transported east.29 According to the U.S.
Census reports, New Mexico wool production continued to increase, going from 493,000
lbs. in 1860 to 685,000 lbs. in 1870 – not millions as claimed by Arny - , and then
undergoing a massive rise to 4,000,000 lbs. in 1880, as shown in Fig. 4.130 Far more of
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New Mexico’s sheep were being retained as wool producers rather than sent to slaughter.
The sheep population increased, and the number of growers in the territory increased.31
The increased production was expedited by the expansion of federal grazing lands made
possible by the subjugation of the Navajos and Apaches in this timeframe.
The pre-annexation situation where profits came almost entirely from live sheep sales
ended, never to return, although this development was not fully realized until the 1870s.
New Mexico sheepmen still profited primarily from mutton production. In his annual
report to the Territorial Assembly in 1867, Gov. Robert B. Mitchell noted: “A very
respectable number of our most enterprising citizens, I am happy to say, are already
engaged in the laudable business of sheep growing, and are undoubtedly making it a
profitable business, not so much from the sale of wool produced from these flocks, as
their sales of mutton to the government for the subsistence of the soldiers, and Indians
being furnished subsistence by the government.”32 Indeed, the first issue of the Daily
New Mexican, July 9, 1868, contained only a single advertisement by a wool merchant,
claiming he could obtain high prices on the Philadelphia market, but advertisements for
ten attorneys.33 Notwithstanding the governor’s comment, and the lack of newspaper
advertising space, commercial wool growing became a permanent feature of the
territory’s, and the West’s, sheep industry, but not without negotiating post-war market
imbalances. After the war, the demand for wool quickly fell, as cotton production
resumed in the South, which soon reestablished itself as the leading world supplier of raw
cotton.34 The demand for wool at the nation’s textile mills decreased accordingly. To
make matters worse for sheepmen, an influx of cheap imported foreign wool flooded the
U.S. market. And the military market for wool disappeared overnight, while the federal
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Fig. 4.2. Total Value of Woolen and Cotton products manufactured annually in the
United States. In 1860 the total value of woolen goods produced in U.S. textile mills was
about 60% of the value of cotton goods produced. When the Civil War curtailed the
cotton supply, northern mills switched from cotton to wool. Woolen goods then
surpassed cotton goods, increasing by 70% in value between 1860 and 1870, and
dominated until about 1890. Thereafter, cotton products again exceeded woolen products
in value, with the values of both quantities rising sharply in the early twentieth century.
All data are from U.S. Census reports, 1840-1920. The dollar amounts quoted therein
have been converted to 2010 dollars using the Annual Consumer Price Index for the
United States.
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government placed large accumulated stocks of army woolen goods on the open market,
producing a temporary glut in such merchandise.35 Wool prices fell correspondingly.
After the war, Rocky Mountain wool prices collapsed from $0.35-0.45/lb. in 1865 to
$0.18-0.20/lb. in 1868.36
Worldwide production decreased in response to the glut and the concomitant
depressed prices, and the post-war surplus of wool and woolens dissipated. By about
1870, the national wool market began to improve. Wool growing remained profitable in
the West, if not elsewhere, because of the low production costs of open-range ranching.
The resumed demand for wool resulted in a further expansion of the Rocky Mountain
flocks. The center of U.S. commercial wool, and sheep, production shifted from the
eastern and midwestern farm belts to the West, cf. chap. 5.37 In the early 1870s as
commercial sheep production was just getting underway in northern Colorado and
Wyoming, New Mexico wool production began a sharp increase. Wool production of the
western states and territories for 1900 is given in TABLE 4.1.
In addition to the increased demand for wool, the Civil War produced a meat shortage
in the American cities, which was accompanied by a rapid increase in prices. New
Mexico sheep could not, however, help address that shortage because of the lack of rail
transport in the West at the time. Trail driving live sheep east was not a viable option.
This situation would change in the following years when rail transport of live sheep
became available in the West.
Hispanic rico sheepmen-merchants were the major producers in New Mexico’s
expanded wool trade through, at least, the mid-1880s. Jose Leandro Perea, one of the
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_____________________________________________________________
TABLE 4.1

Wool Production, Fall 1899 and Spring 190038
Arizona

3,353,000 lbs.

California

13,680,000

Colorado

8,543,000

Idaho

15,474,000

Montana

30,437,000

New Mexico

15,209,000

Oregon

18,350,000

Utah

17,050,000

Wyoming

27,758,000

Western Division Total

159,968,000

United States Total

276,992,000

_______________________________________________________________

wealthiest men in New Mexico, with an assessed wealth of $800,000 in 1875
($16,000,000 in 2010 dollars), was an important grower. He owned 75,000 sheep at this
time, his estate having increased steadily since the 1850s, cf. chap. 3. Perea became
involved in the wool trade in a substantial way fairly early. He is known to have outfitted
a large train in 1867 carrying wool to Kansas City, which he exchanged for merchandise
to be sold in New Mexico, establishing a routine he followed annually for many years.39
Government livestock expert Clarence W. Gordon reported in 1880, near the time when
the territory’s sheep population reached its maximum, that three quarters of New

86

Mexico’s sheep were being raised by some twenty-one families, about 80% of which
were “Old Mexican families,” employing “inherited pastoral traditions” and, with their
large herds, were benefitting from economies of scale. And, according to his estimates,
72% of the territory’s sheep were churros, so the sheep industry was still dominated by
very large-scale family operations running sheep that had not been upgraded for
increased wool production. Wool was, nevertheless, a major product. The average
holding of these large-scale operations would have been about 160,000 head, considering
a total sheep population of 4,500,000 in 1880.40

Selective Breeding
To fully exploit the growing wool market, selective breeding of sheep for heavier
fleeces was required. A breeding program had been on-going in the East for many years.
Prolific wool producers, full-blooded Merino sheep were, it is believed, first imported to
the United States from France in 1801 and brought to a farm on the Hudson River for
breeding.41 Merinos were notable for the desireable fineness of their wool as well as their
high fleece weight.42
Wool production having been an adjunct to its sheep industry, New Mexico was not
totally unprepared for the new marketing opportunity. Selective breeding on a large scale
was initiated by well capitalized Anglo sheepmen, many recently arrived, who seem to
have had a clearer vision of its utility than most sheep-growing ricos. It became in time a
permanent fixture of sheep ranching operations. In the early territorial years, a number of
Anglo sheepmen established herds in northeastern New Mexico. As early as 1859,
sheepman George Giddings trailed the first purebred Merinos into the territory from
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Kentucky.43

M.M. Chase and John B. Davison brought in 200 Merino rams from

Vermont, a prime breeding area, to be bred with New Mexican churro ewes.44 One
hundred and thirty Vermont Merinos were imported to Colfax County in 1864, an area of
perdominantly Anglo sheep growers.45 Merchant-sheepman Felipe Chaves imported
Cotswold rams from Canada.46 Others imported rams from Pennsylvania and Ohio.
Between 1876 and 1880, sheep were driven east to New Mexico from California, where
the flocks had been upgraded with midwestern stock during the California sheep trade of
the 1850s. That stock significantly enhanced the number of graded animals in New
Mexico. One of the largest importers was Col. Stoneroad, who drove 10,000 Merinos
from the Merced River in California to Puerto de Luna, New Mexico in 1876. He
purchased the sheep for $2.00/head in California, and they were valued at $3.50 in New
Mexico. A half dozen other Anglos imported large Merino flocks.47 Altogether, some
40,000 graded Merinos were imported from California, although 13,000 head were
subsequently driven on to Colorado. Trail losses were reportedly quite high, 36%,
reflecting the inferior trailing abilities of the Merinos.48 A few wool-producing sheep
were also driven into New Mexico from Texas.49 These imports occurred at the same
time that New Mexico was exporting large herds of churros to help stock ranches
throughout much of the West, cf. chap. 5.
Breeding to develop and retain the most desirable characteristics entailed
considerable communication between New Mexican sheepmen both among themselves
and with experienced breeders elsewhere. Commercial wool growing thus drew the
territory into a larger economic arena. Western Socorro County sheepman Montague
Stevens read every publication on sheep growing that he could get his hands on. He
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purchased both Merino and expensive Schropshire rams to start his ranches, cf. chap. 9.50
New Mexico’s large-scale Hispanic producers seem to have retained a specialization in
churro wool, although a large herd was required to produce a profitable quantity.
Hispanic sheepmen took up breeding when they saw the Anglo Americans with improved
flocks making more money from their wool and wether sales. The common Anglo
sentiment at the time was that Hispanic sheepmen were not to be called “lazy or
indifferent” but were generally about ten years behind the times in adopting modern
growing practices.51 The delay was, in fact, real and would cost some of those growers
dearly as the sheep industry, wool growing in particular, became increasingly
competitive, and efficient operations became a necessity.
The fact that Hispanic sheepmen did not attempt to develop quality wool in their
flocks as soon as the wool market opened seems a bit perplexing. This failure can be
traced to a few definite factors. Some authors have attributed it to the partido system,
which shifted all the risk and little of the reward of sheep growing onto the partidario.
According to this view, the owners of partido flocks were insufficiently motivated to go
to the trouble and expense of initiating a breeding program since they were already
earning a low-risk, effortless 20% return on their inherited principal, cf. chap. 2. The
partidario, for his part, would have had similarly little incentive to expend the added
labor to undertake selective breeding, since his patron would be the prime beneficiary.52
There is probably some truth to this assessment.
An additional, and more concrete, consideration is the high risk inherent in New
Mexico sheep growing. As late as 1902, government livestock expert E.V. Wilcox
reporting on the western sheep industry noted the frequent complaint of growers, “One
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frequently hears the statement from sheep raisers that their business is in the nature of a
lottery venture – when all goes well the profits are very good, but losses of an extremely
serious nature may occur when least expected.”53 The periodic droughts and harsh
winters as well as the Indian raids, diseases, poisonous plants, and predators made any
breeding program risky.54 Because of the trial-and-error character of breeding, any
deviation from established practices compounded the known risks. For most Hispanic
growers, selective breeding would have been a step into the unknown and opened the
possibility of failure and losses from which recovery might have been difficult. Since the
exigencies of survival in the frontier environment were not rapidly alleviated by the
annexation, breeding for improved wool may have remained a low priority in the minds
of many established growers.
An additional factor that would have affected the smaller-scale sheepmen was the
expense of breeding both in time and money. Graded rams were expensive, as were the
required shipping costs. And the returns on the investment would not be realized
immediately, but might, in practice, require a period of years. In the interests of
economy, Montague Stevens and Solomon Luna shared a delivery of 150 Shropshire
rams to Magdelena, cf. chap.9. Progress in breeding was retarded because top quality
breeding rams were beyond the means of many of the territory’s sheepmen. In time,
under-capitalized growers unable to afford quality rams were placed at a competitive
disadvantage. They did not fully share the higher profits that wool growing made
possible. Many small producers went out of business as increased capital investments
became necessary, cf. chap. 8.
Despite the above considerations, it is still curious that few large-scale, Hispanic
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sheepmen seem to have given breeding a serious trial before it was introduced by Anglos.
Anglos immigrating to New Mexico after the annexation brought with them a knowledge
of breeding, which had been practiced in the United States for decades, that the ricos
lacked. That knowledge substantially reduced the risks and served the Anglos well.
The cross breeding of heavy-fleeced select rams with churro ewes became
widespread in New Mexico. And it would be practiced, to a greater or lesser extent,
throughout the Rockies and Great Plains as sheep ranching developed in those regions.
Once breeders gained some experience under southwestern conditions, they soon
concluded that the ewe bands had to be developed from Merino stock. The churro blood
provided the offspring with the robustness, flocking instinct, and ease of handling needed
on the western ranges, while the Merino blood provided heavier fleeces of higher-quality,
commercially more desirable, wool, an important consideration since wool sold by the
pound. Favorable results came relatively quickly, although multiple generations of
breeding were needed to obtain the most desirable crosses.55 The first cross of Merino
bucks with churro ewes, “Mexican” sheep as they came to be called, produced what were
called “improved Mexican” sheep which gave fleeces of about 3-4 lbs., essentially
doubling the churro fleece weight. After the fourth generation of employing the Merino
rams, the offspring produced “a fleece of about eight pounds of unwashed wool, tolerably
fine, yolky and of a fair medium staple” without loosing robustness, rustling ability,
fertility, and herding instincts. A considerable number of sheepmen employed the less
desirable “improved Mexican” rams instead of expensive pure-bred Merino rams.56
Sheep breeding involved considerable challenges. Successful breeding was not to be
accomplished casually, but required years of steady commitment and a degree of
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experimentation, as sheep grow differently in every environment. Breeding was thus a
continuing process, and hands-on management was required. As Carman et al. noted in
1892, “It has been demonstrated by the experience of practical flock masters that the best
methods for profitably conducting sheep husbandry, in the Territory [New Mexico], is for
the owner to have personal supervision of his flocks, or if the management of the flocks
must be left to hired help, to be sure they are capable, honest, and faithful.”57 A wellfounded choice of rams and breeding procedures adapted to the relevant range area were
essential in a newly competitive wool market. Western breeders often experienced the
development of undesirable characteristics after a number of generations. The flock
might drift too far in the churro direction or too far in the Merino direction. Even when a
good average was attained, it was always accompanied by an undesirable amount of
variation among the ewes.58 While the Civil War had expedited New Mexico’s, and the
West’s entrance into the national wool market, the results of breeding for heavier fleeces
did not fully materialize until some years afterward. Raton sheepman Daniel Troy
identified the fifteen-year period 1877-1892, as a time of steady, widespread
“improvement” in New Mexico flocks.59 The crossing system employed in the West not
only required considerable time and effort, but was never wholly satisfactory.
Despite the enhanced breeding efforts, the churro remained the most common sheep
on the New Mexico range for some time. Its fleece became sufficiently valuable that it
assumed an important place in the national market. According to western promoter, Dr.
Hiram Latham:
A sheep raiser in New Mexico notwithstanding the coarse quality of
the wool of the present stock can herd his sheep and make a profit
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from the product of his wool and have all the increase of his stock
in addition thereto.60
The situation changed somewhat during the 1870s. A recent report estimates that by
1880, nearly 40% of New Mexico’s sheep were of improved breeds, churro-Merino
crosses.61 A decreasing, but still substantial fraction of the wool was still churro
produced. By the early 1890s, however, about 75% of the wool came from “improved
Mexican” breeds, which had finally become widely available only a few years earlier.
These were largely California Merino-churro crosses, or their descendents. Beyond that,
about 15% of the produce was fine quality wool obtained from more carefully bred
stock.62 Thus, only about 10% of New Mexico’s output was still of the coarse variety
produced by churros. In the official governor’s report of 1905, the claim was made that
6,000,000 sheep of improved grades were grazing in the territory.63 Although this figure
is now believed to be an overestimate, the boast indicates the importance ascribed to
sheep breeding by New Mexico government officials.
By 1900, the average New Mexico fleece weight had risen to 4.25 lbs, not a
spectacular result but definitely a significant increase. The territory was left behind by
Montana and Wyoming, where the average fleece weights were 7.0 and 7.75 lbs.,
respectively.64 By the late nineteenth century, western wool breeds elsewhere were
producing fleeces weighing as much as 10 lbs. A group of English Cotswold lambs
produced an average of 12.65 lbs. of wool in a federal research project reported in 1898.65
Indicative of what was possible in New Mexico, Montague Stevens reported in 1899 that
one of his Shropshire sheep had sheared 16.5 lbs., cf. chap. 9.66
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Two-Component Operations
The Santa Fe Trail had, after a slow start, made commercial wool growing in New
Mexico viable. The Civil War made it more profitable. When wool became important,
the territory’s sheep industry took on a two-component structure in which both live sheep
and wool were major factors. Ranchers supplied meat to an influx of immigrant factory
workers in the industrializing East and Midwest and raw wool to the textile mills of the
Northeast, even as cotton rebounded after the war.67 When the railroads arrived, they
greatly accelerated the growth of both mutton and wool production in the territory, cf.
chap. 6.
The emergence of two-component operations gave New Mexico sheepmen a degree
of stability they had not previously enjoyed. The Las Vegas Stock Grower reported, in a
routine article, the success of Judge Justo R. Armijo, who having sold his substantial
wool clip at a good price then proceeded to sell 3000 wethers in Pueblo, Colorado. The
optimistic judge predicted a period of “lasting prosperity” for the New Mexico sheep
industry.68 While extreme weather, poisonous plants, and predators remained enemies of
the sheepmen and would not be eliminated as long as sheep were raised on the open
range, the effects of market volatility were mitigated somewhat by wool production. The
reason for this is that meat and wool prices did not necessarily rise and fall together;
sometimes mutton and lamb prices rose to a relatively high level while wool prices were
lackluster, as happened after 1890. Other factors could enter also. New Mexico Gov. L.
Bradford Prince reported in 1889 that large flock losses over the winters of 1887-1888
and 1888-1889 were offset by an increase in wool prices. In his assessment, “…no
industry in New Mexico is more prosperous at this time than that of sheep raising.”69
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Through the 1870s and early 1880s, western sheepmen concentrated predominantly
on wool, which remained sufficiently profitable under western growing conditions to
sustain the industry, while meat prices remained low. They bred for heavier fleeces.70
However, by the late 1880s, wool prices had softened significantly, while sheep prices
were on the rise. Chicago wether prices rose from $3.50/hundred weight in 1884 to
$6.00-6.50 in 1891 and lambs were $7.00/hundred weight, an attractive price.71 By 1888,
Rocky Mountain sheepmen concluded that wool production was too unreliable to assure
continued profits and redoubled their efforts to produce mutton, to which they had been
giving low priority. To that end, mutton rams were crossed with the wool-producing
ewes that had been so carefully bred since the Civil War. However, care was taken not to
breed away the wool-bearing capabilities of the off-spring. Breeding as the markets
demanded, New Mexico sheepmen never foreclosed either the wool or the mutton
option.72 They could generally profit from both.
Even before the establishment of a western rail system, the market for churros was
growing broader and New Mexico herds were being driven to new locations, cf. chap. 5.
After the railroads arrived, new markets for live sheep in Denver, Omaha, Kansas City,
and Chicago began serving New Mexico growers, and meat prices assumed a degree of
uniformity throughout the country, even though they might fluctuate significantly from
week to week. Likewise, wool prices in the major markets of Philadelphia and Boston
differed only moderately but likewise fluctuated, a significant fraction of America’s wool
needs being met with imports. Both cities were home to numerous wool brokers who
purchased wool from all over the country and sold it to the woolen mills in their
regions.73 The broadened markets together with two-component production not only
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stabilized the New Mexico sheep industry to an extent but drew New Mexico further into
the national economy. By the late nineteenth century, business conditions for ranchers
had improved significantly from a few decades earlier when they sold only live sheep in
volatile, highly-localized markets.
As variable as mutton and wool prices might be, they combined to provide a decent
return over an extended period for many New Mexico sheepmen. Assessing the situation
in 1905, the governor’s report stated in the ebullient language of the day, “Free lands, the
finest climate in the world, irrigation, churches, schools, railroad facilities, home markets,
good prices, extensive range, are all factors which help to make the life of the farmer and
stock grower in New Mexico pleasant and prosperous.”74 There was more than a grain of
truth in this assessment. The sheep population had tripled and wool production had
increased by a factor of thirty since 1860. However, the two-component structure did not
eliminate all the risk in an inherently risky industry. It only shielded sheep ranchers
somewhat from moderately unstable markets, the norm. Hard times for the sheep
growers still came and went with regularity. The Panic of 1893 devastated the western
sheep industry for several years. The well-capitalized operations survived and eventually
prospered again. But many smaller operations did not.

Scouring
Not every Anglo innovation was ultimately successful. Wool fleeces as they are
sheared from the sheep are heavy and dirty with grease. They must be scoured before the
wool can be spun into thread. The scouring process reduces the fleece weight
considerably, and it is the reduced weight of the cleaned wool, or an estimate thereof, on
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which the price is ultimately based. Before scouring has occurred, it is difficult to
estimate weight shrinkage, and hence the price to be realized by any specific wool
shipment. In a move to ameliorate the uncertainty, several scouring plants were built in
New Mexico and Colorado starting in the late nineteenth century.75 This capability had
the further advantage, its principal motivating factor, of reducing rail shipping expenses
for the wool, which were determined by weight. A two-fold impetus to New Mexico
merchants to scour their wool locally thus developed. By 1902 Las Vegas had at least
four scouring mills. Merchants Gross, Kelly & Co. became very active in scouring the
wool they handled. The scouring plants employed a considerable number of people,
largely Hispanic women, but eventually died out in New Mexico when eastern buyers
elected to receive un-scoured wool because it gave them greater control over the product.
They could select by grade, sort, comb, and blend the wool as their customers desired and
then scour it for themselves. Most of the New Mexico scouring mills were gone after
1908.76
While wool exports grew steadily, New Mexico stock was sought after to be driven
north and east to help launch sheep production in other Rocky Mountain and Great Plains
states and territories. This is the subject of the following chapter.
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Chapter 5
Stocking the Western Ranges

Agricultural Developments in the Midwest
A sequence of developments, economic and technological, starting in the years
immediately before the Civil War had a profound effect on the nation’s sheep industry
and food production in general. The end result was a vast increase in sheep production
together with a geographical shift of the industry from the eastern states and some
midwestern areas to the trans-Mississippi West. A broad-based western sheep industry
developed and spread throughout much of the Great Plains and the Rocky Mountains.
New Mexico’s churros played a unique role in this chain of events in that they provided
the seed stock, totally or in part, for herds through much of the region.
The catalyst that unleashed the later developments was the expansion of America’s
rail network into the Midwest in the 1850s. Up to this time, midwestern farms were
congregated in the river valleys so as to be near the water highways over which they
transported their crops to market. Some farmers transported their surplus produce by
wagon to the nearest navigable river for continuing transport by barge down to the
Mississippi River and thence to New Orleans for further transport by ship to the markets,
and the relatively dense non-agricultural populations, on the eastern seaboard, an
expensive and time consuming practice. Others transported their produce east via the
canal systems of New York and Pennsylvania that were built in the early nineteenth
century.1 The railroads penetrating the Midwest rendered such inefficient transport
practices obsolete. In a development analogous to their effect on the New Mexico wool
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industry a few decades later, the railroads could transport midwestern agricultural
produce for the first time to urban eastern markets relatively quickly, safely, and
inexpensively. As farms now needed only to be reasonably near a rail line, it became
practical for farmers to take up lands much further from the rivers. As a result, a much
greater fraction of the midwestern land area opened up for agriculture. At the same time,
America was undergoing rapid industrialization, which created a growing army of urban
factory workers needing to be fed. Even as their numbers grew, the midwestern farms
did not sufficiently meet the expanding market for their crops.2 This resulted in increased
prices for farm produce. Increasing agricultural prices drove up the value of farm land.
At the same time, a wave of farmers pursuing new opportunities took up homesteads in
the Midwest, diminishing the availability of good farmland. The growing scarcity tended
to drive up land values even further. However, a relatively large amount of pasture land
was required for commercial livestock production, even utilizing the grassy meadows of
midwestern farms. Particularly critical, the winter feeding of farm-raised livestock, a
necessity in eastern areas, became considerably more expensive, considering the
increasing value of the land that had to be dedicated to growing feed.3
In a further development that finally rendered eastern sheep growing unattractive to
many farmers, the price of domestic wool dropped precipitously after the Civil War, cf.
chap. 4. The rapidity and extent of these inauspicious changes caught sheep farmers by
surprise. According to one government report, “…thousands of flock masters have quit
the business in disgust.”4 Many, faced with ruin, sold off their stock in panic. Others
continued production, but the eastern sheep industry as a whole underwent a steady
decline that continued through the 1890s and into the early twentieth century. 5 Sheep
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growing made less and less economic sense in the Midwest and the East.6 It simply
became too expensive to continue breeding herds on the farms.7
If sheep production became less profitable, agriculture became more so.
In response to the opposing price trends of agricultural produce and wool and the
increasing land costs, wool growers in the East and Midwest redirected their efforts away
from sheep to more profitable crops, grains in particular. They ramped up wheat and
corn production considerably and acquired dairy cows to produce milk, butter, and
cheese.8 Others moved their sheep operations west. This is not to say that sheep growing
ceased altogether in the East. Until the early1880s, the small farms east of the
Mississippi River dominated commercial mutton and lamb production. Shipments were
small, buyers were numerous and small, and the produce entered the meat market through
local butchers.9

The Far West Beckons
While conditions in the East and Midwest turned inhospitable for sheep growers, the
Far West beckoned. There, large tracts of grazing land were cheaply available to
immigrant stock growers, in marked contrast to the rising land prices in the Midwest.
Alexander Majors, principal in the western freighting firm of Russell, Majors, and
Waddell, quoted in a government report of 1870, asserted, “The country west of the
Missouri River is one vast pasture, affording unequalled summer and winter grazing,
where sheep, horses, and cattle can be raised with only the cost of herding.” The same
government report went on to assert that there was little choice, “We must of
necessity…if we grow wool at all, develop the resources of the great interior pasture land
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[The Great Plains and Rocky Mountains].”10 The land remained cheap even as ranching
took hold on a much larger scale than in the past. Land prices were held down in New
Mexico by “a deep and acknowledged distrust of land titles” under the American legal
system. A legacy of the Spanish-Mexican land-grant system, this retarded homesteader
immigration, giving ranchers a few more years to dominate the range that they would not
otherwise have enjoyed.11 Several different avenues to grazing lands were open. In the
1860s and into the early 1870s, an undivided interest in Spanish-Mexican grant land
could be acquired for as little as $0.30/acre, when there was still little understanding
among grantees willing to sell of the potential economic value of their holdings. Well
situated land with clear title could be had for $3.00/acre.12

But much of the territory’s

land was freely open for occupancy. Before1880, many ranchers simply used unclaimed
portions of the public domain without, in any way, establishing legal ownership. Rights
of occupancy were recognized on a first-come-first-served basis. As described by West
Texas sheep rancher Winifred Kupper, your range was yours “though you hadn’t paid a
cent for it. It was yours by unwritten law because you’d got there first.” Ranchers were
expected, however, to keep their sheep on their own range and not let them stray onto
anybody else’s. Conversely, it was sometimes necessary to defend ones own range from
intrusion by other stockmen with the help of a gun.13 In a similar fashion, many Hispanic
families owned their lands by Spanish occupancy custom.14 Following the annexation,
Hispanic herders in many areas of New Mexico retained for many years the traditional
grazing areas they had long been using. Such lands would have included the common
lands on community grants and unclaimed lands that had become U.S. public domain.
The U.S. Census of 1880 noted that New Mexico had a substantial contingent of widely-
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ranging, largely Hispanic, nomadic herders who owned no home range.15 The various
avenues to land acquisition after about 1880, when some degree of legal ownership
became necessary for ranchers, are described in detail in chap. 8.
Even when grazing tracts were purchased, the entry costs were altogether manageable
for many sheepmen. The lure of cheap land drew Anglo sheepmen, refugees from the
eroding opportunities in the East, to the West, including New Mexico. Writing in 1881,
promotional writer Gen. James S. Brisbin made the observation that the young farmer of
the East could no longer afford the farm his father had acquired a generation earlier. The
opportunities of the past were gone, it seemed. He continued, “What has been occurring
in the East during the last two hundred years is now occurring in the West, only with ten
fold more rapidity.” He further asserted that “No industrious man can make a mistake in
moving west…”16 By the mid-1870s, with the considerable suppression of Indian
hostilities and the increased realization of the value of New Mexico land, prices did begin
to climb.17 Land values continued increasing in the 1880s with the arrival of the railroads
and the economic boom they engendered. Hispanic grantees who sold out at rock bottom
prices would later believe that they had been cheated. When a proper legal title under
American law was obtained, grant land took on greater value because it could now be
readily bought and sold on the open market, without regard to its occupants and any preexisting obligations to them, a necessity in a capitalist economy and a disaster for the
land’s Hispanic occupants. By the late nineteenth century, only fee simple ownership
was practical and acceptable for Anglo ranchers. Despite the price rise, Anglo stockmen
continued to find ways to acquire large tracts of New Mexico land cheaply.
If the western lands provided fine grazing, many areas, including most of New
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Mexico, were recognized as poorly suited for agriculture, at least for the higher-priced
crops.18 Until the advent of mechanized irrigation, the West could not compete with
eastern agriculture in the national markets.19 Western lands would not even be fully
useful for grazing until their Indian occupants were pacified.
In New Mexico, Indian depredations had caused Hispanic herders no end of grief in
the past, cf. chap. 3. Large continuing of losses of livestock and significant, if less
frequent, losses of human life were endemic. When forced to it, Hispanic sheepmen had
expanded out from their river kingdom with considerable trepidation, despite the
immense tracts of unused rangeland. When the Civil War started, Indian depredations
increased throughout the West. Wagon trains no longer attempted to cross the plains
without military escort.20 Neither the Hispanic settlers nor the Anglo immigrants felt
much sympathy for the nomadic tribes that had, among their other depredations, severely
inhibited the development of the territory’s sheep industry.21 An 1865 article in the Santa
Fe New Mexican expressed a widely held sentiment, “With a country unsurpassed for
stock and grazing purposes, we are yet almost unknown in the great marts of the east and
why? Because numerous bands of Indians roam at will over our territory, plunder our
farmers, murder our herders, and crush out that spirit of enterprise which would
otherwise give us a remunerative competition with the rest of the nation in the production
and sale of such articles as our land could well produce.”22 The Report of the U.S.
Department of Agriculture for 1869 presented an even harsher assessment:
The depredations of wild Indians, many of them beneficiaries of the
general government under treaty stipulations, have restrained settlement
in some of the most desirable portions of the [New Mexico] territory.

103

The annual loss to which the old Mexican population has submitted for
ages from these savage free-booters, in livestock and grain, to say nothing
of the murders and wholesale devastations, is almost incredible. The
Indians infesting these regions, especially the Apaches, Navajos,
Comanches, and their kindred tribes are the most formidable foes of
civilization on the American continent.23
J. Francisco Chaves, by now a leader in territorial politics, asserted furthermore, “Were it
not for the insecurity of life and property, caused by wild marauding bands of Indians,
especially the Navajos, but a few years would elapse before the hills and plains of New
Mexico would be literally covered with fleecy flocks.”24 He was right.
By 1870, the U.S. Army had suppressed the hostilities of the nomadic tribes
throughout much of the trans-Mississippi West, in the process removing those Indians
from their ancestral hunting grounds and placing them on reservations. The campaign
would continue into the 1880s. In the same general timeframe, American hunters
removed vast populations of buffalo from the western plains, slaughtering them primarily
for their hides and tongues, but also to feed railroad laborers and to weaken Indian
resistance by depriving the nomadic tribes of their most critical resource.25 The
combined Indian and buffalo removal, aside from the very significant moral and
ecological considerations, which were expressed only weakly at the time, opened vast
tracts of inexpensive western rangeland for domestic livestock. In this sense, the western
ranching industry was built to a significant degree upon land stolen from the nomadic
tribes. For their part, the ranchers taking up these lands could concentrate their resources
on raising livestock rather than defense against Indian raids. And their livestock did not
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have to compete with wild buffalo for the available forage.
The western rangeland, as astute observers had long noted, was prime grazing land.
Santa Fe trader Josiah Gregg’s 1844 assessment was typical: “…by far the most
important indigenous product of the soil of New Mexico is its pasturage. Most of the
high-table plains afford the finest grazing in the world being mostly clothed with
different species of nutritious grass called grama.”26 The environment was overall more
conducive to sheep growing, and stock growing in general, than that of the East.27 And
the western grasses were indeed superior. Where there is sufficient rainfall, east of the
100th meridian, natural grasses remain green and full of sap throughout the summer until
the coming of frost. When the frost strikes in the fall, these grasses lose their nutritional
qualities and can no longer sustain livestock. As a result, eastern farmers had to provide
winter feed for their livestock for as much as six months of the year, a considerable
expense, as already mentioned.28 In the West, the feed promised to be free year around
and seemingly inexhaustible. Abundant grama grass (genus Bouteloua) ranged from
Texas through Arizona and north to Colorado. It was said to withstand dry weather better
than any other grass.29 Also valuable for grazing, buffalo grass (genus Buchloe) ranged
north and south from Canada to Mexico and east and west from the Rocky Mountains
into Kansas.30 The western grasses required no human intervention. In the words of
Brisbin, “…it is unnecessary to cut hay, for the grass cured on the ground and always at
hand is better than any hay in stacks.”31 Indeed, during the summer and fall, the grasses
in the West cure, i.e. dry out, before the coming of the first frost. The nutritional value of
the grasses is locked in with the curing. In a good year, the dried, uncut grass of the
western range would sustain a herd adequately during the winter months, despite the cold
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temperatures.32 A typically optimistic government report of 1870 described the entire
Rocky Mountains from New Mexico to Montana as a land of “perennial pastures,
“boundless, endless, gateless,” where cheap beef and mutton may be raised to feed the
millions of laborers who are to develop the wealth of this continent...”33 The optimism
proved justified to a considerable extent.
Shelter facilities were needed in the East to protect livestock from the harsh eastern
winters, another significant expense. The midwestern stockyards installed sheds to
protect the sheep from the elements.34 Further west, shelters were not essential until
much later, and the expense was avoided.35 Livestock could be run freely on the open
range or in feed lots, exposed to the elements year around, at least in most years.36 Winter
losses from inadequate forage or freezing storms were sustainable in good years.
Western ranchers only started building shelters in the late nineteenth century when
increased competition demanded that winter losses be minimized.
A further benefit for sheep growing in the West was that the large expanses of
available land, allowed for substantially larger herds than the farm environments of the
East, introducing money-saving economies of scale. As in the past, a skilled herder in the
West could manage 1000 head or more.37

The Western Railroads
A technological development, the railroads, made possible the full utilization of the
West’s fine grazing lands. They opened the way to an expanded, and more efficient
western sheep industry. Snaking their way west across the Great Plains after the Civil
War, they provided transport for western livestock quickly, safely, and relatively cheaply
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to the eastern and midwestern slaughter houses, in Chicago, Omaha, Kansas City, and
elsewhere. Reducing travel times from months to days, they also efficiently transported
wool to the east-coast textile mills.38 The dramatic expansion of the western wool
industry started only after the arrival of the railroads, spreading generally north from New
Mexico and Southern Colorado, where the industry was first established, cf. Fig. 4.1.39
The role of the railroads is discussed more thoroughly in chap. 6.

Churro Seed Stock
Cheap land and developing transport capabilities were important factors that made the
West attractive for growing sheep. A third major factor was the availability of cheap,
acclimated sheep, and in this regard New Mexico played a decisive role. Inexpensive and
prolific, New Mexico churros could be used to assemble a commercially viable flock
quickly and cheaply.40 Before 1869, ewes could be had for prices in the range of $1.251.75/head, an attractive price despite the animals’ small wool output.41 The low cost
would enable men of modest means, who might otherwise have been unable to do so, to
take up western sheep ranching.42 As it turned out, New Mexico churros were employed
as seed stock throughout much of the West. Some western sheepmen built their flocks
exclusively from churros. Before the Civil War, flocks were driven in small numbers to
Mormon farms in Utah, to the Nevada silver mines, and, after 1858, to the Colorado
mining districts, as noted in chap. 3. Flocks were also driven to Kansas, Nebraska,
Missouri, and Fort Laramie, Wyoming on a very small scale for both meat production
and breeding. During this period, New Mexico sheep came to be recognized as a
desirable commodity.43
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Eastern sheep also contributed to western herds. Like the churros, the eastern sheep
were also cheap following the post-Civil War collapse of the wool market. In their worst
years, 1867-1869, midwestern and eastern flock owners sold off their herds in mass at $12/head for animals that had been selling for as much as $20-40/head only a short time
earlier (during the war). These sheep, generally bred up wool producers, were either sent
to slaughter or driven west to help stock the open ranges.44 Eastern farms also provided
wool-producing rams used to upgrade western flocks for increased wool production, as
discussed in chap. 4. Thus, graded stock from the eastern and midwestern farms, as well
as churros, contributed to the western gene pool.45
The initial capital investment for a commercially viable western sheep ranch,
including land and livestock, was relatively modest through the 1880s. Annual operating
expenses for open-range grazing were likewise low, labor costs being a major
component.46 The availability of Hispanic herders was an important factor in the
evolving economics of sheep ranching in New Mexico, and the West, in the post-Civil
War era. A government report of 1869 described the situation rather bluntly, “Ample
labor to meet the demands of the rude pastoral industry of the Territory [New Mexico] is
supplied by the emancipated peons at low rates. Owing to the small outlay required,
sheep husbandry continues profitable under the primitive conditions still existing, not
withstanding the distance of the markets.”47 Skilled Hispanic herders could indeed be
secured for $10.00/month (less than $200 in 2010 dollars) and board at the time.48 Low
labor costs remained an important consideration, even a necessity, for sheep growers
through the remainder of the nineteenth century, cf. chap. 9, describing Montague
Stevens’ labor problems.
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Cheap Hispanic labor would not last forever. Starting in the 1870s, Hispanic men
began, for the first time, to leave their villages for seasonal employment in outlying areas.
There were a number of reasons for this. They were pushed out by losses of grant lands to
Anglo speculators, degradation of long-overstocked lands remaining in their possession,
human population growth which had diminished the size of the agricultural long lots
allocated to each family on community grants, and the inability of their patrones to
provide competitive compensation for their labor.49 They were drawn by new
employment opportunities at higher pay on the western railroads, in the mines, and, much
later, in the Colorado sugar beet fields, cf. chap. 9. Some of these men went to work for
Anglo stockmen throughout New Mexico and the Rocky Mountain region.50 John and
Thomas Cosgriff, starting in 1882, built what became the largest sheep operation in
Wyoming, eventually 165,000 head, and employed as their foreman, Adriano Apadaca,
one of the cohort of Hispanic herders that spread throughout the West.51

The Sheep Industry Moves West
The confluence of economic developments in both the East and the West opened the
way to an expanded, capital-intensive, and altogether more efficient national sheep
industry. The push created by low wool prices and high land and feed prices in the East
combined with the pull of low-cost western land, stock, and labor had the effect of
shifting America’s livestock industry to the west. This combination of conditions fell into
place in a comparatively compressed timeframe. The center of commercial sheep and
wool production shifted from the eastern farm belts to the Rocky Mountain-Great Plains
region and the Pacific Coast, expanding outward from the two pre-Civil War centers of
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sheep breeding, New Mexico-Southern Colorado and the more recently developed
California-Oregon area.52 In the 1870s, a contingent of midwestern sheepmen, from the
Ohio Valley in particular, emigrated to California, Colorado, and New Mexico.53 Large
herds of wool producers owned by an increasing number of growers stocked government
lands.54 New Mexico’s wool production doubled in the 1880s, cf. Fig. 4.1.55 The new
generation of growers was part of a larger post-war wave of western migration.
Thousands of displaced veterans, from both the North and South, moved west to
Missouri, Kansas, Nebraska, and Colorado, attracted by the cheap land on which they
took up farming, cf. chap. 6.
While the easterners concluded that commercial sheep production no longer made
economic sense and sold off their herds, western growers, sometimes acquiring those
same herds, believed that to be profitable, they simply had to maintain larger herds,
production costs being low.56 The low land, livestock, and labor costs combined with
increasingly efficient shipping facilities and the economies of scale possible with large
open-range operations made for a profitable post-Civil War western wool industry.
Wyoming stockman J.A. Moore reported in 1870 after eleven seasons that he could
produce wool for less than half what it had once cost him in Ohio and elsewhere in the
East.57 According to other contemporary sources, the annual cost of keeping sheep in the
West was reported to range from $0.25-0.75/head, while the cost in the East and Midwest
was about $2.00/head.58 In the early 1890s, production costs in New Mexico were
reported to be cheaper on a per head basis than in any other area west of the Mississippi
River with the exception of Texas, even though the annual lamb production per breeding
ewe might have been somewhat lower than elsewhere.59 Western growers prospered in
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the 1870s, even though sheep prices were low. Southern Colorado grower Don Felipe
Baca, who began raising sheep in 1864, reported that his wool clip covered all his annual
running expenses. The sale of his wethers on top of that resulted in pure profit.60 New
Mexico sheepmen were now profiting substantially from both wool and live sheep.61
And although mutton production costs were low and profits were still possible, many
western sheepmen in the post-Civil War period concentrated on wool, at least until the
late 1880s.62 According to the Las Vegas Stcck Grower, the older sheep-producing
states, with their higher production costs, Missouri, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Indiana in
particular, could not compete in either wool or mutton production with “the range states,”
including New Mexico, and the feeder states of Kansas and Nebraska.63 By the 1890s,
the wool and sheep production east of the Mississippi River had declined substantially,
despite growing national markets.64
As was the case with the other western states and territories, New Mexico’s sheep
industry grew under the impetus of evolving conditions, expanding national markets for
meat and wool being major factors. The New Mexico sheep population more than tripled
between 1867 and 1883 because wool had become truly profitable, cf. Fig. 2.65 Evermore
rangeland was brought into production. The newcomers to New Mexico employed
traditional Spanish open-range grazing practices, which were well suited to the territory
at the time. Land remained cheap or free even as ranching took hold on a much larger
scale than in the past.
The territory’s role was, however, unique. It supplied breeding stock for flocks
throughout the West, starting in the late 1860s and continuing into the 1880s. Churros,
particularly ewes, were employed to establish flocks in Colorado, Utah, Wyoming,
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Kansas, and Nebraska.66 Until about 1880, sheep growing in New Mexico and Southern
Colorado was still largely controlled by Hispanics, wealthy, large-scale producers but
also a growing population of small-scale owner-herders. Elsewhere sheep growing was
an Anglo endeavor.
Anglo flock owners were, during these times, possessed of an unshakable optimism
about the future, and that optimism was an important key to their success. It fostered
aggressive expansion and capitalization at a time when the industry would benefit most
from it. The sheep industry spread throughout the Rocky Mountain-Great Plains region
with extraordinary speed. Although popular imagery has always favored the cowboy and
the cattle industry, the sheep industry was, at the very least, an equally important part of
the economic foundation of the West between1870 and 1900. See Fig. 5.1.
Promotional Literature
How the various economic forces translated into actions on the part of the stockmen
and farmers in the East who actually emigrated is an important aspect of the westward
shift of the sheep industry. The great majority must have been drawn to the transMississippi West by expectations of superior lands and greater economic opportunities,
but they unquestionably arrived at these expectations without much real knowledge of the
region. Promotional literature played an important role in the dissemination of
information, and mis-information, that influenced those who made the move. As the
railroads penetrated the West, promotional writers with a range of agendas inundated the
East and Europe with glowing reports of what an emigrant could expect to find. A
diverse group, their numbers included recently-arrived immigrants, foreign travelers,
newspaper correspondents, land developers, railroad promoters, military reconnaissance
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Fig. 5.1 New Mexico Annual Earnings versus Year for Live Sheep and Wool, Cattle,
and Farm Crops. Data are taken from U.S. Census Reports, 1850-1920 and New Mexico
Agricultural Statistics, 44, 56. Rocky Mountain Wool Prices for 1860-1900 are taken
from Sypolt, Appendix III, 326. Annual earnings from live sheep and cattle are estimated
to be produced by the sale of 30% of the total inventories. Earnings from cattle were
negligible before about 1870 and did not surpass sheep earnings until after 1880. From
1890 on, cattle earnings surpassed or were at least comparable to sheep and wool
earnings. After about 1900, the earnings from agricultural crops increased rapidly and
surpassed both sheep and cattle earnings around 1905. Dollar amounts have been
converted to 2010 dollars using the Annual Consumer Price Index for the United States.
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officers, and political publicists.67 In an era when all economic development was
considered beneficial, much of the western promotional literature was aimed toward
attracting eastern capital to finance western industries, including livestock operations.
The doctrine of Manifest Destiny provided a quasi-religious motivation and justification
for the economic development, even if it meant trampling on pre-existing, non-Anglo
cultural and economic traditions, particularly those concerned with land tenure. The
literature clearly played an important role in the cattle investment bubble of the 1880s,
which extended as far as Europe. Deep-pocketed investors, English and Scottish in
particular, responded to the storm of propaganda by pouring money into large western
cattle operations that they would never see and little understood, cf. chap. 6.68 Others, a
range of men, many unprepared and incompetent, came west to actually operate the
ranches and make money. Most eventually failed.69 But there was no frenzy of East
Coast or European interest in western sheep ranches. The Anglo sheepmen who found
their way to New Mexico were primarily independent, on-site operator-investors.70 The
promoters’ influence on the sheep industry is thus more difficult to quantify, although
they sought to appeal to all stockmen. Some sheepmen were clearly drawn west by false
information.
The railroads were particularly active promoters and, perhaps, the most influential.
They had a two-fold agenda. First, they sought to create a customer base in the sparsely
populated western areas through which they were laying track at great expense; farmers
and ranchers settling these regions would ship their produce to eastern markets over their
lines. Secondly, the railroads had been granted huge tracts of land along their rights-ofway by Congress to help finance their construction. These grants were thus a federal
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subsidy to private enterprise for the construction of roads deemed to be in the national
interest. They took the form of from ten to forty alternate sections of land along both
sides of the line – a checkerboard pattern - for each mile of track laid, lands that were
theirs to sell.71 The railroads thus stood to profit doubly by selling these lands, so
conveniently located along their lines, and, at the same time, securing a customer base for
their freight services.72
The railroad promoters showed no restraint in making western sheep growing appear
attractive. Latham, at one time a surgeon employed by the Union Pacific Railroad,
predicted a “sure and profitable return” in Trans-Missouri wool growing for sheepmen
who relocated.73 In his ebullient words of 1871:
Along the whole length of the Union Pacific railway, along the
Central Pacific railway, along the Kansas Pacific railway, in the
valleys of the thousands of streams bordered with timber for buildings
and fences, there are untold millions of acres of luxuriant grazing
lands, where sheep can be put down from New Mexico, Iowa, Illinois,
Missouri, and other States for two dollars per head. Shepherds can be
hired from thirty to forty dollars per month [He seems to be including
the costs of board.] that can readily herd three thousand head [One or
two thousand was more reasonable].74
Although Latham’s predictions were, on the whole too optimistic, their general drift
proved justified; such was the hugely successful wave of economic development that
swept across America in the late nineteenth century. A profitable sheep industry
developed and flourished over a wide area of the West where it had not formerly existed.

115

And a large number of the inexpensive sheep that would stock the newly opened lands
did indeed come from New Mexico, as did many of the “shepherds.” The promoter’s
optimism must have been quite infectious.
At their most specific, the assertions of the promoters were, to say the least,
misleading. Brisbin asserted:
With $500 or $1000 in hand, a suitable herd can be started and a
ranch provided. Of course, he [the prospective sheepman] would
have to build his own house for the winter, with stables and corrals
for animals, but this anyone can do. In sheep-shearing time, unless
an expert at the business, he would have to hire a shearer at eight cents
per fleece; but now, since the bands of shearers from New Mexico and
Colorado come North, a fleece can be cut for five cents, and, in some
instances, three cents….They [the shearers] cut a fleece with marvelous
rapidity and want little else than their food and clothing, with sometimes
a pipe and a glass of beverage after supper.75
The experiences of Montague Stevens, described in chapter 9, belie these claims.
Extraordinary rates of return on modest initial investments were promised in the
widely disseminated literature. It was asserted that sheepmen who established ranches in
the West could expect to become rich within a few years.76 Brisbin described a few
instances of extraordinary success over short periods, no more than a few years, with
annual investment returns in the range 35% or more and suggested such returns could be
expected by anyone. He cites the case of M.E. Post [initials interchanged by Brisbin] of
Cheyenne, Wyoming, who from an initial investment of $8,900, mostly in the form of
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livestock, and an annual operating expense of $1,128, realized a profit of $5,172 in one
[in fact one very good] year of operation, a 50% return.77 This may have been true, but
Post’s case was exceptional. Very few western sheepmen ever saw such a large annual
return, and none saw such returns consistently, year after year. Many would-be
sheepmen apparently took the optimistic promises at face value and, unprepared for the
immense efforts demanded, failed.78 Many others, however, did establish profitable
operations in the West in the post-Civil War nineteenth century and contributed to the
dramatic expansion of the industry.
New Mexico political leaders promoted their territory for another reason altogether:
to advance the quest for statehood and the economic advantages envisioned to follow.
New Mexico statehood was blocked by the U.S. Senate for decades largely because the
territory was visualized as an impoverished, foreign land with a different language, a
different religion, even an altogether different culture, unprepared to participate in the
democratic process. The territory’s political leaders believed that an enhanced Anglo
population would “Americanize” New Mexico and thus render it ready, or at least more
acceptable, for statehood. New Mexico’s large-scale land owners, some politically
prominent, pressed the statehood issue aggressively. They understood, correctly as it
turned out, that, along with statehood, an influx of settlers from the East would increase
their land values.
Reflecting their sentiments, the official annual reports of the territorial governors to
the U.S. Secretary of the Interior presented a glowing picture of the farming and grazing
resources available in New Mexico to enterprising, presumably Anglo, stockmen and
farmers, who would develop the territory’s resources to their full potential. During Gov.
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Miguel A. Otero’s term, the governor’s report, echoing official reports over the preceding
quarter century, boldly asserted, “No country in the world is better adapted to sheep
raising and wool growing than New Mexico.”79 A later report under Gov. Otero went
into more detail, “The mild winters, the grassy mesas and watered valleys, and the
sheltered canyons help make sheep raising very profitable….A moderate capital invested
in sheep, a home ranch, and ample range, will bring success to the sheep raiser if he
possesses good tact and experience.”80
The territorial Bureau of Immigration, a promotional agency established in 1880, was
set up specifically to attract immigrants to the territory. According to Twitchell, its
efforts brought “large capital” to the territory, some of which would have contributed to
an expanded livestock industry. In describing the 1882 “Tertio-Millenial” Exposition of
Santa Fe, a promotional celebration of six weeks duration, which drew thousands of
visitors to Santa Fe, he asserted furthermore that this was “a great factor” in the growth of
the population and of the livestock and mining industries of New Mexico.81 Twitchell
was an unrestrained New Mexico booster and may, like almost all the promoters, have
overstated the situation.
Even the federal government joined in the promotional efforts. In his report on the
livestock industry in the U.S. Census of 1880, Gordon, echoing the railroad promotional
literature, described the case of a young Colorado man who started in 1872 with 770
churro ewes and 10 Vermont Merino bucks for a total investment of about $2,100. Eight
years later, in 1880, his flock had increased ten-fold to 7,500 head valued at $18,750. In
the mean time he had established a ranch worth $7,750, sold $24,000 worth of wool and
250 wethers for $650.82 This may have been true, but it was a most extraordinary case, a
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fact that the promotional literature never mentioned. Besides, $2,100 was quite a large
amount of money in 1872 ($39,000 in 2010 dollars); many sheepmen could not have
made such a large an initial investment.
The promotional literature undoubtedly played a role in bringing to the West a new
class of Anglo-American sheepmen. A large fraction of these men employed New
Mexico churros to start their herds. A significant number ended up in New Mexico. The
promotional literature invariably exaggerated the advantages of the West, citing as typical
the most successful known operations in their most successful years. The basic point
they were making that the West provided a much more favorable environment than the
East for raising sheep was, however, valid.

Churros and the Expansion of the Western Sheep Industry, 1870-1885
In the post-Civil War years, there was a tremendous demand for sheep in the West as
flocks were being established for the first time. As a result, New Mexico churros, well
positioned to address the demand, were driven throughout the Rocky Mountain-Great
Plains region to establish ranches. The sheep drives out of New Mexico, curtailed during
the Civil War, resumed on a much larger scale afterward.83 They involved, altogether,
more sheep than the California drives of the 1850s.
Stocking of the western ranges had begun gradually during the 1850s when New
Mexico speculators and sheepmen exported some 700,000 sheep to California and
another 100,000 to Colorado, Kansas, Nebraska, and Wyoming combined, while boosting
the territory sheep population by about 500,000, cf. chap. 3.84 A hiatus followed during
the Civil War. Then, peaking during the 1870s, western sheepmen purchased herds of
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breeding livestock in large numbers in New Mexico and trailed them to their ranches.85
These post-Civil War sheep drives throughout the West have been chronicled in detail
elsewhere and will only be summarized here.86 The exports were largely ewes prior to
1885. By 1876, New Mexico was exporting 350,000 “Mexican” sheep annually by trail
to Wyoming, Kansas, and Nebraska. The numbers increased steadily thereafter until
1885 when sheep exports, shipped increasingly by rail, reached a maximum of
approximately 1,000,000 head annually (“principally to Texas” at this point).87 In
the1870s, the aggregate sheep population of Idaho, Montana, Utah, Wyoming, Nevada,
and Colorado increased from 190,857 to 1,407,916, a seven-fold increase due
significantly to churro imports, according to U.S. census data.88
Colorado was the first area to be extensively stocked using New Mexico sheep. By
the time of the Civil War, Hispanic New Mexicans had expanded their homeland into
southern Colorado, and the southern third of the territory had already been stocked with
churro herds. A handful of Anglo sheepmen began to arrive during and immediately
after the war. Some of them established large flocks using churros.89 By 1871, there
were several large Anglo outfits in Colorado and Wyoming.90 Some, but not all, of the
early Anglos employed rams imported from the East to build their herds.91 In 1880,
61,420 sheep were imported to Colorado, 50,000 of which were trailed in from New
Mexico.92 The New Mexico ewes were highly regarded as seed stock and, as indicated in
chap. 4, could be readily bred up for wool production. The Bennett Brothers of
Livermore, Colorado were getting an average fleece of about 10 lbs from their1000 head
in 1877.93
The sheep industry swept north, penetrating Wyoming upon the completion of the
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transcontinental railroad.94 Here sheep growing was an Anglo operation from the
beginning, but New Mexico churros again played an important role.95 According to one
government report, 22,000 stock New Mexico sheep were driven to Wyoming in 1880.
Wyoming, and also Montana, had a significant effect on the New Mexico industry; they
provided serious competition. A few digressive comments are in order here. Wyoming
territory was well suited for sheep, with good grazing on over half its land area. And
although it got off to a comparatively late start, around 1870, it had the second largest
sheep population of any state or territory by 1900, cf. TABLE 4.1. One Wyoming sheep
outfit grew into the huge Warren Livestock Company.96
The “Big Freeze” of 1886-1887, which devastated the cattle industry over large areas
of the North, had remarkably little impact on Wyoming sheep ranchers, sheep being
better able than cattle to withstand drought and freezing conditions.97 Prior to that time,
cattle had been the favored livestock in the territory. Afterward, many cattlemen, wiped
out and lacking the financial resources for a fresh start, entered the sheep business, which
required substantially less capital.98 The notable Swan Land and Cattle Company,
originally of Cheyenne, survived when many others failed. But after years of failure to
realize its pre-1886 profitability, the company began in the early twentieth century to
make substantial investments in sheep.99 Wyoming proved superior to the older areas,
including New Mexico, for growing, if not breeding, sheep. By 1903, Wyoming and
Montana sheep were valued at $2.58 and $2.31, respectively, while New Mexico sheep
were valued at $1.98 on the average.100 Clearly, New Mexico had not kept up with
developments elsewhere in the West, due in part to environmental considerations. While
it benefitted considerably from the growth, the territory’s monopoly on Rocky Mountain
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sheep slipped away. Even as their industry expanded, New Mexico ranchers became,
within a decade, an integral part of, were even enveloped by, a large Rocky MountainGreat Plains industry of national importance that was dominated by Anglos.
The sheep industry next swept eastward across the Great Plains. The first permanent
herds in Western Dakota Territory were started in the early 1880s with flocks from New
Mexico and Colorado.101 Thousands more head were driven from New Mexico to Texas
in the early 1880s and sometimes traded for cattle. Over a twelve-year period, about 1.5
million head were trailed from New Mexico and the Texas Panhandle, then occupied by
Hispanic sheepmen, to Kansas.102 During 1880 alone, some 228,900 sheep were shipped
from New Mexico to Colorado, Kansas, and Nebraska, greatly surpassing in size the
annual shipments to California during the 1850s. And an additional 30,000 head were
driven that year to Arizona Territory and 15,000 to Texas.103 Three to four million head
in all were exported from New Mexico between 1870 and 1900.104
Some Anglo sheepmen built their first herds entirely from churros. But it became a
widespread practice to build flocks by breeding churro ewes with graded rams imported
from the East and California, just as in New Mexico, and for the same reason, i.e. to
develop a robust, open-range flock that produced an optimum combination of wool and
mutton, an optimum that varied from year to year with changing market conditions.105 In
either case, New Mexico sheep constituted an important component of the initial
breeding stock. By the early 1880s, sheep herds throughout the Rocky Mountains were
well established, the demand for churros died down, and New Mexico sheep exports for
stocking purposes dropped off substantially. The West dominated sheep and wool
production in America from this point on.
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Although New Mexico ranchers prospered in the post-Civil War years, sheep and
wool merchants assumed increasing importance within the industry and ultimately
assumed leadership. This is the subject of the following chapter.
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Chapter 6
Sheep and Mercantile Capitalism

The New Mexico’s sheep industry could never have assumed the commercial
proportions that it did without a local network of dealers. As the territory’s sheep
population increased, ever more people were employed raising sheep, since a herder on
the open range could still only manage about 1000 head. And the handful of large-scale
Hispanic growers that had been controlling the industry was joined by a much larger
contingent of small- and intermediate-scale, independent Hispanic growers together with
an influx of immigrant Anglo sheepmen.1 It is believed that the smaller Hispanic
operators, many of whom were owner-herders, were the successful partidarios who had
achieved independence from their patrones.2 Their numbers were, in any case, amplified
by a growing number of freed peon herders, peonage having been outlawed in New
Mexico by federal statute in 1867.3 The emergence of these new classes of sheepmen
constituted a significant demographic shift within the industry. By the late nineteenth
century, even Solomon Luna, with a herd of 80,000 head, owned little more than 2% of
the territory’s sheep.4 However, only the very large-scale growers had the wherewithal to
transport and sell their own produce in the distant markets, as they had done during the
days of the Camino Real and the California drives. Uneducated, Spanish-speaking,
unconnected with the outside world, and having negligible financial resources in an
increasingly capital-intensive industry, the numerous smaller-scale sheepmen became
dependent on New Mexico’s growing community of mercantile capitalists to market their
produce.
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A leadership shift occurred. Well-connected and well-informed merchants, largely
but not exclusively Anglo, assumed significant leadership roles in the sheep industry.5
They eventually handled the bulk of New Mexico’s wool, linking the growers to a
preexisting and, needless to say, Anglo establishment of eastern commission merchants
and woolen mills.6 Dealing in wool and live sheep became an important, distinct
component of the sheep industry. The merchants came to play a pivotal role in its
professionalization and integration into the mainstream American economy.
The landed rico families carried on as in the past; a few patrones became successful
sheep and wool merchants, particularly those who had been active in the Santa Fe trade.
But the number of rico growers was, if anything, dimishing, some of the old family
fortunes being diluted by inheritance customs, particularly when there was no ambitious
young heir to assume control of the herds.7 The Hispanic monopoly in sheep production
slipped away, as Anglo ranchers entered the expanding industry.
Mercantile establishments, dealing in general merchandise imported from the East,
had operated in New Mexico since the opening of the Santa Fe Trail. Many more opened
after the annexation. Sheep and wool were not commodities of overriding importance for
these operations in their early years. But merchants soon found themselves dealing in
sheep because they were an important medium of exchange in the cash-scarce economy.8
As an adjunct to their mercantile activities, some accumulated large herds, which they
maintained under a modified partido system. Markets expanded after the Civil War.
Wool became, for many merchants, the single most important component of their
business and their principal wherewithal for purchasing general merchandise in the East.9
The mercantile community grew for the remainder of the nineteenth century, particularly
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in the 1870s in response to rapidly increasing sheep and wool production.

Basic Modus Operandi
The merchants’ basic modus operandi was straight forward. They bought general
merchandise wholesale in the East, transported it west, and sold it in New Mexico at
higher western retail prices. Their retail businesses were characterized generally by low
volume and high prices. Seeking out the best deals to be had, they made important
contacts and purchased merchandise from suppliers in New York City, Philadelphia,
Baltimore, or St. Louis for heavy, bulky items. New Mexico merchant John Dold
transacted a considerable amount of business with New York City merchant-wholesaler
Leon Arnold & Co., while Ilfeld sold his wool to the Gregg Bros. of Philadelphia.10 The
merchants traded the merchandise they imported from the East for the agricultural
produce and livestock of the numerous small ranchers and farmers in their respective
areas, as hard currency remained scarce in New Mexico until the railroads arrived. They
sometimes also made cash purchases from growers in their areas. When they had
amassed a sufficient quantity of produce from several small-scale growers, they would
ship and sell it in bulk.
From the time of the annexation until after the Civil War, the principal markets for
livestock and agricultural produce in New Mexico, and the Southwest in general, were at
the U.S. Army posts and Indian reservations, where there were many mouths to feed.
During and after the war, the army brought to the territory a substantial contingent of
civilian employees, who congregated in Santa Fe, military headquarters for the territory.
Many soldiers and civilian employees were joined by their families, expanding the Anglo
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population of the area and the market for food.11 It goes without saying that New
Mexico’s entire economy, not just the livestock industry, benefited significantly from
federal dollars spent at the forts and reservations. From this point forward down to the
present, federal defense spending has provided a boost to the local economy and has been
an important source of well-being for New Mexicans. Today, of course, the federal
dollars are spent supporting military bases and national defense projects rather than
simply food for soldiers and Indians. From the late 1850s on, the sedentary merchants,
along with independent Santa Fe Trail traders, began shipping wool east over the Santa
Fe Trail, cf. chap. 4. Beginning in the 1870s, before the arrival of the railroads in New
Mexico, sheep were driven to Great Plains railheads in Kansas and Colorado and shipped
on to meat packers in Chicago, Philadelphia, and other large cities. Charles Ilfeld, one of
the first to do so, began shipping wool in quantity east from the Great Plains railheads
around 1874.12 During the post-war period at least through the late 1880s, the market for
New Mexico wethers in the Colorado mining camps was steady and reliable, longer trail
drives to more distant markets having proved generally unprofitable since the close of the
California trade.13
The arrival of the railroads greatly expanded New Mexico’s mercantile operations,
enabling merchants to ship live sheep to the midwestern slaughter houses and wool to
northeastern dealers in much larger quantities. Substantial mercantile houses appeared in
Taos, Albuquerque, Socorro, Trinidad, Colorado, and particularly Las Vegas with its
major railroad terminal and proximity to the extensive grazing lands of the eastern plains.
They took the form of general stores located at town plazas or railroad depots, often
conjoined with warehouses and livestock holding pens. The mercantile outlets, which
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were eventually scattered throughout New Mexico, became part of a growing national
commercial network that extended into the West from the industrial cities of the Midwest
and the East. The merchants built lines of communication, tenuous as they may have
been at first, between isolated, rural, Hispanic New Mexico and the rest of the nation.
New Mexico’s mercantile capitalists, and the sheep they dealt in, were thus important
agents drawing New Mexico into the U.S. economy and, by extension, U.S. society in
general. Wherever they set down, the successful outlets came to dominate the local
economy, their customer base always mostly Hispanic. Although, mercantile
establishments appeared in other sheep-producing areas of the West, they played a
somewhat unique role in New Mexico in that they became involved in every aspect of the
sheep business. Besides providing their customers with the only readily accessible
markets for their produce, they became the sole perveyers of imported eastern
merchandise. They also provided more limited services to the large-scale, sheep-growing
ricos. Besides sheep and wool, the new establishments, dealt in a variety of other local
produce including lumber, hides, and furs. They also provided financial services before
the territory’s banking industry developed. They remained the most prominent type of
merchandising outlets for as long as transport to the eastern markets was comparatively
slow and inefficient and New Mexico’s population was sparsely distributed. Only in the
twentieth century did industrial capitalism, with its great thrust toward specialization,
replace the mercantile mode of commerce in the territory.14
Many of the mercantile capitalists were recently arrived Anglos who were relatively
well educated, familiar with prevailing business practices, and, most critically, had access
to capital. Notable among these businessmen was a small but influential community of
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German-Jewish immigrants with long family traditions in merchandising.15 Among their
enterprises, The Charles Ilfeld Company, headquartered on the Las Vegas Old Town
Plaza, was for many years New Mexico’s largest mercantile operation. Earlier, by 1864,
Jacob Amberg’s store on the northwest corner of the Santa Fe plaza was said to be the
“most commodious and elegant building in New Mexico.”16 With their generally
superior resources, the Anglos were able to compete successfully with established
Hispanic merchant-sheepmen almost as soon as they arrived. The bulk of Ilfeld’s
customers were Hispanic. A key to their success was the large amount of capital they
invested in their operations. By the late 1860s, merchants Elsburg and Amberg held
$100,000 worth of stock in Santa Fe and Chihuahua, their initial financial resources
having come from outside the territory. And they were carrying a debt obligation of
$210,000 to New York creditors ($3,600,000 in 2010 dollars).17
Although the prominent nineteenth-century merchants were largely Anglo, a few
Hispanics were extraordinarily successful. New business opportunities opened by the
Santa Fe Trail had enabled some mercantile families to expand their operations and
significantly increase their wealth. Active after the annexation, one of the most
successful Hispanic mercantile capitalists was Belin-based Felipe Chavez (1834-1906), a
well-connected, well-educated cousin of J. Francisco Chaves, who built his fortune upon
a foundation of preexisting family wealth. He was, for a time, one of the richest men in
the territory. Like other elite Hispanic merchants, his operations were essentially
indistinguishable from those of his Anglo cohorts. He established an impressive
information network that extended to cities in Mexico, the United States, and England.
In all likelihood, he entered the wool business before or during the Civil War, as he was
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receiving reports on wool prices from his St. Louis buyer, Glasgow Brothers, during the
last days of the war. Chaves’ wool business, whenever it was actually launched,
expanded rapidly during the post-war period when he made large sales in Kansas and
Missouri. He also had extensive dealings, including wool transactions, with New York
City merchants Peter Harmony and Nephews. Chaves shipped 7,642 lbs. of wool to
Philadelphia in 1869, his first documented wool transaction. Nine years later, he shipped
192,668 lbs. out of New Mexico, a 25-fold increase. During this same period, the prices
he received grew from $0.11-0.12/lb. to $0.18-0.22/lb. He is known to have driven herds
of sheep east also. Like all the New Mexico merchants, he benefited greatly when the
railroads arrived and freight rates to the East were slashed. And like many of his
Hispanic cohorts, he remained active in sheep ranching. Like all sheepmen, he paid his
salaried herders very low wages. Had he done otherwise, he could not have survived in
the business world.18

Sheep and the Railroads
The extension of the nation’s railroads into the West after the Civil War had an
immense, transformative impact on the region’s economy. In New Mexico, the arrival of
the AT&SF Railway in 1879, was, as has already been aluded to, a critical factor in the
development of the territory’s sheep industry. But the fact that the railroad traversed
New Mexico at all was a fortuitous accident. The territory’s modest commerce over the
Santa Fe Trail, which the line would supplant, was of little interest to AT&SF officials.
However, the territory lay along the path to Southern California and its much larger,
rapidly expanding economy. California business justified the line; New Mexico was a
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passive beneficiary. When the AT&SF linked up with the Southern Pacific Railroad in
Deming in 1881, the nation had a second transcontinental line. And New Mexico’s sheep
industry, linked with rail transport, was once again well situated by chance to take
advantage of extra-territorial developments.
The railroads were the most important national adjunct to New Mexico’s mercantile
community. They could transport sheep and wool anywhere in the United States rapidly
and relatively inexpensively. The roads thus provided access to far more outlets than the
sheep trails ever had and opened up vast new markets for the territory’s produce. The
railroads also provided greater security for their cargo. Before they arrived, the trail
drives to the markets were quite hazardous. Losses on the great drives down the Camino
Real were always considerable, and sheepmen simply had to sustain them. They were an
inherent inefficiency in the business. After 1880, weather, predators, and trail conditions,
once important sources of danger on the trails, became largely irrelevant. Over the next
three decades, rail transport significantly reduced the uncertainties in an inherently highrisk business. The Santa Fe Trail had engendered a basic trade pattern that linked the
territory to the national economy for the first time. Modest shipments of New Mexico’s
wool had been exported over the Trail since the 1850s. The growing rail network, in
dramatically expanding trade, greatly strengthened the territory’s national connections.
After the war, sheep and cattle drives from New Mexico to the railheads became
practical. The territory’s sheep were, in small numbers, initially driven to recently
established railheads in Missouri for shipment to markets further east. As the railroads
were extended across the plains of Kansas and into Colorado, the Santa Fe Trail, along
which the rails were laid, became, in effect, ever shorter. Its eastern terminus shifted
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continually westward over a fifteen-year period with the advancing tracks. By 1877, the
AT&SF Railway had reached Animas, Colorado, providing service to the East via Kansas
City. And the D&RGW Railroad established a competing terminal at El Moro, Colorado,
providing connections to markets in St. Louis and Chicago. The travel time from El
Moro to Kansas City via Denver was about 50 hours for a heretofore unimaginable
savings in the time and labor.
After the AT&SF reached Animas, only a comparitively short wagon haul from New
Mexico was required to get wool to the rail terminus. From there, the wool could be
forwarded directly by rail to Boston and Philadelphia brokers, who purchased the
commodity from all over the country, scoured it, graded it, sorted it, and then sold it to
the woolen mills in their respective regions. In 1879 when the AT&SF reached Las
Vegas, it rendered the Trail commercially obsolete. Las Vegas, and later Albuquerque,
with its rail access, became major shipping centers. Wool and sheep export volumes
exploded in the ensueing years. After shearing time during Las Vegas’ halcyon years, the
main trail into town from the eastern plains would be backed up for four or five miles,
with wool-laden wagons. In 1900, merchants Charles Ilfeld and Gross, Blackwell were
each weighing in one-hundred wagons per day loaded with wool to be shipped east by
rail.19 To the west, Frank Bond was shipping large quantities of wool out of Espanola
over the D&RGW.
Although wool had been shipped east from New Mexico by wagon since before the
Civil War, trail drives of sheep to the U.S. markets in the Midwest had never proved
profitable before the railroads. The situation changed when they arrived and introduced
double-decked stock cars, which made the transport of live sheep to national markets
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profitable for the first time. Chicago and Philadelphia, with their efficient mechanized
packing plants, initially provided the most important markets. Later in the nineteenth
century additional livestock markets opened in Kansas City, Omaha, and Denver. The
railroads were used not only to transport New Mexico sheep directly to market, but also
to transport them north to Wyoming and Montana for fattening in the rich summer
pastures and east to feeder farms in Kansas and Nebraska. Thereafter, the stock would be
again transported by rail, this time to the slaughter houses. The railroads competed
aggressively for the merchants’ business. One common practice they employed to this
end was to offer rebates to their commercial customers who shipped in large volume.
The Kansas-Pacific Railroad gave Charles Ilfeld a 25% reduction in freight rates and a
free pass for his personal travel.20 Arrangements like this, while they ultimately made
the industry run more efficiently, were one more thing that made it difficult for smallscale merchants to compete.
The railroads not only facilitated the export of the territory’s produce, they made it
vastly easier for Americans to move west. In so doing, they brought about a considerable
influx of Anglos, largely farmers and stockmen, to New Mexico, perhaps the most
important and dramatic influence overall of the railroads on the territory. [Frank Bond
arrived in New Mexico by railroad.] The Anglo immigrants significantly increased the
territory’s population and, at the same time, altered the ethnic mix of New Mexico
society and of the sheep industry in particular. The population of New Mexico nearly
tripled from 119,565 in 1880 to 327,301 in 1910, by which time, it is believed, over half
the population was Anglo. In this same time period, wool exports expanded from
4,000,000 to 15,000,000 lbs., a factor of nearly four, cf. Fig. 4.1.21 Not only did the
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railroads bring people, they gave birth to new Anglo towns outside the Hispanic
heartland, located at promising points along the rail lines. Frank Bond opened an outlet
in Cuervo, while Charles Ilfeld opened one in Santa Rosa. Although this development
disrupted older commercial centers, with stable Hispanic populations, like Las Vegas, it
gave rise to a network of smaller, overlapping trade areas, greater competition among the
established merchants together with greater specialization and greater efficiency. The
Charles Ilfeld Co. moved toward a specialization in sheep and wool and, to a much lesser
extent, cattle and other livestock starting in the late 1880s.
The U.S. Army forts with their cash payrolls and monetary exchange services had
provided the first steady source of capital in the territory. The arrival of the railroads,
three decades later, brought the first infusion of corporate capital. Their cash payrolls
provided a second source of hard currency, giving merchants, sheepmen, and society in
general, greater liquidity, an important benefit to businesses throughout the territory.
Describing his first Sunday on the job at a Chamita store in1883, Frank Bond recalled
years later, “Sunday was the big trading day in the week when the people came to church,
and I recall on the first Sunday we took in so much silver the till had to be emptied.
There was not much other money in circulation that day apparently. It was more money
than I had ever seen before.”22 On another level, by providing a rapid response to
merchants’ needs, the railroads enabled them to reduce the size of their inventories, thus
releasing capital into circulation that otherwise would have been tied up in merchandise
sitting on shelves.23 Some of this freed up capital was used to provide cash advances to
sheep growers.
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Growing Complexity of Business Practices
The retail sales of general merchandise and food supplies to army personnel, before
the railroads, not only constituted a profitable new market for the territory’s merchants,
but the importance of that market was amplified because the sales were paid for in cash,
or its equivalent, still a scarce commodity.24 A commerce in bank drafts ensued since
sales to the U.S. government were often paid for with such drafts, i.e. checks, drawn on
eastern banks and backed by the U.S. government. These drafts were freely exchanged
between New Mexico merchants in lieu of large cash exchanges. The introduction of
secure bank drafts began to liberate New Mexico from its largely barter economy and
eventually eliminated the need for clumsy, insecure transfers of hard currency, like those
over the Santa Fe Trail during its early years. The drafts were carried east and used to
purchase manufactured goods from wholesalers; they were used by eastern and
midwestern merchants to purchase large lots of sheep and wool from New Mexican
traders. The expansion of the sheep industry in the post-Civil War period, when frequent
financial transactions, large and small, became the norm, could not have occurred without
the introduction of secure bank drafts and the monetary exchange they engendered, an
injection from the East. Since monetary exchange was the purview of the merchant, its
introduction was, in the view of Parish, the most important factor in shifting sheep
industry dominance from the producer to the merchant.25 This meant that even the largescale Hispanic ranchers would no longer dominate the industry, as they once had, even as
the market for their produce expanded.
As the markets continued to grow, meat packers and wool commission houses
became more aggressive and sent buyers out to western sheep growing regions including
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New Mexico. They offered established merchants purchase contracts, and sometimes
large advances, for livestock and wool, which, of course demanded considerable capital
reserves on their part. This was not an easy job. Wool buyers had to inspect and judge
each individual lot and offer a purchase price based on its estimated sale price in the East,
usually months in the future. The well-known non-uniformity of American wool made
for added difficulty.26 Domestic produce would be competing with imported wool on the
east coast markets so the buyers needed a thorough, up-to-date knowledge of
international crop data. However, at this time no centralized information sources existed.
Each buyer had his own somewhat-limited, personal information network. Wool, and
also sheep, buying was thus characterized by uncertainty, instability, and risk.27

New

Mexico merchants, for their part, sometimes negotiated contracts in advance with their
sheep-growing clients to insure prices and adequate deliveries. This chain of contracts
could relieve them of some of the risk they had previously assumed but, at the same time,
demanded careful planning on the part of everyone involved. Las Vegas and Santa Fe
merchants sometimes made direct loans to their producers, issuing them checkbooks, and,
when necessary, contracting with partidarios to tend their sheep. The merchants always,
however, sought to remain strictly brokers and avoid direct involvement in production,
which was even more risky.
The sheep business became sufficiently large and profitable that sheep and wool
contractors and brokers connected elsewhere sometimes established residency in the
territory, congregating in Albuquerque because of the vast sheep ranges then extending
both east and west of the town. These dealers offered New Mexico producers an
alternate source of financing, beyond that offered by the merchants. These men obtained
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working capital in the form of loans from large eastern commission houses and western
feeder farms and operated on a larger scale than New Mexico’s established resident
merchants had in the past.28 They were able to contract for the entire sheep or wool
output of large-scale ranchers. And like the merchants, they advanced operating funds to
ranchers at the beginning of the growing season and settled accounts with them at the end
of the season upon receipt of their produce. As their numbers grew, these independents
posed some competition for the established general merchants, who had gained control of
the sheep industry through their access to capital and control of monetary exchange when
these were still relatively scarce. The merchants’ business with the smaller New Mexico
growers, who had no liquidity and were often in debt to them, remained secure however.
The territory’s merchants remained viable by expanding their existing sheep and wool
operations to the more remote areas of the territory. In any case, the northern and eastern
sheep brokers often actually preferred to work through New Mexico’s established
merchantile capitalists because of their greater flexibility, since they could more readily
deliver a shipment of a specified size and grade. The numerous buyers from outside the
territory, visiting and resident, were, like the territory’s merchants, specialists within the
context of the sheep industry and constituted a new component in an industry of
increasing complexity.
As their livestock holdings grew, the merchants made significant capital investments
that expedited their operations and, at the same time, consolidated their leadership in the
sheep industry. To enhance the usefulness of his Pintada Ranch, Ilfeld went to the
expense of drilling a well. Beyond the acquisition of pasture lands, the merchants built
large warehouses for storing wool at the rail terminals where their businesses were
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centralized.29 Such facilities enabled merchants to stockpile incoming wool and hold it
off the market during periods of weak prices in the East. The small producers did not
have this luxury. They were generally forced to sell their wool to a merchant at the local
prevailing price as soon as it was shorn from their sheep. They had no way to safely store
it, nor did they have the capital reserves to sustain their operations, and support their
families, while their wool sat unsold awaiting a turn in the market. The advice given by
the Las Vegas Stock Grower to producers to hold their produce for three to six months at
the time of a downturn in the market was out of the question for many small Hispanic
growers.30
Merchant Bankers
The sedentary general merchants became the first bankers in New Mexico when they
provided rudimentary, but badly needed, banking services for their sheep-growing
clients, often advancing them money for supplies, payrolls, or the purchase of livestock at
the beginning of the growing season [Spring] and settling accounts at the end of the
season [late Fall] upon receipt of their produce. The growers might use the loans to
purchase supplies at the creditor-merchant’s store. Large-scale wool and sheep
producers, who dealt directly with dealers in the Midwest and the East, similarly
borrowed operating funds from those dealers, using their future wool and sheep
shipments as collateral. The density of such transactions was considerable by the end of
the nineteenth century, although the loans rarely ran for more than a year.31 Frank Bond
entered into such arrangements on a fairly large scale. In a more or less typical
arrangement, Charles Ilfeld provided funds to Alfred H. Long of Puerto de Luna to
purchase sheep in 1898.32 Sometimes the negotiations could be more complex. J.G.
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Clancey requested a loan of $400 from Las Vegas merchants Gross, Blackwell & Co.,
with whom he had an account, in order to pay off a note he had given to the San Miguel
Bank.33 For many years the merchants remained the sole source of credit for small-scale
growers. The continuing scarcity of hard currency in New Mexico before 1880 and the
persistence of barter transactions thereafter prevented many small-scale ranchers and
farmers from accumulating capital reserves, a growing necessity by the later nineteenth
century. As previously indicated, the same was true of many landed ricos whose wealth
was tied up in lands and livestock. Like the small-scale growers, they became dependent
on the merchants for cash and credit.
To the detriment of the growers, the last half of the nineteenth century was generally
a period of tight money, correspondingly high interest rates, and moderate sheep and
wool prices. Filling a critical need, the Ilfeld Company eventually became quite active in
banking, taking deposits, paying interest, and issuing checkbooks to its more reliable
rural customers.34 After 1882, Ilfeld usually charged his customers 12% annually for
loans, but in some cases his rate went as high as 18%. Some less fortunate growers had
to pay as much as 25% on borrowed money.35

Sometimes, the larger producers sold

smaller-scale sheepmen livestock on credit, enabling them to get started or to sustain their
operations when they lacked the cash required. In this case the sellers typically charged
the stock buyers a monthly interest of 1%.36 In taking out loans from various lenders,
New Mexico’s small-scale sheep growers were drawn into the less paternal modus
operandi of American capitalism. [If the above comments seem overly general, it should
be noted that banking practices had not yet become standardized during this era; almost
all financial arrangements, even those with extra-territorial lenders, were transacted face-
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to-face on a more or less ad hoc basis.]
With the rapid growth of the western sheep industry in the late nineteenth century and
the concomitant demand for financing, New Mexico’s merchants eventually found
themselves unable to provide the loans needed by their many farming and ranching
client-suppliers. Requiring ever larger amounts of capital, they began borrowing from a
variety of sources, including, eventually, eastern wool commission houses, western
feeder farmers, midwestern slaughter houses, and occasionally private investors.37 The
Bonds are known to have obtained a substantial loan, about $22,000 ($575,000 in 2010
dollars), from private investor Abraham Staab in 1902.38 These firms charged lower
interest rates than the eastern banks, presumably because they knew their customers, had
confidence in the collateral, and were themselves dealers in wool or sheep. The interest
rates they charged were still relatively high.39 The New Mexican merchants employed
these borrowed funds in the same way as their personal funds, both to provide advances
to local ranchers and to buy outright farm and ranch produce for resale elsewhere. Loans
to producers were usually granted on the condition that the borrower was obligated to sell
or consign his livestock and purchase all his supplies, through the lending merchant until
the debt was settled. Otherwise, the producer’s livestock might be confiscated by the
merchant to satisfy unpaid debts. The mercantile firms sometimes became full-service
financial agents for their growers. Besides advancing needed operating funds, they
honored bank drafts used by their clients to pay herders and buy equipment, and they
negotiated leases for grazing lands. They were purchasing agent, sales agent, real estate
broker, and banker all rolled into one and all expedited by their control of the flow of
money and credit between east and west.40 The increasing reliance of intermediate- and
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small-scale producers on the merchants, helped to elevate the merchants to leadership
positions in the territory’s sheep industry.
A creditor sometimes had to be forceful to insure that a loan would be paid off. In
one documented situation, New Mexico wool grower Eusebio Garcia y Ortiz run up a
debt of $1,716 to Otero, Sellar & Co. of Las Vegas, substantially larger than the annual
expenses of $1,000 that he incurred running a band of about 3,500 sheep. Perhaps
sensing an impending difficulty collecting on the loan, the company took an advance
assignment of his 7,000 lb. wool clip to be delivered to the company after shearing. This
they were authorized to sell and to apply the proceeds to Garcia’s indebtedness.41
Professional banking began in New Mexico in 1870 when a group of partners
founded the First National Bank of Santa Fe (FNBSF) with the proceeds from the sale of
the Maxwell Land Grant. The banks eventually replaced the forts as providers of
monetary exchange, the commissions for which provided large profits. These banks had
few depositors in their earlier years, monetary exchange being their main business. In
this sense, they were just informal extensions of eastern banks. The western banks were
usually small, and their high interest rates discouraged livestock financing, although that
became a considerable part of their business. Western banks typically charged a monthly
rate of 1.5% loans, not entirely because of the considerable risk of the livestock business,
but largely because of the shortage of funds available and the resulting competition for
loans. For their part, bank officers knew their customers well and understood the
uncertainties they faced. In granting loans, they relied on the character and ability of
their clients to pay. The merchants remained the bankers for the hinterlands populations
long after the banks arrived. New Mexico banks experienced unique problems.
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Responding to an inquiry from the Comptroller of the Currency concerning the large
number of overdue loans in the late 1870s, the cashier of FNBSF responded: “Banking in
New Mexico is surrounded by many…trials by which banks in the east are free
(especially having as customers sheep growers) who though perfectly good and solvent
and always pay in the end [an overstatement of fact] are invariably in the spring of the
year hundreds of miles away with their herds.”42
Some merchants became professional bankers. Lehman and Willi Spiegelberg of the
prominent mercantile family established the Second National Bank of Santa Fe in 1872,
which operated in close competition with the First National Bank.43 Loans to sheepmen
were an important component of the business of both banks. In another notable case,
Don Miguel A. Otero, politically prominent partner in the Las Vegas mercantile concern
Otero, Sellar & Co., sold out his interest in the company and together with several other
local businessmen established the First National Bank of Las Vegas in 1881. A major
part of this bank’s business also involved loans to New Mexico sheepmen.44 Sheep were
thus an important agent in the development of the territory’s banking system.
A word about financing in the cattle industry is appropriate here as a point of
comparison. Unlike the case for sheep, absentee investors were an important factor in the
Rocky Mountain cattle industry. Those interested in western livestock focused largely on
the cattle business, which they visualized as new, exciting, and promising. Conversely,
they expressed little interest in sheep, as the cattle bubble raged.45 Sophisticated
investors on the east coast and in Europe, men who had never been west of the
Mississippi River, poured their resources into large cattle ranches, and the early returns
did seem promising.46 These investors, like cattlemen on the range, considered the sheep
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industry shabby and disreputable. The industry was, of course, old and the fortunes it had
produced, although real, were modest by gilded-age standards. However, the open-range
sheep business was less expensive to enter than cattle ranching, so western sheepmen, to
their benefit, were able to get started and operate without large-scale absentee capital
investors.

Merchant Sheep Owners
Because they were often paid for their merchandise in the form of livestock, many
merchants found themselves in possession of considerable numbers of sheep, which, for a
variety of reasons, they often needed to hold for a time prior to shipment to market. The
merchants did not actively choose to be sheep owners, but did it out of necessity. It was a
situation for which they were initially ill prepared, but the practice became widespread
and expanded in time. Prior to about 1875, Charles Ilfeld typically had a relatively
modest herd of 3000-5000 sheep.47 In later years, his company and his sheep holdings
grew considerably. The extent of this activity is illustrated by the inventory of the Bond
Brothers in 1900, at which time they had $36,000 ($1,000,000 in 2010 dollars) invested
in sheep, including over 18,000 head rented out under partido contracts.48 An almost
natural result of the situation was that the merchants, their inclinations to the contrary,
sometimes became actively involved in raising sheep. To that end, they secured grazing
lands and entered partido contracts. Ilfeld held most of his partido sheep in San Miguel
County.49 The Bond brothers held large partido herds in the Antonito, Colorado area, as
well as other locations.50 The merchants thus assumed in part the traditional role of the
sheep-growing patron, while the pastores exercised an increasing degree of
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independence from their former patrones. For the merchants, this constituted an
important adaptation to local tradition. And the small-scale producers exchanged one
master for another, in a sense, one generally more impersonal but also more systematic,
efficient, and arguably less exploitative, particularly when an element of competition
among merchants was present. It was a relationship with which the herders were familiar
and comfortable.
Business practices in territorial New Mexico were always somewhat schizophrenic.
Up-to-date methods were employed in negotiations with the outside world, while
dealings with local sheep growers diverged slowly from tradition, involving a
considerable degree of barter. This was, in many ways, an extention of the operations of
the sheep-growing ricos prior to the annexation. The sedentary merchants took over
some, but not all, of the traditional functions of the patron. They provided a connection
with the outside world to the isolated villagers in their area. With their specialized
knowledge, they sold the local produce in national and international markets at the best
prices possible. They provided the household merchandise and farm supplies needed in
the villages they served, employing their wholesale sources in the East and Midwest.
They extended cash advances or credit to their suppliers on produce for future delivery.
And they sometimes provided translation and rudimentary legal services. The merchants
did not, however, generally assume the political or the social leadership roles of the
traditional patron. They concentrated on business, which had become a demanding, fulltime activity. When Frank Bond’s Taos partner, J.H. McCarthy got involved in local
politics, Bond admonished him severely writing, “We have never mixed politics or
religion in our business and we certainly do not wish you to do so…Keep a still mouth as
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regards politics or religion. They have nothing to do with business…”51
While the merchants assumed a greater role in territorial life, the leadership and
power of the traditional patrones eroded. With improved transportation and
communications, outside influences penetrated the isolation and relative self-sufficiency
of the village plazas. When telegraph lines reached New Mexico in 1869, it became a
practical possibility for a resident of the most remote village to be in reasonably close
contact with the outside world through newspapers if not personal interactions. The
patron was thus no longer the sole link between the villagers in his bailiwick and the
world at large. When small-scale sheepmen wished to sell their produce or required cash
advances at the beginning of the growing season, they went to the merchants if they
could. As alternative employment was offered by mines, railroads, lumber companies,
beet farms, and even Anglo sheepmen, the patron ceased to be the sole, or even the
principal, employer in his area, cf. chap. 9. When the patron was unable to pay the
competitive wages that village men could get from seasonal employment elsewhere, he
lost his overriding economic leverage over his peones, if he still had any, and his salaried
employees. The social and economic leadership of some rico families thus eroded as a
result of changing conditions arising from extra-territorial developments to which they
did not or could not adapt.

The Partido System, Revisited
As the merchants acquired sheep, they adopted a variation of the traditional partido
system to manage their flocks, which involved a somewhat expanded range of
considerations and the exchange of both sheep and cash or credit. Although the partido
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contracts varied in detail, in a typical agreement, the merchant furnished the supplies and
advanced the territorial ad valorem taxes, ram usage fees, shearing costs, and transport
fees to the nearest rail junction. The supply outlays and half the other outlays were to be
repaid by the partidario out of his fraction of the wool and wether income. The rent for
the herd was still paid in the form of sheep and/or wool. Accounts were settled each
summer or fall when the sheep and wool were sold. In a typical arrangement, the owner
might receive two lbs./head of the wool shorn annually from his herd and a credit for half
the increase of the wethers. At the end of the contract period (possibly five years), he
then received, if all went well, a replacement for his original flock together with his
portion of the flock increase, possibly an annual increase in sheep count of 25-33%, as in
the partido agreements of the past. Ilfeld initiated such a practice in 1883 at a time when
his collection problems became severe and he was presumably accepting more sheep as
payments for merchandise.

He advanced his partidarios cash or credit at his stores for

the necessary supplies. Under this modified system, if the partidario came up short at the
end of the contract period, he might have to make up the difference using his own sheep
as currency or simply emerge from the contract owing his merchant-patron a specified
amount of cash to be paid off at some future time. The revised partido system was thus a
cash-barter hybrid that reflected the increasing role of capital in the industry. Sheep
themselves could no longer be used as the sole means of exchange.52 Partido contracts
secured for the merchant the herder’s patronage for food and other supplies and left the
merchant in control of the sale of the sheep and wool. As a reflection of the growth of
the sheep industry in the late nineteenth century, by 1890 Ilfeld had 17,000 head under
partido contracts, which grew to 33,000 by 1897. His maximum holdings reached
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86,000 in 1905, which were managed by 44 partidarios. With his flocks producing an
average annual lamb yield of 65-85% of his ewe holdings and with lambs valued at
$0.90-1.00/head, a partidario could now earn from a flock containing 500 ewes a profit
of $150-200 annually ($4,000-5,000 in 2010 dollars), as his expenses were quite small.
Ilfeld hired his herders in Las Vegas and received more requests for partido contracts
than he could fill. He generally turned down requests from Anglo applicants, preferring
to deal with local Hispanics who were his customers and may have owed him money.53
The partidarios were often required to secure the necessary grazing lands themselves,
minimizing the range requirements, and hence the expenses, for the merchant. Ilfeld
generally did not acquire large grazing tracts, but chose his partidarios from among,
small-scale, Hispanic ranchers who owned or had access to some useful land that could
be readily augmented by the surrounding public domain, cf. chap. 8 concerning public
domain usage by ranchers.54 Other merchant-patrones, including the Bond Brothers,
assisted their partidarios by leasing private or government lands.55 Eventually however,
Ilfeld controlled through ownership or lease the 63,000 acre Pintada Ranch, which his
company began working in 1899, using it initially as a holding area for sheep acquired as
payment on debts. At this time, he was holding 33,000 sheep on the ranch, but the
number soon rose to 57,000 as a result of speculative purchases on the part of Nordhaus.
The partido system as it was adopted by the merchants provided new advantages. It
gave them an outlet for excess livestock so that, like wool, herds might be held during
periods of weak prices until the markets rebounded. The system enabled Ilfeld to retain
many of his old customers through hard times by granting them partido contracts.
Between 1894 and 1904, Ilfeld’s annual return on his personal sheep business varied
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from 5-16%, which was reduced to 3-11% after taking into account the interest expenses
he incurred on money he borrowed to sustain the operations. His partido operations were
thus only moderately profitable. But, he still went to the extreme of borrowing funds to
purchase sheep for partido contracts with his favored customers as a means of preserving
their earnings during tough times so that they might continue to patronize his stores. It
served to shield his business from losses which might have otherwise occurred if his
customers had suffered severe financial reverses. The system was also a vehicle for
retaining old customers and obtaining new customers outside the Las Vegas area; it was a
comparatively safe means of providing them badly needed credit.56
The system also had its drawbacks. It was believed that it discouraged selective
breeding, as in the past, because neither the owners nor the renters cared to bear the
expense, cf. chap. 4. The merchants were, in any case, never in the breeding business,
sheep ownership being only incidental to their operations. And the partidarios would
have had little to gain by upgrading an owner’s flock.57 Moreover, since the merchants
off-loaded a heavy burden of risk onto their partidarios, those herders would have been
disinclined to assume the added risk of breeding.
The partido system had always been open to abuse, and that shortcoming persisted
through the end of the nineteenth century. In 1898 Sheepman Nestor Armijo notified his
dealer, Gross, Blackwell & Co. that he would not be shipping in any wool since lambs
were now more profitable than wool. He had persuaded his partidarios to keep all the
wool for themselves and instead give him all the lambs for the rent, apparently contrary
to the original agreement.58 Abuses of the system did not always originate with the
patron. Max Nordhaus sometimes had problems with partidarios drinking, a problem
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that would not have existed in earlier years when the herders lived in greater isolation.59
Theft by partidarios was an occasional problem. Sometime around 1898, Charles Ilfeld
became aware that some brothers under a partido contract had been selling off small
quantities of his sheep from time to time. The company decided, after unsuccessful
efforts to stop this practice, to take back the sheep. A letter written by Nordhaus
describes the situation:
All the sheep these boys have are our sheep and they have absolutely
no right to dispose of a single sheep. We have previously been informed
that they have sold small numbers ranging from 10 to 25 and although
we have raked them about this—time and again—we did not care to take the
sheep from them, since we know [now] that they are trying to dispose of them
in such a wholesale way we surely have to take decided steps against them.
We have today written Wm. Hunter to at once take possession of our sheep.60
On another occasion, a partidario actually sold 900 Ilfeld sheep.61
Sometimes merchant-partidario relations assumed a “wild west” character. In 1892,
Wagon Mound merchant John Justus Schmidt got wind that one of his partidarios, J.D.
Gallegos, was intent on quietly relocating to Raton, taking the rented sheep in his
possession with him. To prevent the theft of his sheep, Schmidt obtained a restraining
order from the court in Las Vegas, apparently frustrating Gallegos. Sometime later when
Schmidt and his family left town by buggy to attend to some business, Gallegos followed
them, and an altercation ensued. The herdsman caught up with the buggy, threatened
Schmidt with a rifle, and then shot him after he jumped clear of the buggy. Mortally
wounded, Schmidt was able to shoot Gallegos with a derringer before he died.62
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Needless to say, not all partido contracts were successfully concluded. As in the
Spanish and Mexican periods, an assessment of just how many went unfulfilled is
difficult to make. The Ilfeld Company records provide some hint, however. By the late
nineteenth century, some 35% of Ilfeld’s herders had fallen progressively deeper in debt
to the company, which carried over their accounts from year to year. This suggests that a
significant fraction of his partido contracts went unfulfilled. Ilfeld eventually did what
any modern businessman would do and wrote many of these debts off his books as
uncollectible.63 The Bonds may have been more successful than Ilfeld in collecting
debts, cf. chap. 7.

This collection data suggests, furthermore, that a significant fraction

of the partido contracts of earlier years were broken, with, of course, devastating
consequences for the partidario.
By the early twentieth century, substantial tracts of the public domain had been taken
up by homesteaders and ranchers, cf. chap. 10. The partidarios, who continued to
depend on the availability of open rangeland, were squeezed and began to have a
critically difficult time. The partido system gradually fell into disuse as the lands needed
to sustain it became unavailable.64
Merchants and Cattle
A word about the marketing of cattle, territorial New Mexico’s other important
livestock industry in the post-Civil War years, is in order here. As previously mentioned,
the first commercial markets for New Mexico cattle were at various U.S. Army forts
starting on the eve of the Civil War.65 New Mexico merchants, however, rarely dealt in
cattle on a large scale. By the 1870s, cattlemen were employing a network of trails for
the romanticized cattle drives to the Great Plains rail junctions, where they sold their
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herds directly to dealers. After adequate rail service was in place, New Mexico cattlemen
shipped their livestock out of the territory by rail to Chicago and other markets where
they sold their own stock, although they often found the experience frustrating. Ilfeld
chose not to deal extensively in cattle because of the long time delay in completing sales
during which cattle prices could fluctuate even more wildly than sheep prices. The
business was too risky for his tastes. All too often, merchants found midwestern
slaughter-house prices depressed to unprofitable levels by the time they were able to
actually deliver a previously purchased herd. Like Ilfeld, many other New Mexico
merchants, chose to avoid this sceneario, by limiting their cattle dealings.66

Increasing Anglo Dominance
Mercantile Capitalism in New Mexico was always dominated by Anglos, men who
had immigrated into the territory from elsewhere. They had opened the Santa Fe trade
shortly after Mexican independence and achieved a degree of commercial success almost
immediately. Hispanics established a major position in the trade by about 1845, but their
success was short lived. The Civil War brought about considerable economic upheaval in
the West, and many Hispanic merchants sustained large losses as evolving conditions
upset their modus operandi and decreased their profits. Only the most successful
Hispanic mercantile families maintained their wealth in the post-war years.67 Their
numbers were limited. The overriding barrier Hispanics faced was ultimately inadequate
capital. By the 1860s, the nature of the Santa Fe trade had evolved considerably away
from the commerce of “small traders” described by Josiah Gregg. New Mexico prices
along with profit margins had decreased while the volume of trade had expanded greatly.
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Also, Indian depredations, a business expense to be reckoned with, increased for at least a
decade. The evolving conditions demanded of merchants larger shipments and
correspondingly increased capital investment for their operations to remain profitable.68
Trade opportunities, once possible through individual initiative, physical endurance, and
a bit of luck alone dissipated. Most mid-level Hispanic merchants lacked the financial
resources to stay in business. The Hispanic mercantile community contracted. Many
small- and intermediate-scale operations had gone out of business by 1880, while the
very wealthiest families, their capital hard at work, became even richer.69 Only they
made the transition from trail trader to sedentary merchant. To their credit, the most
successful Hispanics learned the American modus operandi and, like Felipe Chaves,
operated in a manner indistinguishable from their Anglo counterparts.70 For their part,
the small, but significant, number of Anglos who ended up in New Mexico and became
successful merchants generally possessed adequate capital resources. They continued to
prosper to varying extents. Small-scale Hispanic sheep growers became of necessity
increasingly reliant, and ultimately dependent, on Anglo merchants to provide cash
advances and to market their produce.

Sheep Feeding
In the mid-1860s, a new practice that would have major repercussions within the New
Mexico sheep industry first appeared. A few ranchers began growing crops to feed their
livestock. Later, New Mexico ranchers discovered it to their advantage to ship their
sheep out of the territory to be fattened on feeder farms prior to sale. The practice was
accelerated by a recovery in the late 1880s of the mutton market, which had been in
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decline since the Civil War. Seeking a supply of winter mutton to feed America’s
growing urban populations, Chicago and Kansas City meat packing families initiated
farm feeding of western sheep as a commercial enterprise, but it was soon taken over by
private feeder-farmers specializing in the activity.71 Feeding was a capital-intensive
business which flourished after about 1890. It played a role in the growth of Anglo
control of the sheep industry in New Mexico.
An early Colorado feeding operation was reported by Civil War Gen. William T.
Sherman. On an inspection trip through Huerfano County in 1866, he visited a feeder
farm with thousands of acres under cultivation, which served to feed 3,000 head of cattle,
5,000-6,000 sheep, and numerous horses.72 Another Colorado operation dating from the
same period, the Doyle Estate, cultivated over 1400 acres, mostly of corn, and ran 5,000
sheep and 600 cattle.73 Over the following decades, an industry of commercial
proportions that specialized in feeding lambs and young sheep until they were ready for
market spread over the Rocky Mountains and Great Plains.74 The feeder farms were
located optimally near rail lines and relatively close to the large midwestern packing
houses where they sold the fattened sheep.
Before the advent of feeding, western sheep were generally grazed throughout their
production cycle on the open range, but still in a relatively circumscribed area. The land
and the fodder it provided were free and, in a good year, supplied the livestock all their
required sustenance. Grass was still abundant in many parts of the West; the sheep were
dispersed, adequately-fed, and healthy, and losses were usually light. Such operations
were, however, not very efficient, cf. chap. 9. As competition grew and market
requirements became more exacting, traditional practices became less profitable. More
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proactive attention to growing conditions was needed, even demanded. When the
periodic summer droughts and overly harsh winters arrived, sheep became thin and weak,
not suitable for market even when they survived the winter, an increasingly unsustainable
situation for growers. Under these circumstances, assisted feeding was beneficial,
particularly during the first three months of the year.75 Feeding was found to produce
heavier animals, which were better able to withstand the winters and brought higher
market prices. Furthermore, fed sheep matured faster and could be sent to market sooner,
reducing production costs. In the mid-1880s, western growers, including those of New
Mexico, started shipping sheep in large numbers to feeder farms to be fattened at
locations better suited for this activity. With the advent of rail transport, it became
practical to ship lambs, not just mature sheep, to feeder farms, providing western growers
with a new outlet for their produce. Lambs in the care of their mothers had always proven
difficult to trail drive and were thus not readily marketable prior to this. The feeding
process typically added the final 15-25 lbs. to a 55 lb. lamb, and the quality of the
resulting meat was more desirable according to the market standards of the time.76
Breeders found the new practice more profitable than raising livestock to full maturity on
the open range, even after their profits were shared with the feeder farmers. Just prior to
the Panic of 1893, the New Mexico sheep industry was flourishing, in part due to the
extra-territorial demand for its feeder stock.77
Alfalfa and grains were the most common feed grown for sheep. The emergence of
the Colorado sugar beet industry in the late 1890s on irrigated lands had an important
effect on the feeding industry in that area. It was discovered that beet tops and the residue
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beet pulp, a byproduct of the sugar-refining process, made good feed for both cattle and
lambs.78
Farm feeding, as it was practiced in the West, owed its success to the fact that the
southern ranges were best utilized for breeding livestock, while the northern plains and
valleys were best for fattening. The grasses in the southern regions, which included New
Mexico, had sufficient nutritive value for building bone and muscle, but lacked the sugar
and starch needed to build up the level of fat then desired. The fields further north
produced better grass for fattening. But the northern areas have colder winters that can
extend well into spring and are subject to sudden, extreme climate changes, rendering
them unsuitable for breeding livestock.79 Cold, windy spring weather, during the first
month after birth, could cause significant losses of the newborn.80 Having comparatively
stable weather patterns and mild springs with the ample green grass needed by the ewes,
New Mexico had always been a good breeding area.81 Late in the year, when the weather
on the ranges became colder, was the best time to ship sheep to the feed-growing areas to
be fattened. This proved to be more profitable than transporting feed from the farms to
the sheep ranches, although that was tried.82 New Mexico ranchers thus came to
specialize increasingly in breeding. The Santa Fe New Mexican, ever optimistic,
predicted that New Mexico would become “the great breeding ground of the Southwest
where young and healthy sheep and cattle can be produced so cheap that northern dealers
can better afford to come here and buy than attempt to compete with this territory by
breeding in colder districts.”83 The New Mexico-Colorado border was described in one
government publication as the boundary between the breeding and fattening regions.84
Specialization made possible optimum use of the available lands.
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New Mexico sheepmen sent their flocks to several different feeding areas,
particularly Colorado, Nebraska, and Kansas, where the needed crops were readily
grown. Feedlots proved to be quite profitable for the farmers involved. By the late
1880s, the lamb feeding industry of the Fort Collins area was described as “the most
profitable industry the farmers of this county ever engaged in.”85 By the early 1890s,
typically about 25% of the New Mexico sheep inventory was sold every year and shipped
by rail or trail driven to feeder farms or ranches in the “North and East.”86 A measure of
the growing importance of feeding is the introduction by the Las Vegas Stock Grower on
January 1, 1887, of a new department entitled “Feed Farming,” devoted exclusively to
news about livestock feeding.87 The practice of feeding grew steadily through the 1920s.
A thriving feeding industry developed in Colorado at a relatively early date following
the introduction of alfalfa into the territory from New Mexico in 1863. Appendix E
provides some general information about alfalfa. Commercial-scale operations were in
place by the mid-1880s, when crop surpluses along the Platt and Arkansas Rivers proved
useful for feeding livestock. Sheep, many from New Mexico, but also from Wyoming,
Idaho, California, and Colorado itself, and smaller numbers of cattle, were brought into
these irrigated areas to feed on the alfalfa and corn.88 Typically, lambs were purchased in
New Mexico, shipped by rail to Colorado where they were fattened in feeding pens for
four-to-six months, and then forwarded for sale in the Kansas City and St. Louis markets.
Colorado sheep feeding received a boost in 1889 when a rail shipment of 2,400
“Mexican” lambs belonging to New Mexico growers E.J. and I.W Bennett became stalled
in Walsenburg by a blizzard. When the weather finally cleared, the lambs were in such
poor condition that the brothers decided to ship them to Fort Collins where they could
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recoup on cheaply available alfalfa. Finally shipped to market in Chicago, they brought
an excellent profit.89 The brothers then expanded this modus operandi, feeding 3500
“Mexican” sheep the following season. Word of their success got around, and Fort
Collins developed into another important feeding center. Lambs surpassed wool as the
Colorado sheepman’s main source of income.90
Following the Panic of 1893, which devastated the Colorado feeding industry, H.C.
Abbott trailed 10,000 sheep partly from Folsom, New Mexico, into Las Animas,
Colorado, on the Arkansas River, giving rise to a spring lamb industry in that area. In
1895, Abbott relocated to Springer, New Mexico, and went into partnership with S.
Florsheim, from where the two men drove many flocks into the Arkansas Valley over the
years.91 The first lambs for rebuilding the Fort Collins feeding industry after the panic
were shipped from New Mexico in 1896 The Sargent family of Grant County, Wisconsin
was quite active in the San Luis Valley, where the Colorado sheep industry had started.
One of the sons, Ed Sargent, entered a business arrangement with Frank Bond and
eventually had sheep on feed all over Colorado and Northern New Mexico, cf. chap. 7.92
Besides individual sheepmen, New Mexico mercantile companies became involved in
Colorado feeding. Both Gross, Kelly and the Moulton-Ilfeld Company were active in the
Arkansas Valley. The Colorado feeding industry grew steadily for the remainder of the
nineteenth century.93
Feeding started in the Platt River Valley of central Nebraska in the late 1870s with a
New Mexico flock. In the mid-1880s, most of the state’s farmers replaced their range
stock with pen-fed farm flocks. The Nebraska feeding industry subsequently spread,
taking up fertile, unused farm land in several areas. Feeding in the North Platte area of
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Western Nebraska began in the late 1880s when irrigation ditches were built. By this
time, Nebraska led the nation in the number of range-bred sheep it fed, reportedly more
than “all the balance of the United States.”94 The larger Nebraska feeders typically held
10,000-26,000 head.95 The stock was usually shipped by rail, although as late as the
1890s, occasional flocks were still being trail-driven to the state. The Las Vegas Stock
Grower and Farmer reported that over 12,000 head of New Mexico sheep had been
shipped to a single Nebraska feeding outfit in the first seven months of 1897. More than
one million sheep were readied for market by Nebraska feeders in the same timeframe.96
Frank Bond acquired a 270-acre feeder ranch in Wood River, Nebraska in 1909 where he
fed 20,000-25,000 head. He also had dealings with other feeders in Wood River, where
several other New Mexico sheepmen also had feeding arrangements. A few years later,
he leased additional land in Lexington, Nebraska for feeding purposes. He marketed his
Nebraska-fed sheep in Omaha, cf. chap. 7.97
Kansas, where flocks were first developed in the late 1870s, became another leading
feeder state. Beginning in the late 1880s, some farmers, following practices adopted a
few years earlier in Nebraska, shifted their emphasis to feeding farm-raised sheep. The
feeding industry grew steadily, as reflected by the sixteen-fold increase of the Kansas
alfalfa crop between 1891 and 1904 to meet the needs of the industry.98 The fattened
sheep were sent to market from January through May, when range-raised mutton was not
readily available.
The feeder industry was driven by the feeders themselves who found the
specialization profitable and aggressively sought stock for their operations. By the late1880s, farmers in all the feeder states, even Iowa and Minnesota, were sending buyers to
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New Mexico, seeking not just feeder stock but also breeding ewes.99 Fort Collins feeder
and U.S. Senator William A. Drake began his highly successful operation in 1892 with
15,000 sheep purchased in Albuquerque, illustrative of the large capital requirements
required in this new endeavor. By the early 1900s, Fort Collins feeders were traveling to
Espanola in August to purchase lambs from the Bond Brothers and continuing on to
Wagon Mound and Las Vegas to further fill out their needs.100 Interestingly, the
“Mexican” lambs, preferably 6-8 months old, still widely grown in New Mexico, were
described as the most sought after by Colorado feeders. Churros were found to respond
well to feeding, and their superior meat was desired by consumers. As mutton once again
became more important than wool, their light fleeces were not an issue.101 The men who
took up farm feeding had largely been part of the wave of western migration following
the Civil War when thousands of displaced veterans, from both the North and South,
moved west to Missouri, Kansas, Nebraska, and Colorado, attracted by the cheap land on
which they took up farming and stock growing. They discovered, perhaps to their
surprise, that their newly acquired lands were capable of growing copious forage crops
and were profitably devoted to feeding livestock.102 The western sheep industry had by
the late 1880s served the United States quite well. The increased supply it provided of
mutton and wool “greatly decreased” the cost of those commodities to America’s
consumers.103
Several additional factors contributed to the rise of the feeding industry. Land had
always been critically important for sheep raising; a great deal of land was required for
open-range grazing. The growing scarcity of rangeland, and the grass it supported, as
more and more stockmen placed more and more sheep and cattle on the ranges to share in
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nature’s diminishing bounty, was detrimental for all ranchers and an important factor in
the adoption of feeding. Furthermore, widespread deterioration from over-stocking had
generally reduced the stock-carrying capacity of the existing rangeland. In New Mexico,
land scarcity became even more critical starting around 1880 as homesteaders
immigrating to the territory in substantial numbers started taking up the best unclaimed
tracts, cf. chap. 10.104 According to Carlson, the growing land scarcity forced ricos who
had expanded their sheep operations onto the public domain back onto their grants, thus
limiting their herd sizes.105 As discussed in chap. 10, the federal government exacerbated
the situation with a misguided land policy that channeled good western rangeland into
what proved to be marginal dry-land farms. This resulted in further widespread overstocking of sheep and cattle onto the remaining, mostly inferior rangelands.106 Naturally
growing forage became altogether too scarce, and sheep growers had little choice but to
become more proactive in feeding their flocks.107 By shipping their stock out to feeders
before they were fully grown, New Mexico ranchers addressed this need while also
reducing their land requirements.
On another front, the development of large-scale irrigation projects in the same latenineteenth-early-twentieth century timeframe opened up new agricultural areas, notably
along the Platte and Arkansas Rivers. Many feeder farms were established in these areas,
as noted above. Irrigation projects came late to New Mexico, but when they did, feeding
took hold.108 By the late 1880s, alfalfa crops were being grown for feeding purposes in
the Las Cruces area.109 And by 1910, about 300,000 sheep were on feed in New
Mexico.110 But feeding did not develop to a great extent in New Mexico; the territory’s
sheepmen generally favored specialized feeding areas elsewhere.
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Winter feeding provided, for the first time, western sheep for consumption during the
first three months of the year, important for the growing urban populations. Traditional
open-range grazing could not support a winter market; the large land grants and public
grazing tracts of New Mexico were of no use for this purpose. Range sheep always lost
weight during the winter and were not profitably marketed at that time. Under the new
system, feeder farms could provide fat sheep year around.
The development of sheep feeding in the West was part of a larger overall process
occurring in America at the time. The nation’s agriculture was taking on new levels of
sophistication and efficiency. Each section of the country was beginning to recognize
what it could do best and to specialize accordingly. By 1900, specialized farming
particularly suited to the soil, climate, and geographical location was taking hold
nationwide.111 An early manifestation of that process was the emergence of a Rocky
Mountain-Great Plains feeding industry that was dedicated to fattening sheep while New
Mexico became increasingly focused on breeding. So successful was the new system,
that by the early twentieth century, most western sheep were being fattened in what one
writer designated the “grainger states.”112
The financial arrangements associated with feeding were varied. Sometimes breeders
sold their sheep to feeders through buyers operating in New Mexico. Looking to greater
potential profits, but at a higher risk, some breeders contracted with feeder farmers
outside the territory to prepare their stock for market. Others consigned their animals to
feeders to be sold on commission when they were ready for market. For the numerous
small-scale growers in New Mexico, feeding transactions were often carried out through
a local merchant. Charles Ilfeld began contracting sheep he amassed from small-scale
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growers with feeders starting around 1890.113 Buyers often had to provide advances to
New Mexico sheepmen to help them cover their running expenses until their sheep were
actually delivered. The buyers thus required substantial capital backing, while some
small-scale growers fell into debt. In a few cases New Mexicans themselves owned and
operated feeder farms. As noted above, Frank Bond was heavily invested in Colorado and
Nebraska feeding operations. Feeder farms were capital-intensive and required
substantial up-front outlays. Beyond the acquisition of large numbers of young sheep, a
farmer required irrigated land and actively growing feed crops. Many of the farmers
were heavily dependent on loans from local banks, particularly during their first years in
business. P.G. Scott, president of the Bent County Bank and a feeder himself financed
feeding operations for a hundred miles in each direction along the Arkansas Valley.114
Frank Bond financed his feeding operations in the winter of 1914 with a $65,000 loan at
9% ($1,500,000 in 2010 dollars) from the Denver livestock commission firm of Clay,
Robinson, and Company, a measure of the financial commitment needed.115 During
1911, his most active year up to that time, Bond and his feeding associates had a total
investment of $283,000 ($6,700,000 in 2010 dollars).116 The feeding business did not
lend itself to small-scale, family operations.
The western feeder industry was well established by 1900, the feeding season
generally running from November 1 to May 15. Sheep feeding was not only an important
innovation, but it hastened changes already underway in New Mexico. New Mexico
growers became linked to another class of sheepmen spread out over an extensive
geographical area. Important commercial relationships entailing contractual agreements
and large transfers of capital developed between New Mexico breeders and the northern
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and midwestern feeders, linking the territory more strongly to the regional and,
ultimately, the national economy. And those feeder farmers outside of New Mexico and
Southern Colorado were largely, perhaps entirely, Anglo, having come originally from
outside the Southwest.117 These Anglo sheepmen often operated across state and territory
lines, extending their influence into New Mexico, though they were usually not residents.
The territory’s sheep growers became one component of an industry of growing
complexity that was predominantly Anglo. New Mexico Hispanics were thus left as a
distinct ethnic minority within the industry as a whole. After the Civil War, they had
become increasingly dependent on Anglo merchants with the financial resources and
information networks needed to get their produce to the national markets, while at the
same time finding themselves joined by a new generation of competitive, well-capitalized
Anglo growers. With the advent of feeding, they lost control of one phase of mutton and
lamb production to capital-intensive, Anglo-owned feeder farms outside the territory.
New Mexico sheepmen who did not embrace the changes did so to their own
detriment. The added effort and initiative required for specialization within an
increasingly competitive and exacting market was apparently too great an undertaking for
some of the old, large-scale, sheep-growing families as well as smaller-scale marginal
operators. Some ricos, appearing to have simply run out of steam, sold their grant lands
to ambitious speculators and ranchers, both Anglo and Hispanic, and relocated to the
towns.118 Recalling his youth in Albuquerque around 1900, Harvey Fergusson, grandson
of merchant Franz Huning, gave a rather harsh assessment of these relocated families: “I
lived in Old Town among people who belonged to the past – surviving families of the old
Mexican aristocracy who still cherished their pretensions and their hand-hammered
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silver …”119 Government investigators Carman et al. in their 1892 report expressed
frustration with Hispanic growers who didn’t seem interested in the new developments:
To secure reliable data concerning the detail of the [New Mexico]
sheep industry has been a task of more than ordinary difficulty, for
the reason that so many of the flock masters actually engaged in this
pastoral occupation care very little about literature of this or any
other kind unless it is in the Spanish language, and even then it is
doubtful whether they would take sufficient interest to cooperate
with any representative of the bureau [Bureau of Animal Industry]
unless he was conversant with the Spanish language. Owing to the
general indifference, unwillingness, and too often inability of the
Mexican flockmaster, the writer had to rely mainly on the American
sheep-owners, together with a few of the public-spirited and educated
Mexicans, for the information presented in this report.120
Although there may be prejudicial overtones in this comment, it is hard to believe it was
totally without basis in fact. Better informed Hispanic ranchers adapted, breeding their
stock for the constantly evolving wool, mutton, and lamb markets, conscientiously
dipping to irradicate scab, operating on credit, and engaging in contractual arrangements
alongside their new Anglo rivals. Roman A. Baca, Manuel Antonio Chaves and his son
Amado Chaves, Felipe Chaves, Secundino Romero, and Solomon Luna, all
comparatively well educated members of old sheep-growing families, remained
prominent well into the territorial period. But their numbers were limited. Hispanic
sheepmen, directly or indirectly locked into commercial relationships with well-situated
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Anglo feeders, increasingly dependent on Anglo merchants, buyers, and bankers,
generally buffeted by external forces over which they had no control, lost their leadership
role in the industry. This development was largely the result of impersonal economic
forces created by America’s growing industrial economy, and not so much by avaricious
Anglos actively forcing Hispanic growers to the sidelines, although this may well have
occurred. It is hardly surprising that Anglos assumed the leadership of the New Mexico
sheep industry.
Juan Gomez-Quinones has made an interesting point in this regard. In his view,
Hispanics of the Southwest generally lost political representation in the
late-nineteenth-early-twentieth century timeframe partially as a result of their diminished
economic status. And it was the rico class, the “minuscule bourgeois or capitalist
sector,” that generally lost the most ground.121 This included the large-scale Hispanic
sheep growers and merchants of New Mexico. But he also attributes this development in
part to the tendency of the ricos to assimilate socially and culturally into the Anglo upper
and middle classes. Indeed, territorial New Mexico’s first Hispanic governor Miguel A.
Otero, Jr., the son of businessman, political leader, and sometime rancher Don Miguel A.
Otero and his Anglo wife from South Carolina, himself, married an Anglo lady from
Minnesota. His political associate J. Francisco Chaves had married an Anglo lady he met
in California, where he gone to sell his family’s sheep in the 1850s, cf. chap. 3. In the
twentieth century, some of the more successful sons and daughters entered the middle
class and resided in the towns.122

Because sheep growing was traditionally a family

operation carried on from generation to generation, social disruptions like assimilation
adversely affected Hispanic representation in the industry.
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To summarize the adoption of feeding, New Mexico’s sheep industry underwent a
major change with the recovery of the mutton and lamb market as America’s urban
population grew. Faced with increasing competition and more demanding markets, the
territory’s sheepmen, like those elsewhere in the West, adopted the practice of assisted
winter feeding. To this end, they shipped their partially-grown stock to feeder farmers in
the North and Midwest to be fattened for market on alfalfa, grains, and sugar beet
products produced in irrigated fields.123 The fattened sheep were then sold to the large
packing plants in the Midwest and elsewhere. This proved to be a more efficient and
more profitable way to raise sheep than open-range grazing which was, in any case,
becoming unsustainable over the long term due to a growing land scarcity. New Mexico
sheepmen came to specialize increasingly in breeding, for which the territory was
naturally suited. With the development of a large, commercial feeder industry, which
extended north into Colorado and east through Kansas, Nebraska, and beyond, New
Mexico livestock merchants and growers, were integrated more thoroughly into an
extended production network and, ultimately, the national economy. But, at the same
time, they lost control of a substantial component of mutton and lamb production. The
western sheep industry became increasingly dominated by Anglos, a process that had
begun after the Civil War and then accelerated during the final two decades of the
nineteenth century. By the turn of the twentieth century, the New Mexico sheep industry
was controlled largely by Anglo merchants and sheepmen. The feeders assumed
increased importance after the Panic of 1893 when their sheep purchases remained a
source of hard currency in the territory as other sources dried up.
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Mercantile capitalism played a multifaceted role in the New Mexico sheep industry.
The well-documented business activities of Frank Bond and his brother G. (George) W.
exemplify that role. The establishment, growth, and success of the various Bond
enterprises are treated in the following chapter.
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Chapter 7
Frank Bond and Innovative Organization

No mercantile company in New Mexico became more heavily invested in the sheep
and wool business, more successful, and more influential than the organization of Frank
Bond. Operating from his Espanola headquarters for forty-two years, and from
Albuquerque thereafter, he built a frontier mercantile empire extending from the San Luis
Valley of Colorado east into Nebraska and south through much of New Mexico.
Although the Bond organization began as a general mercantile concern, and remained so,
sheep and wool became major components of the business.1 In Frank Bond’s own words,
“I am a stock-man. I gamble in wool, also speculate in land, lend a little money, make
some money, and lose some.”2 His operation was innovative, complex by contemporary
standards, capital-intensive, and extraordinarily profitable. In his corporate history,
Frank Grubbs, succinctly and accurately described the Bond enterprises as “not only
intricately interlocked corporate organizations but also numerous joint venture
arrangements for buying and selling wool and sheep…”3 The Bond organization was a
transition institution between the comparatively simple, independent mercantile
operations of the Santa Fe Trail era and the complex structures of twentieth-century
corporate capitalism. It was well-adapted to the New Mexico economy of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Its operations mirrored the nation’s sheep
business which was becoming increasingly complex and capital-intensive during this
period, developments driven, ultimately, by the demands of expanding national and
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international markets into which New Mexico was drawn. These changes, as they played
out in New Mexico, are elucidated by considering the Bond empire.
Frank Bond was born in 1863 and grew up on a farm in Argenteuil County, Quebec
Province, Canada. His correspondence from his long business career indicates a stern but
fair, highly-disciplined workaholic of a somewhat secretive bent. At age 19 or 20,
(reports differ) he joined his older brother George, who was working at a general store in
Chamita (San Juan Pueblo). Entering into partnership, the brothers soon bought out a
small mercantile firm located in the recently established town of Espanola, population
150. The business, renamed G.W. Bond & Bro., was well situated as the town was
becoming a rail terminal of importance since the arrival of the Denver & Rio Grande
Western Railroad. It is believed that the brothers were initially financed by a loan from
their father in Quebec, possibly of about $25,000, a considerable sum at the time.4 The
brothers were typical of many Anglo businessmen who came to New Mexico after the
Civil War in that they had no long-standing antecedents, family or friends, in New
Mexico, but through some unclear channels had learned about the economic opportunities
in the territory. Smart, ambitious, and hard-working, they also possessed the sense of
adventure, and the stomach for risk, to pursue the opportunities offered. Like many of
their Anglo cohorts, the Bond brothers seem to have been well educated and possessed of
a family background of affluence. They were fluent in French and Spanish as well as
English. Frank was less than delighted by what he saw upon his arrival in New Mexico.
Commenting years later on the stagecoach ride from Santa Fe to Espanola in 1883, he
noted, “The country seemed to me a perfect desert, and the people we met, with their few
burro loads of wood and sacks of grain in tanned buffalo sacks, seemed so poor that I was
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by no means very favorably impressed with my new home.”5 If the Bond brothers were
not atypical of a new class of New Mexico immigrants, their father also bore much in
common with many absentee investors in the West. Western business organizations
during this period, even those running large cattle ranches, were often basically closed
circles of family and friends. The younger men served as on-site managers, while the
older men, more often than not, remained in the East providing financing and attending to
other necessary business matters.6 The Bond brothers are not known to have had any
prior involvement in merchandising or, for that matter, the sheep business.
The brothers’ mercantile operation seems to have been generally successful from the
start, growing quietly for its first decade. And like other New Mexico mercantile
capitalists, the brothers found themselves, in time, dealing in wool and live sheep and in
possession of herds of significant proportions. The earliest clear indication in company
records of wool dealings was in1897, but Frank Bond recalled years later that the
brothers were buying up, and marketing at a small profit, most of the wool grown in their
part of the country during the Panic of 1893.7 They purchased what they called “outside”
wool from local growers. And they acquired wool in the form of rent from partidarios to
whom they had contracted out their own flocks. The Bond sheep generally produced to
the partners’ credit two pounds of wool per head, indicating a degree of breeding for
increased wool production. The brothers gained leverage in the trade by controlling
access to the D&RGW rail service, over which they shipped both wool and sheep out of
New Mexico to eastern markets. As early as 1890 they had acquired a tract of land in
Walsenburg, Colorado, almost certainly used for grazing, the first hint that the company
would expand far beyond the confines of Espanola.
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The Bonds’ first entry into the live sheep business, likewise, occurred no later than
1893. Like other New Mexico merchants, the Bonds accepted sheep from their
customers in exchange for merchandise or to satisfy standing debts. And to care for that
livestock, they employed a modified partido system, eventually enlisting Hispanic
herders throughout New Mexico and the San Luis Valley of Colorado, cf. chap. 6. The
earliest existing Bond partido contracts date from 1895. The brothers rented sheep out in
the fall for periods ranging anywhere from one to five years, but most commonly for
three years. The partidario assumed the entire risk in caring for his rented flock,
including losses from bad weather, poor range conditions, and disease. Like Charles
Ilfeld, Frank Bond assumed the role of patron, while his partidarios, accustomed to the
situation, operated much as they always had in the past. And like the traditional Hispanic
patrones of the past, the Bonds maintained control over their flocks through partidarios
who were indebted to them financially. The Bond contracts were not uniform, but, being
granted on an individual basis, were adapted to local conditions.8 The brothers required
their partidarios’ wives to also sign the contracts.9 Should the herder be unable to fulfill
the terms of his contract, he would be left in debt to the Bonds at the end of the contract
period. [He would not, of course, become a debt peon, as in earlier times.] The Bonds,
like other New Mexico merchants, provided an interface between the traditional, smallscale Hispanic sheepman, who may have spoken no English and known little of life
beyond New Mexico, and the often volatile, sheep and wool markets of the East.

The Money Flow
Significantly, when they commenced operations in Espanola, the brothers found it
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absolutely necessary to extend credit to their customers; the bulk of their sales, in
Espanola as well as at other branches they established later, were in fact made on credit.
The Bonds also found it necessary to extend advances to their wool suppliers, usually in
the late spring or early summer, against deliveries in the fall. Likewise, their partidarios
needed credit, in addition to sheep, to get started. Their financial commitment became
considerable as they engaged in a growing number of partido contracts. By the end of
1890, the partnership had extended $10,266 in credit while carrying a merchandise
inventory of less than $14,000. This practice grew rapidly. By 1898, they had extended
$55,000 or more in credit out to their customers.10 In 1911 at the time of the partnership
dissolution, Frank Bond was carrying $420,000 ($10,000,000 in 2010 dollars) in the form
of notes and bills receivable. This amount was far beyond the lending ability of most
western enterprises but, ultimately, enabled the Bonds to take on more business and
continue to grow.11
Much like their mercantile cohorts, the Bonds employed three different basic modes
of buying and selling wool. In the first case, they purchased wool outright with their own
funds or in partnership with another investor. After collecting together a sizable
shipment from their numerous small suppliers, they sold the entire lot to their Boston
dealer, sharing any profits with their partner if there was one. In the second case, they
would not sell but instead consign a particular lot of wool to the dealer, who then sold it
on commission to the New England textile mills, the dealer operating solely as a
commission merchant. For many years the Bonds sold or consigned their wool to the
Boston commission house of Brown & Adams. In the third type of transaction, the
Bonds would purchase wool in the West with partial or full financing from their Boston
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wool house. The advantage of this was that the eastern dealer was able to borrow money
in the East at a relatively modest rate and then turn around and loan it to Frank Bond at
the higher rate of 6% interest. Bond would then turn the money around again, loaning it
to his suppliers against future deliveries. If he borrowed from a western bank, which he
often had to do, he was required to pay the higher prevailing rate, 8% or more, cf.
chap.6.12 When the Bonds engaged in such arrangements with their Boston commission
house where they put up some of the money and the commission merchant put up the
rest, the risk in this inherently risky business was shared.
The Bonds usually financed their wool purchases with advances from eastern wool
dealers on clips not yet shorn, the third case above. They took out the advances on fall
deliveries in the late spring or early summer, the loan collateral being the unshorn wool.13
A standard condition on such transactions was that the western wool merchant would
consign or sell his wool, when it became available, through the eastern dealer who
provided the advance. Capital had become not just convenient, but essential for the
functioning of the New Mexico wool industry. The Bonds employed a similar procedure
to finance their feeding operations. At the beginning of the winter feeding season, they
borrowed funds, typically from their livestock dealer Clay, Robinson & Co. of Denver,
which they used to provide lambs and cash for purchasing feed to their feeder ranchers in
Colorado and Nebraska. They compensated the feeder $50/month plus 15% of the profits
when the sheep were sold.14 The loan was essentially paid off in the form of fattened
sheep delivered to the dealer at the end of the season.
During times of particularly uncertain markets, western buyers like the Bonds would
be reluctant to sink their own funds into advance wool purchases, not knowing whether
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they would experience a profit or loss on the sale at the end of the growing season.
Under such trying circumstances, the eastern dealers might, out of necessity, simply
provide all of the necessary funds and engage their western suppliers, like the Bonds,
simply as on-site wool buyers. Another practice, undertaken in uncertain times, was for
the eastern wool dealer to guarantee a minimum price to the western merchant, shielding
him against loss. In both these scenarios, the eastern dealer assumed a higher degree of
risk than normal practice against the possibility of realizing higher profits at the
westerners’ expense. In February, 1915, Frank Bond made such an agreement of
guaranteed price with Brown & Adams, something he rarely did. They guaranteed him
his costs plus the first cent/lb. of any profit on the wool, while reserving for themselves
the next half cent of profit. Additional profits if any would go to Bond, although the tone
of the letter suggests this was unlikely.15 Thus, in this instance, Bond relinquished
potential profits in return for a guaranteed price support, which would protect him from
losses. It was a crude form of insurance policy. The New Mexico merchants thus had
procedures for hedging their investments in uncertain times, rendering a risky business a
bit less risky. Sheep growers had few such options to protect themselves in a bad year,
cf. chap. 9 on Montague Stevens. Needless to say, these arrangements involved a close
relationship between the New Mexico merchant and the commission house two-thousand
miles away. Good communications and financial know-how were essential for
consumating such deals. These new complications are one of the reasons why marketing
sheep and wool became the purview of a specialist, the merchant. The grower, unless he
operated on a fairly large scale, could not continue to be his own dealer. Whether he
fully realized it or not, the New Mexico wool grower was absorbed into a nationwide

174

financial network, on which he had become fully dependent by the late nineteenth
century.
During the Panic of 1893, the Bonds were forced to accept ewes as payment on debts,
for which they gave a credit of $1.00/head, despite the depressed going price of only 50
cents/head.16 During another run of tough times in 1901, the brothers experienced a loss
of $1868 in a wool transaction with Brown & Adams, having paid by pre-agreement with
their New Mexico growers more than the wool was actually selling for on the eastern
market by the time it was shipped.17 In 1903, the situation was even worse. Brown &
Adams sold 557,646 lbs. of wool for the Bonds and their partner in the deal, Fred
Warshauer, for a loss of nearly $10,000 ($260,000 in 2010 dollars).18 The Bonds, being
well-capitalized, were able to sustain an occasional annual loss, such as this, in one
component of their business. Their wool profits in 1904 and 1905 more than offset the
losses of 1901 and 1903.19 This is discussed further below. At the opposite extreme,
their suppliers, small, independent, undercapitalized, mostly Hispanic, were liable to be
thrown out of business by one particularly bad year. Like Charles Ilfeld, the Bond
brothers chose, when necessary, to forgo immediate profits and take losses in the interest
of keeping their suppliers solvent, loyal, and a source of future profits both as wool and
livestock producers and as customers at their general stores. This was an act of survival
more than altruism. Despite such losses, the Bonds’ overall business, including general
merchandise, live sheep sales, and partido contracts, was always profitable, although the
profits varied widely from year to year.20
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Expansions
The Bonds expanded steadily over the years, establishing several branch operations.
In 1892, after eight years in business, they bought out an existing mercantile store in
Wagon Mound after the owner, John Justus Schmidt, was killed by a disgruntled
partidario, cf. chap. 6. George relocated to Wagon Mound and managed this operation
for over a decade until 1904, while Frank remained in charge at Espanola. The brothers
capitalized the Wagon Mound branch at just under $40,000, drawing largely upon
accumulated profits from the Espanola store, but with an additional $8,000 loan from
their father at the modest annual interest of 4%.21 Like the Espanola headquarters, the
new Wagon Mound branch at first dealt principally in general merchandise; but within
about two years, it was holding $3,300 worth of sheep in Fort Collins, Colorado feed lots.
Its sheep holdings increased more than ten fold in value over the next few years to
$46,000 in 1898. By 1900, Wagon Mound had 30,000 sheep out on partido contracts.22
In its first year of operation, the branch realized a 20% return on the Bond’s initial capital
investment.23 And during its first decade of operations, 1893-1903, the branch usually
produced an annual return in the range of 18-40%. This is a huge sustained return by
twenty-first century business standards and indicates what was possible for a
conservatively-run, well-capitalized operation in New Mexico at the time.24 After 1914,
the bulk of the profits were coming from sheep and wool, as was also the case for the
other Bond branches.25 The territory truly could be a land of opportunity. In later years,
the brothers transferred additional capital infusions from Espanola to Wagon Mound to
further expand the operation. The free flow of capital between their branches, these two
branches and others they established later, greatly facilitated the company’s operations
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and expansions. During their partnership, the brothers occasionally took out short-term
bank loans when an immediate need for cash arose. They borrowed from private investor
Abraham Staab and the First National Bank of Santa Fe, with which they had a close,
long-term relationship.26 This was a practice they tried to minimize because of the high
interest rates for such loans. However, their expansions were, like the Wagon Mound
acquisition, always financed with accumulated past profits, never by bank loans or
through public offerings of stock like a modern corporation. Only when industrial
capitalism finally diffused into the southwest would New Mexico businesses employ
these means of finance.
Up until this point, G.W. Bond & Bro. had remained a simple partnership between the
two brothers. The expansion demanded that an additional manager be hired. To help run
the Wagon Mound branch, the Bonds brought in an old family friend from Quebec,
Archibald (Archie) MacArthur, employing a strategy then typical of western businesses.
In a similar scenario, Charles Ilfeld had brought several of his brothers to New Mexico,
who later established an independent mercantile operation in Albuquerque. The
Spiegelbergs did likewise. And, as previously noted, Ilfeld also brought his brother-inlaw, Max Nordhaus, over from Germany, eventually placing him in charge of his Las
Vegas headquarters.27 In a more atypical move, the Bonds also employed in a managerial
capacity a family outsider, former Schmidt employee and Wagon Mound native, Manuel
Paltenghe.28
Upon the arrival of railroads on the eastern plains, the Bonds established a branch
operation in Cuervo, fifteen miles east of Santa Rosa, on the newly built Rock Island rail
line. [The Chicago, Rock Island, and Pacific Railroad] They employed another outsider,
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Andy Wiest, to manage that operation.29 They had serious competition here. The
Charles Ilfeld Company established a similar branch in 1904 in Santa Rosa, cf. chap. 6.
The Bonds initially financed the Cuervo operation with $10,000 accumulated profits from
the Wagon Mound store.30 In Taos the same year, the Bonds acquired the longestablished mercantile establishment of Alexander Gusdorf in partnership with Gusdorf’s
younger brother Gerson and Justin H. McCarthy, the latter two men providing the on-site
management and investing some of their own funds. Thus was born the Bond, Gusdorf,
and McCarthy Company, initially capitalized at $30,000, predominantly with Bond
funds. The partners made an agreement never to sell their interest to an outsider without
first offering it to the other associates on the same terms.31 And in fact, Gusdorf sold out
his share to the other stock holders in 1907. This acquisition was notable for the mixed
ethnicity of the owners, Canadian, Jewish, and Anglo-American, which was not atypical
of New Mexico mercantile enterprises of this era. The extraordinary challenges and
rewards of frontier enterprises often drew together talented men of diverse backgrounds
in pursuit of common opportunities. The Bonds’ Antonito partner, Fred Warshauer,
discussed below, was also Jewish.
Not all the expansion was in the form of branch stores. In 1907 Frank Bond built, at a
cost of about $1,000, a sheep loading complex with pens, scales, and a camp house in
Servilleta, thirty-eight miles north of Espanola on the D&RGW line. Sheep were
thereafter driven from the various grazing locations in the region to this loading site, for
rail shipment out of New Mexico. The scales, a new expense, became necessary when
sheep began to be sold by weight rather than by the head, around the turn of the twentieth
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century, so the animals had to be weighed prior to loading.32 In another significant
capital outlay, Bond built a sheep-dipping plant in Espanola for about $3,500 in 1911.33
The Bonds had cautiously departed from the family business modus operandi when
they hired able outsiders for important positions. In 1904, the Bonds took another major
step and incorporated the Wagon Mound operation with themselves, MacArthur, and
Paltenghe as shareholders, establishing a procedure that they would employ repeatedly in
the future as they opened new branches. The new corporation was called the A.
MacArthur Company, as MacArthur now became the on-site general manager, while
George Bond departed for Trinidad, Colorado. MacArthur and Paltenghe were actually
the largest shareholders, at least on paper.34 The Bonds incorporated the Cuervo branch
the same year as Bond & Wiest with Andy Wiest as stockholder-general manager.
The specific procedure employed by the Bonds to bring in their key managers as
stockholders was innovative. They would first issue the man a block of stock. Since
these employees generally had no funds of their own to pay for the stock, they were
allowed to give the Bonds a note, i.e. an I.O.U., for the amount needed.35 Then, instead
of turning over the stock certificates to the employee, the Bonds retained the certificates
as collateral for that note. In this way, an employee with no funds of his own became a
part owner of the store he managed and would share in future profits. Over a period of
years he would be able to pay off his note to the Bonds using the profits resulting from
his own managerial efforts. The arrangement provided a powerful motivation for the
employee to perform his duties well. In the meantime he was paid a salary, typically
$75-100/month ($2,000-2,700 in 2010 dollars). for a general manager, which was quite
substantial for the times. Thus, no cash or even stock certificates initially changed hands.
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The Bond brothers, holding all the certificates, thus maintained ultimate control over the
new corporation and their managers. Frank Bond strengthened his leadership position
further by making personal loans to his various store managers, who would then be
doubly indebted to him. He directed branch operations from his Espanola office, while
his employee-stockholders oversaw the day-to-day operations. As the Bonds employed
this procedure to finance and consolidate control over a succession of branches, each new
enterprise constituted an individual corporation, with the stock owned by the brothers,
their key managers, and a mix of pre-existing Bond corporations. The actual cash used to
capitalize each new initiative came from the accumulated profits of previously
established branch corporations, over which the brothers retained tight control. Just as
the Wagon Mound branch was initially financed by the Espanola operation, it in turn
financed other Bond start-ups in later years.36 This arrangement made possible
considerable operating flexibility since the Bonds were not beholden to any outside
investors and could effortlessly transfer cash as needed from one such corporation to
another. Wagon Mound was only one of a series of successful partnerships Frank Bond
formed with talented, proven family outsiders.
In 1906, two years after the Wagon Mound reorganization, the Bonds incorporated
their Espanola store as Bond & Nohl Company, with the Bond Brothers and Louis F.
Nohl as principal share holders. Nohl, another outsider, had joined G.W. Bond & Bro. in
1900 under some sort of profit sharing arrangement, and over time he had assumed much
of the day-to-day management of the store. Frank Bond retained a separate business, still
part of the G.W. Bond & Bro. partnership, on the same site, buying and selling wool,
overseeing his numerous partido contracts, negotiating lamb feeding agreements, and
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looking after the financial and organizational matters for his growing empire. Bond &
Nohl handled all the merchandising, the sheep trading, and financial aspects of the
feeding operations, a developing activity for the company, cf. chap. 6.37
While George was establishing what was to be a very profitable sheep and wool
operation in Trinidad, the Bonds undertook another new initiative in Colorado. A few
years earlier, around 1903, they had entered a partnership agreement with Fred
Warshauer of Antonito, Colorado, sharing profits 50/50 in outside wool deals in New
Mexico and Southern Colorado.38 This was another case of the Bonds identifying and
entering profit sharing agreements with able family outsiders. Some years earlier, during
the winter of 1894-1895, they had begun placing lambs with feeders in Colorado through
their Wagon Mound branch, and they negotiated feeding contracts in Nebraska as early as
1902.39 After about 1908, they became actively involved in the winter feeding of lambs,
forming a three-way partnership with Warshauer, and E.S. Leavenworth of Wood River,
Nebraska, who owned a feeding ranch. That year, they had over $100,000 ($2,400,000 in
2010 dollars) worth of sheep on feed with Leavenworth and even more with another
feeder.40 The Bonds maintained a decade-long, and quite profitable, partnership with
Warshauer, with whom Frank became particularly close.41 Feeding operations required
considerable capital investment. Besides the cost of the lambs, the cost of feed - corn,
hay, alfalfa - was quite substantial.42 As mentioned above, the ranchers required cash
advances in the fall that were paid off in fattened lambs in the spring. Frank Bond
financed much of his winter feeding through John Clay’s livestock commission firm,
Clay, Robinson & Co. in Denver.43 The Bonds continued doing business with
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Warshauer’s company, The Warshauer-McClure Sheep Company, after his death - by
suicide- in 1913.44
In 1911, after twenty-eight years in business together, the Bonds ended their
partnership; thereafter Frank became the sole senior managing proprietor of the business,
although he continued to take on new partners from time to time. George retained his
financial interest as a stock holder, but relocated to Idaho and California to pursue other
business opportunities. Frank’s personal net worth at this time was in excess of $500,000
($11,000,000 in 2010 dollars), a considerable fortune at the time.45 During the best year
of their partnership, 1905, the brothers had cleared nearly $100,000 in profits.46 At the
time of the partnership dissolution, Frank had in his own account 37,296 head of sheep
valued at $112,000 out on partido contracts. Considering his various partnerships, he
held an interest in a total of 52,244 sheep, rented out under ninety separate contracts to
individuals in and around Espanola and Taos, where most of the Bond sheep were grazed,
and Antonito, Colorado. To manage his large holdings, he went into partnership with
various individuals and other mercantile companies who oversaw the various partido
operations in their localities. Most of these companies and individuals were Anglo, as
indicated by their names. The sheep were generally run in small flocks either on public
lands, with Bond paying grazing fees, or on land grants. With grazing rights on the public
land becoming permanent after three years, Bond took particular care to count and report
to the forest authorities all his sheep and partido contracts and thus protect his grazing
resources from being taken over by another stockman.47
The Bonds made their first move to the south in 1905 with the establishment of a
mercantile branch in Encino, Torrance County south of Albuquerque. The branch was
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dealing in sheep and wool within a few years and remained profitable through the
remainder of the territorial period.48 Frank Bond continued expanding during the early
years of statehood. In mid 1914, he opened a branch in Albuquerque that dealt strictly in
sheep, wool, hides, and pelts with no general merchandise activity. Following his usual
policy, Bond incorporated the business, taking on three of his managers as shareholders.49
This start-up is notable on account of new general manager and shareholder Walter
Connell. Connell was a Fordham University graduate with years of experience
merchandising and wool buying in New Mexico and banking in New York; such was the
level of talent now entering the territorial sheep industry.50 In its first full year of
operation, 1915, the Bond-Connell Sheep & Wool Co., as it was called, sold 151,000
head of sheep, 455,000 lbs. of wool, and 305,000 lbs. of hides and pelts, for a net profit
of over $20,000, a staggering return on the initial capitalization, thought to be $25,000.
Additionally, the company was still holding a considerable inventory of sheep, wool,
hides, and pelts at year’s end.51 Following this success, Bond established the BondSargent Company in Grants, New Mexico, a site chosen because of its proximity to the
Navajo Reservation with its large sheep population. This branch developed into one of
the most successful of the Bond enterprises. Its successor, the Bond-Gunderson
Company, was still in operation in the early 1960s.52

Land Ownership
During the early years of the twentieth century, the brothers, under George’s
initiative, invested or speculated in various tracts of land, mostly in Southern Colorado.
A few years earlier, however, they had started to acquire land in New Mexico. With
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growing sheep populations in San Miguel and Leonard Wood (later Guadalupe) Counties
and the pending arrival of railroads, the Bonds acquired at least six ranches in the area
around 1900.53 In 1900, they also purchased a 63,000-acre segment of the Preston Beck
Grant for $43,000. At one point they were holding up to 30,000 head of sheep on the
Beck land, but they sold the tract in 1907 for a profit of over $20,000.54 They also held
an interest in the Piedra-Lumbre Grant on the Rio Chama west of Abiquiu and in 1903
purchased the 27,000 acre Trampas Grant north of Santa Fe for $18,000, apparently for
speculative purposes.55 A few years later in 1909, they acquired a 270-acre feeder ranch
in Wood River, Nebraska for $65,000.56 The Bonds also invested considerable effort and
some money in a futile attempt to acquire the Tome Grant in Valencia County. However,
despite all their land acquisitions, their business was never dependent on huge tracts of
grazing land, as was also the case with Charles Ilfeld. They held some of their tracts for a
comparatively short time. In some cases they seemed more intent on land speculation
than the acquisition of good grazing land for their flocks. Land ownership was no longer
a prerequisite to wealth and influence.

Business Policy
By the early twentieth century, G.W. Bond & Bro. had moved far beyond a two-man
management structure and had a substantial number of salaried employees, including
several of managerial status, with no Bond family connections. It has been estimated that
Bond & Nohl had about ten or twelve salaried employees at Espanola, presumably a
typical number for an active branch operation.57 These positions included store
managers, bookkeepers, and, on account of Frank’s voluminous correspondence,
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stenographers, as well as store clerks, general handymen, warehouse clerks, and general
laborers. Bond & Nohl always employed one or two “native clerks.” Frank Bond paid
his stenographers as much as $75/month, fluency in both Spanish and English being
desired, and his bookkeepers as much as $100/month ($2,400 in 2010 dollars). He
generally recruited bookkeepers and stenographers from out of town.58 An important
position in his organization was that of “outside man,” a sort of assistant manager tasked
with buying sheep from the growers, contracting for wool, making collections, and acting
as general foreman in the field. For many years, this position at Bond & Nohl was held
by Leandro Martinez, who also was a small shareholder in the company.59 Frank Bond
always paid his store managers $75-100/month, a good salary at the time, and, for key
men, he augmented this with a profit-sharing arrangement including stock in the branch
corporation, as described above. Business hours were long. The Bond & Nohl store was
open six days a week, usually closing at 10:00 pm. The sheep and wool business could
be quite profitable – it certainly was for the Bond brothers - but the efforts required to
fully realize the potential gains were considerable.
Frank Bond was a hands-on manager; he kept close watch on every detail of his
empire, and supplied his own labor when it was called for. He often personally
supervised the loading of sheep onto railroad cars, rising at 3:00 am to serve as his own
foreman, working at what has been described as a “fast dogtrot” all day long.60 For a
single shipment in October 1913, Bond loaded an estimated 27,000 head of sheep at his
Servilleta facility into thirty railroad cars per day for a period of three successive days.
He apparently did not mind the physical labor. Frank Bond was totally dedicated to
business. He asserted in a letter to his brother George, “… in fact, I wouldn’t trade my
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job with anybody.”61 When he wasn’t working he was bored and unsettled. Five years
later he went into detail:
You know that you and I don’t know any other pleasure except our
business. I think it is a great misfortune that we should be so, and
especially so when we pretend to cut adrift from business, but it can’t
be helped, so the only thing for us to do is to stay with the business as
long as our health is good; and I believe if we can bring in and associate
young men with us, we will continue to be successful.62

Challenges
The Bond enterprises faced several persisting challenges, which were characteristic of
sheep- and wool-dealing mercantile operations. Consideration of these various
challenges, which are well documented for the Bond enterprises, provides some insight
into what working in the New Mexico sheep industry may have been like.
All the Bond companies, as with all weather-dependent businesses, then and now,
experienced widely fluctuating profits from year to year, despite being quite
conservatively managed. Such fluctuations were a fact of life that never abated and
derived in part from the inherent instability of the national sheep and wool markets. And
that brought the matter of capital reserves to the forefront of financial considerations.
Capital was, of course, needed just to keep the company operating smoothly. The
brothers routinely moved funds back and forth between their various enterprises as
needed. But during extraordinarily tough times, when expenses exceeded income, capital
was totally essential for survival. At Bond & Nohl, annual net profits between 1906 and
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1915 ranged from $3,400 to $29,400.63 The Bonds’ wool partnership with Warshauer
lost $10,000 in 1903, as previously noted, and then yielded $25,000 profits in 1906,
$46,000 in 1908, but only about $12,000 in 1911.64 Annual profits of the Bond,
McCarthy Company, the Taos branch, fluctuated widely between 1905 and 1915, from
$1,500 in 1910 to $18,700 in 1915.65 Although the Bond enterprises always realized an
overall annual net profit, sectors of the business sometimes underwent significant losses
that had to be covered. The Bonds’ policy of turning profits back into their businesses, as
opposed to declairing stockholder dividends, provided a substantial cash cushion for
negotiating the large ups and downs in profits as well as for meeting extraordinary
expenses when they arose. Other businessmen were not so financially fortified as to
prosper or even survive under such instability.66 Volatility imparted considerable risk to
the widely touted, and occasionally realized, business opportunities found in New
Mexico and the West in general. When Fred Warshauer, died, Frank Bond advised the
man’s widow not to invest any more of her money in sheep or wool, noting that he would
not want his own wife to do so if he died.67 Expressing a similar sentiment in his will,
Solomon Luna advised his wife to liquidate the family business and invest the proceeds
in conservative securities. In any case, soon after his death in 1912, she relocated to
California.68 When Frank Bond’s own wife’s expressed an interest in investing her
personal funds in sheep, he instead purchased secure bonds paying 5% for her. Frank
Bond believed that the high risk could only be counteracted by close attention to the
business. In answer to an inquiry from a Kansas City businessman who was considering
investing in sheep, Bond replied:
I consider this line of business very dangerous, and [it] requires
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very careful watching. Three of our renters have lost this winter
over half of their flocks on account of heavy snows. These three
men owe us large accounts, besides the rented sheep. They have
lost over $15,000 in sheep, and as a result of their loss we are bound
to loose several thousand dollars…I would advise you very strongly
to have nothing to do with sheep, unless you can give the matter your
personal attention…We make money out of sheep, but we make it
because we give them close attention, otherwise it could not possibly
be done.69
The merchandising of sheep, as risky as it was, actually involved less uncertainty than
raising sheep, which the merchants always undertook with reluctance, cf. chap. 9.
Up-to-date market information was critical for success in the sheep and wool
negotiations, particularly as the markets could be quite volatile. Information retrieval
was thus an important continuing activity for western merchants. Valuable industry news
and advice was provided to them by the east coast commission houses they dealt with.
Specifically, the eastern establishments provided up-to-date news on domestic market
trends and the effects of foreign wool production on markets in Britain [London and
Liverpool], Australia, and other parts of the world. They discussed such matters as the
wool tariff, wool manufacturers’ current problems, and the condition of wool clips in
various parts of the United States at the time. The Bonds, like other western wool
merchants, were dependent on the eastern wool houses for such information. Information
was transmitted west in the form of long, coded Western Union telegrams or detailed
letters.70 Max Nordhaus received intelligence from an eastern wool house by telegraph
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but also directly from his boss, Charles Ilfeld, who by the 1890s was spending his winters
in New York City. Adolph Letcher, Ilfeld’s onetime partner now living in Baltimore,
also sent his wool and sheep market forecasts to Nordhaus, who in turn forwarded them
to his New Mexico suppliers.71

The westerners would generally seek out and attach

themselves to an eastern dealer in whom they could have confidence, giving him the bulk
of their business year after year, and thus securing for themselves a reliable information
source. The importance attached to information is reflected in a letter in which Frank
Bond expresses his fear that a certain trouble maker, one Charlie Doll, was going to New
York intent on sabotageing his information source, i.e. “to fix things so that we will be
unable to get bona fide information.”72 For many years, the Bonds dealt almost
exclusively with the Boston wool house of Brown & Adams, as noted above. In later
years, they shifted their business to Hallowell, Jones, and Donald. Early in that shift,
Frank Bond advised his branch manager, Andy Wiest, to shift some of his wool sales
over to H, J & D primarily to diffuse competition that company was creating but also so
that the Bond & Wiest branch would “…get the posting from H, J & D as well as that of
B & A,” thus securing two important streams of information.73 While the Bonds
benefitted from the information they received, they took pains not to pass it on to their
competitors. In numerous letters to his partners and various other business associates
containing important information, Frank Bond admonished the recipients to keep the
information to themselves.
New Mexico’s sheep and wool merchants seem to have gotten along well, generally,
although competition was endemic. The harsh conditions of the frontier gave rise to a
considerable degree of cooperation among businessmen. Each major wool buyer seems
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to have had an agreed upon geographical area in which to operate exclusively. Frank
Bond believed that invading another merchant’s territory would hurt his business as much
as the other merchant’s when that man reciprocated. He asserted decisively, “We leave
the other fellow’s territory absolutely alone knowing that if he so desired he would
probably do us just as much damage as we could him.”74 Nevertheless, conflicts
sometimes arose. Around 1903, H.W. Kelly of Gross, Kelly encroached on Bond’s turf,
offering higher wool prices than Bond. Kelly, whose operation was smaller than Bond’s,
was able to offer higher prices to New Mexico growers at the time because he was selling
directly to east-coast woolen manufacturers and receiving higher prices than Bond did
from his commission merchants Brown & Adams. The matter had apparently blown over
by 1907 when Kelly was once again selling his wool through a Boston wool broker.75
Bond sustained another threat in 1915 when the Boston firm of Hallowell, Jones, and
Donald sent their own agents out to New Mexico to secure wool consignments directly
from producers, cutting local buyers like Bond out of the loop.76 In response, Bond
stopped accepting wool on consignment from his suppliers because he knew that once
accustomed to this mode of marketing their wool, they would soon shift their business
directly to the Boston houses, where they would receive an additional one-cent/lb.,
Bond’s profit at the time. He henceforth only bought wool outright from his suppliers, a
riskier proposition than accepting it on consignment and one the Boston commission
merchant was not willing to undertake. Bond thus assumed added risk to retain supplier
loyality. And as noted above, he also shifted some of his business away from Brown and
Adams, who were by this time dealing largely in foreign wools, and to Hallowell, Jones,
and Donald, who dealt primarily in domestic wool, presumably a move to placate the
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company and thus reduce the threat they had posed. Competition had many
manifestations. When Charles Ilfeld inquired about renting Bond’s unused Cabra store
building around 1904, Bond refused, believing that Ilfeld was intent on developing a
branch to compete with his Cuervo store.77
Getting some customers and suppliers to pay their bills was a continuing
headache. Since most of the general merchandise sales at the Bond branches were
made on credit, the company usually valued accounts receivable on the company
books at less than 100%. In the late 1890s timeframe, the Bond Brothers valued the
loans they extended and the accounts receivable on their books at 75 cents on the
dollar, thus assuming that 25% of their loans would never be repaid. However, by
1912, they raised the figure to 90 cents on the dollar.78 The discount was determined
by a careful annual analysis of the individual accounts on the company books. These
discounts appear to have been overly conservative, if consistent with the Bonds’
business practices. In fact, Bond & Wiest, the Cuervo branch, had to write off only
4% of its loans in 1912.79 This is not to say that collections were not a continuing
problem. At various times, Frank Bond engaged attorneys, collection agencies, and
investigators to collect debts.80 On one particularly dramatic occasion, a Bond
employee seized an entire herd of cattle for the purpose of settling a long-standing
debt just as the animals were being driven through Espanola. The herd belonged to a
particularly recalcitrant pair of debtors described as two “irascible spinsters.”81
When loans were not promptly repaid, it was usually because the borrower was
going through hard times, not because he was attempting to avoid his financial
responsibility. The hash realities of territorial life forced, to an extent, a generally
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cooperative social and business environment, despite the “Wild West” atmosphere in
the railroad town saloons.82 Frank Bond described his experiences with his Hispanic
suppliers and customers after many years in business: “They [the Spanish-American
people] were extremely honest about paying their bills, and to this day in case of a
death in the family, a son will pay his father’s debt, or a father the son’s. They look
on this as a personal obligation.” He added a note of caution, however, with his
assertion that very little money was lost in trading with them “if you do not give
them too much credit.”83
The economic history of the West is a history of panics and bank failures. The
inherent volatility of the western sheep business was exacerbated by bank failures
when they occurred. Frank Bond recounted his experiences during the Panic of 1907
[The so called Roosevelt Panic] when numerous banks were failing and several
checks he had received from feeders, advances on sheep deliveries, were refused by
his Santa Fe bank. Unbeknownst to the feeders, their banks had failed and their
checks were worthless. Bond, in turn, was unable to pay for the lambs scheduled for
delivery at Servilleta, which were to be shipped out to the feeders. He described the
situation that ensued:
I recall going up to Servilleta to receive lambs
from a bunch of our old customers. I told them about the panic and
the position we were in, that we could borrow the money to pay for
the lambs, but if they did not need all the money we would appreciate
it if they would wait until the lambs were marketed next spring. One
of the biggest men spoke up at once and said he did not need a cent,
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and I could keep all his money, and there was not one but what
left part of his money with us. One man who was not there had one
of his neighbors deliver his lambs, and as I could not talk to him
personally, I mailed him a check for his in full. He wrote me back
at once enclosing my check, and said he understood I was giving
out notes in payment of lambs as all his neighbors had told him, and
he would be glad to have a note instead of the money. I never forgot
how those Spanish-Americans stood by me in our time of need….I
will say for our old time Spanish-American people that they are the
most loyal people I have ever met, and if you get their confidence,
they are your friends always.84
In this particular instance Bond was able to draw on the good will of his suppliers to
ease his negotiation of the bank failures. It is appears that these Hispanic sheepmen
did not feel exploited by Frank Bond.
The Bond enterprises had an important influence on the economies of large parts,
if not the entirety, of New Mexico, as well as parts of Southern Colorado and
Nebraska. They dominated the wool business wherever they set down. In later
years, the Bond branches in Roswell and Albuquerque would handle the bulk of the
wool produced in New Mexico.85
As New Mexico grazing land grew scarce and expensive, greater production
efficiencies were required. Open-range grazing, an important feature of the Bond
enterprises during the territorial period, ceased to be commercially viable and
eventually vanished, cf. chap. 10. The Bond empire also vanished, although for
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different reasons. The family liquidated their holdings around 1954, only nine years
after Frank Bond’s death.
The Bond empire exemplifies the capitalization, and subsequent control, of the
sheep industry at the mercantile level. It was a bridge between nineteenth-century
mercantile capitalism and twentieth-century industrial capitalism. The following
chapter discusses capitalization of the sheep industry at the production level.
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Chapter 8
The Capitalization of New Mexico Sheep Ranching

Growing Capitalization Requirements
In a 1902 report, government livestock expert E.V. Wilcox reviewed the various
safeguards sheep ranchers would have to put into place if they were to see attractive
profits in the future. He then asserted that individuals with “sufficient capital and
industry” to impliment those safeguards would be the ones to realize the profits.1 By the
late nineteenth century, the western sheep industry was, indeed, becoming increasingly
capital-intensive and, along with this, increasingly professionalized. A new range of
capital investments and more highly specialized skills and knowledge were required to
meet increased competition and more demanding market requirements. Sheepmen could
no longer depend entirely on New Mexico’s natural resources, nature’s bounty, to house,
water, and feed their herds. The remaining open range, growing ever more crowded, first
with livestock and later with homesteaders’ farms, could no longer serve as a year-around
home and feed trough for the herds. The expansion of the sheep industry in other western
states and territories introduced a degree of competition, heretofore absent. Labor costs
increased as labor requirements became more exacting. Costly new field facilities were
required to counter inefficiencies that could no longer be tolerated. Profit margins
became thinner. While financial leadership in the industry shifted to the well-capitalized
merchants, sheep ranches could still be quite profitable. Under evolving conditions,
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sheepmen needed to invest in land, fencing, wells, windmills, shearing pens, dipping
facilities, and a myriad of other items. Some undertook the growing of winter feed,
alfalfa in particular, which necessitated farming equipment, seed purchases, and irrigation
systems. Outdoor camps had to be updated with the construction of permanent
buildings.2 Selective breeding using expensive, graded rams became necessary, not
simply desirable, to meet the changing demands of the national wool and lamb markets.
Sheep diseases and predator depredations had to be combated aggressively; losses from
these factors could no longer be passively sustained.
Under increasingly demanding conditions, only the financially strong prospered. The
capital requirements worked to the detriment of those Hispanic sheep growers, both
large- and small-scale, whose wealth remained entirely tied up in their lands and
unimproved herds, those who had not amassed capital in mercantile pursuits. Raton
sheepman Daniel Troy observed that the number of sheep growers in his area decreased
during the fifteen years prior to 1892, the small owners being forced out. He also
asserted that the “improved” flocks, then called for, required improved care, employing
expensive improvements and fairly paid, clothed, and fed “American” [not Hispanic]
labor.3 Unable to compete, some rico families sold their private grants to Anglo
speculators, others simply walked away, although they must have done so with
considerable bitterness.4 Those leading Hispanic families with capital, continued to
operate, but their numbers, never great, did not grow. Entering the territory in increasing
numbers, Anglo stockmen with access to some capital, and a little good fortune,
prospered to varying degrees, following the advice of government reports to keep smaller
flocks of higher-quality stock, which meshed with the new economic realities.5 The
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reports, somewhat naively, encouraged them to “…improve on the past traditional
customs as practice judgment dictates, and there will be no apprehension or misgivings as
to permanence, profitability, or future of the sheep industry of New Mexico.”6 New
Mexico sheep ranching, thus, underwent a major transition, both economic and social,
starting in the late nineteenth century, a transition that depended on previously
unprecedented levels of capital investment. Without capital, no sheepman could prosper
for much longer.

Grazing Land
Starting in the 1880s or perhaps even earlier, the most basic capital investment
for sheepmen, beyond actual livestock purchases, was the acquisition of land.
Forced upon ranchers by a growing scarcity of good grazing land, ownership enabled
sheepmen to better control their grazing areas, construct permanent facilities, and
thus work toward stabilizing production conditions, combating the large,
unpredictable year-to-year fluctuations in profits characteristic of the range industry.
Although New Mexico production costs, as estimated in 1890, for farm-raised,
selectively-breed sheep were twice those for the open-range churros still being
produced by Hispanic sheepmen, $0.60/year versus $0.30/year, and land was a major
part of the added expense, ownership led to greater profits.7 Land could be acquired
in several different ways, ethical and unethical, legal and illegal. Two different
classes of land figure importantly in the New Mexico sheep industry: SpanishMexican land grants and U.S. public domain.
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The land grant system of the colonial and republican periods was a frontier exigency
that populated the lands and brought them into production without many legal niceties,
Spanish Civil Law providing the general framework of land tenure. The sheep industry
of New Mexico was reborn on the grants after the Reconquest. The grant system also
supported and propagated the rico class and, by extension, the commercial sheep industry
those families created. After the annexation, the incompatibility of the Mexican and
American legal systems made the grant lands vulnerable to acquisition by AngloAmerican newcomers. In a highly controversial process, Anglo lawyers, speculators, and
stockmen acquired Spanish-Mexican land grants at an astounding rate, to the detriment of
the Hispanic grantees.8
Frequently, Anglo ownership initially fell to the land speculators and lawyers, many
with influential political connections, some with ill-defined and impractical schemes for
developing the lands.9 The Anglo speculators employed a combination of more or less
subtle legal procedures and aggressive lobbying in Santa Fe and Washington to get title
to the grant lands they sought, with little concern for the Hispanic occupants. A great
deal of chicanery was involved. Conversely, Hispanic grantees sometimes lost their
lands because they lacked political clout and the financial resources to engage skilled,
aggressive Anglo lawyers to defend their interests in the American courts. Sometimes
they were able to secure viable legal representation, but, having insufficient cash
resources, paid dearly for those services with land, a substantial fraction of their tracts
being taken up as attorneys’ fees.10 The ownership determinations by the courts were, in
the end, largely arbitrary and unfair. Suffice it to say that the spirit of the Treaty of
Guadalupe-Hidalgo, as it was intended to honor and protect Hispanic land ownership,
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was grossly violated, although most of the land transfers were legal in the eyes of the
federal courts.
A considerable body of work, including case studies of specific grants, has been
devoted to this land-transfer from Hispanic to Anglo ownership.11 The lands included
both the immense common-land tracts of community grants and the private grants that
were traditionally dedicated to livestock grazing, mostly sheep. It seems unlikely that the
contest for New Mexico’s land would have proceeded so rapidly and assumed the bitter
proportions that it did had not the land been proven livestock country.
A few of the best-positioned rico families held their own, as was the case of the
Chaves family. With their claims in San Mateo unconfirmed, Manuel Antonio Chaves
and his half-brother Roman A. Baca sent Manuel’s son Amado Chaves back to
Washington in 1882 to defend their acquisitions. Energetic, well-educated, and bicultural, he worked long and hard to obtain a patent for the grant, which covered over
200,000 acres, and ultimately prevailed.12
Most Hispanic families could not muster such legal talent, and many lost courtroom
battles for their property. Others sold out cheaply when they were unable to pay newlyimposed property taxes.13 Private grants fell to Anglos through other paths. When a
patriarch died, ownership was distributed among the children and surviving spouse.
Some or all the heirs often chose to sell their inheritance, as was the case with the
Maxwell Grant discussed in chap. 3, which was consolidated by Lucian B. Maxwell, an
original grantee’s son-in-law.14 A similar situation transpired in the case of the Montoya
Grant. Speculators and lawyers, in a complex series of transactions acquired, by
purchase or in the form of legal fees, the Pablo Montoya Grant, 530,000 acres previously
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confirmed by Congress and later to be patented, from six of the seven grant heirs in 1868.
Their total financial outlay was no more than a few thousand dollars. They in turn sold
this and other grant lands to flamboyant entrepreneur and land promoter Wilson
Waddingham in 1870 for tens of thousands of dollars. He used the lands to form part of
the massive Bell Ranch, headquartered eighty miles southeast of Las Vegas, where he
raised both cattle and sheep.15 Eventually, many of the grants, both community and
private, ended up in the hands of Anglo stockmen.16 The end result, not surprisingly, was
that sheep-growing resources that had once been Hispanic controlled came under Anglo
control. Hispanic sheep interests diminished; Anglo interests grew.
From the standpoint of Anglos, the presence of Hispanic settlers, squatters, and
trespassers on the grant lands they acquired presented a continuing problem. These
occupants, such as they were, could monopolize the land’s resources. The trespassers
were, in many cases, men who used the grant lands to graze their modest flocks of
churros. The permanent occupants were a mix of squatters who possessed no legal rights
to the land and long-term residents with the customary rights of possession through
occupancy of greater than ten years duration. When New Haven investors Harvard
educated John Greenough and James Brown Potter assumed control of the failing Bell
Ranch in 1893, they discovered that about seventy long-term resident Hispanic families
were living in villages on the grant and using some twenty miles of river frontage to raise
their sheep, thus depriving Bell livestock of grass.17 The situation was, needless to say,
unacceptable to the new owners, as good grazing land and water frontage were growing
scarce. The resources had become too valuable for the new owners to share. The Bell
management, determined therefore to claim the grant in its entirety, simply bought out
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the families with ten or more years tenure, encouraging those families to file homestead
claims on nearby public domain. Apparently, the program proceeded peaceably,
although it is hard to imagine these families were not distressed over the situation. Some
families moved to Trementina and La Manga, nearby villages located outside the grant.
Documentation available for one family, the Munizes, indicates they received $200 cash
plus 10 foals worth $50 in exchange for their holding. By 1898 most of the settlers were
gone. The huge ranch was brought up to high standards of efficiency, enabling it to
operate for the next half century.18 This affair illustrates one way economic forces
marginalized Hispanic small-scale, sheep-raising families. Generally, the new Anglo
grant owners, or their majordomos, devoted a considerable portion of their efforts to
keeping out trespassers. Thomas Catron employed stockman Montgomery Bell to keep
the Anton Chico Grant, to which he laid claim, free of trespassers.19
Much of the land taken up by the expanding sheep industry had, from the time of the
annexation, been U.S. public domain, the suppression of Indian hostilities by the U.S.
Army having opened up vast grazing tracts on these lands, beyond the extent of the
Spanish-Mexican land grants. Just as the Anglo acquisition of land grants has been
highly controversial, so has the acquisition of public lands since much of the land in
question was claimed illegally.20 The public lands that were eventually devoted to sheep
included huge areas extending east and west of Albuquerque, lying somewhat south of
the extensively-granted areas.21 The activities of the Luna family are notable. Starting
from his family’s ancestral grant, the San Clemente Grant in Valencia County, which
extended from the Rio Grande to the Rio Puerco, Solomon Luna grazed his herds on
public lands extending west across the Plains of St. Augustine to the tiny village of Luna

201

near the Arizona border.22 The critical factor in the acquisition of public lands from the
federal government, even when illegal means were resorted to, as they often were, was
some capital outlay, if not mainly for the land itself, then for livestock and other
necessary expenditures, a situation that favored stockmen with ready cash, cf. chap. 9.
And once land was legally owned, it was subject to taxation.
Several paths, both direct and indirect, to public land acquisition existed. The
railroads sold off their grant lands along their right-of-ways. Both military and Indian
lands were at times made available for sale to the public by the federal government. Cash
was not always necessary. Land might be purchased with script, which had been issued
to veterans by the federal government in compensation for military service. Land could
also be purchased at public auction, possibly because of tax arrears on the part of a
previous claimant. And it could be bought from a private owner, possibly a failed
homesteader who had managed to prove up his entry or a claimant under the Desert Land
Act who could sell his claim at any time. Anglo stockmen who began immigrating to
New Mexico after the Civil War sometimes chose this path, preferring to buy lands with
clear title outright rather than claim government land with strings attached. This enabled
them to acquire the better available grazing tracts. These more affluent individuals, men
like Luna’s neighbor Montague Stevens, brought the necessary funding into New Mexico
from elsewhere, England in Stevens case. At the other extreme, many cash poor grant
heirs, caught in a rapidly evolving financial environment, with their assets in the form of
overgrazed land and marginally-improved livestock, lacked the capital resources to
purchase additional, newly available land.23 The end result, again, was that Anglo sheep
interests expanded more rapidly than Hispanic interests. Much public land claimed
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through the various federal programs was dedicated to grazing. Some, perhaps most, of
these acquisitions were illegal.
Although the detailed paths by which public lands ended up in the hands of Anglo
stockmen varied, the Homestead Act of 1862 and the Pre-emption Act of 1841 were often
exploited. The general conditions of the homestead laws are summarized in Appendix F.
They proved to be valuable tools for New Mexico stockmen, although that was never
intended by the law makers.24 The homestead laws were intended to populate the
western regions of the country with productive, small-scale farmers and their families.
Federal law, as it was written, did not permit non-agricultural lands, which constituted
much of New Mexico, to be offered under the various programs. However, before the
advent of mechanized irrigation, the 160-acre tracts available under the Homestead Act
were completely inadequate for farming in the Southwest. Unsurprisingly, little public
land in New Mexico was disposed of by the federal government before 1880.
Starting in the 1880s the situation changed. New Mexico ranchers with the necessary
financial resources circumvented the homesteading restrictions by purchasing script,
directly or indirectly from the veterans to whom it had been issued, and used it to
purchase water-front land at $3.50-6.00/acre.25 Others followed a different path. Much
of the watered land acquired by cattlemen in New Mexico was obtained illegally by
exploiting the homestead and pre-emption laws. In some cases, corrupt public officials,
federal and territorial, were active participants in the excesses. The widespread practice
has been described in detail by Westphall.26 Anglo sheepmen followed similar practices.
The 160-acre homesteads were required by law to be occupied or continuously devoted to
farming by the claimants for five years before title was granted. The laws were, however,
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easily exploited by western stockmen, who never occupied or farmed the tracts they
claimed.27 While illegal, the process was easy and basically risk free. A rancher might
file a claim for land entry, but never acquire title through a confirmation and patent.
Under the Homestead Act, the claimant had sole usage of the land for at least seven
years, regardless of whether he satisfied the requirements for securing a patent.28 This
practice had the effect of tying up the land for years, devoting it strictly to grazing, and
preventing anyone else from filing a claim or using it until the tract was again opened for
entry. Ranchers seem to have had a shorter time horizon than farmers and often found
this procedure for reserving land satisfactory for their purposes.29
With little competition from farmers whose numbers were still small, stockmen, aided
by the collusion of public officials, sought in particular the quarter sections along streams
or with springs needed to water their stock. Then, having secured the essential water
rights, they gained control of large, unclaimed expanses of surrounding dry grazing land
needed for their herds. The dry tracts alone, without water rights, were of no value to an
encroaching rival, be he rancher or farmer, without mechanized irrigation, an expensive
development of a later era. The dry tracts would remain unclaimed and open for grazing
for many years. Both cattle and sheepmen employed this land acquisition procedure in
New Mexico. Montague Stevens described the situation succinctly. “As regards the
amount of land a rancher owned compared with the acreage of his free range, it was very
small and consisted mainly of the actual land on which was living [running] water such
as creeks or springs.”30 This land, the “home range,” would often be the site of the ranch
headquarters. Cattle ranch woman, Agnes Morley Cleaveland describes her family’s
“ranch,” much of it actually public domain, as adjoining that of Stevens, although their
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dwellings were located seventy miles apart!31 Former Arkansas Senator Stephen W.
Dorsey is said to have controlled 10,000 acres of rangeland in Colfax County through a
single 160-acre tract with several springs.32 Miguel A. Otero and J.W. Raynolds
acquired a thirty-mile strip along the Salado River [Socorro County], which in turn give
them control over a thirty-mile square area.33
Claimed stretches of water front could be readily expanded exploiting the Preemption Law, which required only a six-month period of occupancy. An applicant could
easily engage a bogus entryman for that period so as to appear to be satisfying the letter
of the law.34 Describing the situation in the Datil area, west of Magdalena, in the mid1880s, Cleaveland noted that every site of “living water” in the area had been promptly
homesteaded after the area was surveyed, only a few years earlier, and many families had
supplemented their homestead with an additional 160-acre claim under the Pre-emption
Act of 1841. She noted further that although it was not permitted under the law to sell or
transfer these claims until final title was secured, this ruling was easily evaded. Most of
the original homesteaders in her area, in short order after the receipt of land, sold their
[would-be] patents to one of the large, open-range ranching outfits.35 This seems to have
been common practice throughout the territory. Some of these transactions were
apparently prearranged. Among westerners, there was a wide-spread disrespect for
federal land legislation, which must have seemed to them extraordinarily senseless. Few,
seemingly, had serious compunctions about breaking federal statutes to acquire public
lands, which must have appeared inexhaustible into the 1880s.
Westphall has shown that by the 1890s a substantial fraction of the New Mexico
public domain had been acquired fraudulently by ranchers since there were too few
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farmer-settlers in the territory to account for the number of homesteads that had been
alloted.36 Cattlemen sometimes acquired title to public domain that had been used by
Hispanic herders for generations, but never filed on.37 Some stockmen created ranches
by first engaging a number of men, possibly employees, or possibly just fictitious names,
to file contiguous homestead, pre-emption, or desert land claims. The false claimants
would, if necessary, testify in court on each other’s behalf that they were residing on or
using the lands for agricultural purposes, as required by law. As soon as possible, the
rancher behind this charade would buy out all the fictitious claimants, which had been the
intent all along, thus carving out a large tract of rangeland for minimal financial outlay.
The American Valley Company near Quemado, established in 1881 as a cattle ranch and
later converted to sheep, in which Republican Party boss Thomas B. Catron held a large
interest, was a particularly egregious offender.38 Thus, many New Mexico ranches were
created by Anglo stockmen through more or less fraudulent means. The questionable
practices did, for better or worse, enable many stockmen to go into business in New
Mexico without a large financial outlay for land, while putting the land to a use for which
it was better suited.
Westphall makes a good argument that the poorly-conceived, unworkable, unpopular,
inconsistently-enforced land laws opened the way for widespread corruption.39 New
Mexicans seem to have regarded the laws as senseless and, therefore, to be evaded one
way or the other. Only in the late 1880s-early 1890s timeframe did public land
transactions become normalized, as genuine homesteaders started arriving in New
Mexico in substantial numbers and taking advantage of the homestead laws as they were
intended. With the laws on their side, they were able to claim and take up some of the
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best lands, an important factor in ending open-range ranching, cf. chap. 10.

Stockmen

were then forced to approach land ownership legally.
Reflecting the various difficulties, less than 60% of the New Mexico homestead
entries were ever finalized.40 This practice exacerbated the uncertainty in land ownership
first introduced by the grants and further helped keep New Mexico land prices low.
When a proper legal title under American law was obtained, land took on increased value
because it could then be readily bought and sold on the open market, without any preexisting obligations, a necessity in the developing capitalistic economy.
To summarize land acquisition in New Mexico by Anglo ranchers, a great deal of
political chicanery and questionable legal determinations were involved in the cheap
acquisitions. Nevertheless, once the lands were legally owned, they were immediately
subject to taxation, while a period of years might be required to develop a profitable
ranch on the land. Ranchers thus had to be in a position to pay taxes for a time before
profits were realized.41 The bulk of the Spanish-Mexican land grant acreage fell into
Anglo hands. The Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo failed to protect the grantees. The spirit
of Manifest Destiny provided all the moral justification that land-seeking Anglos needed.
Private grantees, like the Montoya family, sold out to aggressive Anglo-Americans,
leaving the land’s Hispanic occupants, who had lived under their patron’s protection, in
an ambiguous, insecure, and altogether difficult situation.42 The federal government gave
away 623,000 acres of U.S. public domain in New Mexico, once the hunting grounds of
various nomadic tribes, and sold another 648,000 acres. The railroads eventually sold
356,000 acres of their deeded grant lands. Suffice it to say that the post-Civil War
expansion of New Mexico’s important sheep industry rested on a foundation of at best
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questionable, and often fraudulent, land transactions. Congress failed to provide
adequate legislation to accommodate the western ranching industry as it assumed national
importance and, perhaps even more seriously, was little concerned.

Fencing
By the late nineteenth century, fencing became an important requirement, and a major
expense, for an efficient, profitable sheep ranch. The introduction of barbed wire,
invented in De Kalb, Illinois, and patented in 1874, made fencing possible for the first
time in New Mexico, where materials for any other type of fence were scarce and would
have been prohibitively expensive to ship into the territory. The railroads made it
possible to ship the heavy rolls of barbed wire into the territory economically, and
fencing was adopted remarkably quickly. Fences altered the character of the rangeland
irreversibly and revolutionized the western livestock industry. The introduction of fences
on the western range was a conflict-ridden process, strongly, even violently, opposed by
stockmen in the beginning; fences disrupted their traditional grazing practices, cf. chap.
10. Ranchers eventually embraced the new technology when they came to understand its
uses. The advent of fencing ultimately led to more orderly operations and generally
greater, more stable profits. It was a critical factor in bringing open-range grazing in
New Mexico and throughout the West to a close, cf. chap. 10.
Barbed wire fences began to appear in New Mexico around 1880. The first to use
them were farmers, mostly, who employed fences to protect their crops from wandering,
untended livestock.43 Like farmers, ranchers first adopted the new technology to keep
intruding livestock and stockmen off of their range and preserve it for their own stock.
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Sheepmen soon discovered, however, that a more important function of fences was to
contain their own livestock, rather than to exclude intruders.
Fences provided an array of advantages for sheep growers. They reduced labor and
equipment expenses significantly. By containing flocks, fences reduced the need for
herders. Two range and fence riders could do the work of ten herders. And the need for
camp tenders, camp equipment, pack burros, and the like was eliminated along with the
long-distance annual treks on the open range. Fenced livestock could be better protected
and fed in winter.44 Fencing could be employed to restrain and isolate breeding stock.
All other factors being equal, fenced grazing land could carry 25% more sheep per acre
since the land was utilized more uniformly. Fences made possible pasture rotation,
reducing the damage from overstocking, widespread by the 1880s. Fenced watering
places remained in better condition also.45 Sheep and cattle could be raised together
more readily in carefully managed enclosed pastures.46 An important advantage of
fencing for wool growers was the cleanliness of the wool produced, because fenced
flocks did not crowd together in their own dust as much as range herds. Moreover,
without the bunching typical of range herds, it was found that fenced lambs got more
food and gained more weight. The practice of holding an entire herd of sheep in a small,
compact, and thus food-scarce pen during lambing and shearing was eliminated, and the
long-standing problem of weight losses during these periods was solved. When
necessary, the sheep could be easily penned up in small groups instead, guaranteeing
adequate feed for every animal during these critical periods. If the fenced pastures were
irrigated and seeded with grass, e.g. alfalfa, they could hold considerably more sheep per
acre than open rangeland. The adequately capitalzed, more progressive sheep operations
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with fences would see increased profits over the long term; the smaller operations
without fencing became marginalized. The value of barbed wire for westerners cannot be
over-estimated.
Many of the first fences were illegal. Ranchers did not restrict themselves to
installing barbed wire on their patented home range tracts. It was a widely accepted
practice for New Mexico stockmen to fence tracts of public range that they had become
accustomed to using, land they considered part of their “ranch.” In an attempt to
eliminate the practice, the fencing of public lands was declared illegal by territorial law in
1882. But the law was ineffective in many areas. Perpetrators could get around it easily
because the fences were generally in remote areas where few people, and only rarely law
officers, ventured. The practice was, besides, essentially a continuation of the custom of
first-come-first-served usage rights. The big cattle growers with large rosters of cowboys
on their payrolls could easily suppress any local protests against their fences.47
By 1883, large stock companies in the territory were putting up fences on the public
domain.48 The Bell Ranch together with several thousand acres of surrounding public
domain, de facto part of the ranch, was completely fenced by 1889.49 Cleaveland noted
that ranchers in her area around Datil enclosed their lands with as much barbed wire as
they could afford. Her family fenced in their water hole and large tracts of adjoining
rangeland, which in her words they used “by custom,” but did not actually own.50 Some
3,500,000 acres of public domain in New Mexico were being acted upon or under
investigation for illegal fencing from 1885 through 1888.51 By 1900, the western range
was crisscrossed everywhere by barbed wire.
The initial cost of constructing sheep–proof fences was high, but operating expenses

210

were lower once the fence was in place. Cleaveland noted that fences cost more than the
land itself in her area.52 In 1880, the Cimarron News and Press reported that New
Mexico attorney Frank Springer installed 18 miles of fencing on his Colfax County
ranch. Likewise, H.M. Porter installed 32 miles, and Chase and Dawson 30 miles on
their ranches in the area. The average cost of the cattle fencing, the case here, was $130140 per mile. Expenditures of this magnitude were out of the question for small-scale
operators having only a few hundred head and no cash reserves. The news story went on
to predict, a little too soon as it turned out, that within five years it would become the
“almost universal custom to fence all ranches.”53
If fences made a ranch more profitable, they made life more difficult for those
ranchers without them. Once they had become relatively common, fences broke up the
range and often restricted the route from one open section to another, making it more
difficult for any herder to utilize the remaining rangeland, cf. chap. 10. Open-range
herding then required more time and labor than in the past. Starting around 1890, the
proliferation of fencing had the effect of leaving many New Mexico partidarios and
small-scale sheepmen “fenced out” of rangelands they had long been using. In
frustration, they sometimes resorted to violence. A wave of fence cutting swept through
New Mexico and elsewhere in the Southwest. This was mainly an activity directed
against large-scale stock growers, be they Anglo or Hispanic, who had erected fences by
small-scale herders, whose marginal operations were most adversely affected by the
fences. Fencing was one of the issues that gave rise to the Gorras Blancas and rampant
fence cutting in San Miguel and Guadalupe Counties starting in the late1880s.54 When
Fabiola Cabeza de Baca reported that the Gorras Blancas had cut miles of fencing on her
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family’s ranch, she was probably not exaggerating.55 The “fencing out” of smaller
operators accelerated during the 1900-1910 timeframe.
The social consequences of fencing the range should not be overlooked. Fencing
ultimately helped bring about a more cooperative and stable farming and ranching
society. The fences designated land claims unambiguously and thus suppressed range
wars as well as less dramatic land conflicts.56

Mechanized Irrigation
Watering crops and livestock had been a major challenge in semi-arid New Mexico
since Spanish colonial times. The colonists learned to harness the forces of nature to
provide their villages with water. They built acequias to channel river flow to their
nearby fields and dug wells for domestic use, but, beyond that, made no technological
progress in water procurement. The industrial revolution, which swept through the
United States beginning in the late eighteenth century, gave birth to a wave of
technological innovation, including mechanized irrigation, which had an immense effect
on both farming and ranching in New Mexico. During the late nineteenth century,
advancing irrigation technology rendered reservoirs, commercially useful wells, and
windmills, at long last, practical and affordable in the West.
The reservoirs utilized the occasional flood waters in the streams, heretofore
untapped. Wells and windmills to pump underground water and also artesian flow were
used to fill livestock watering tanks and to irrigate fields.57 Until this time, possession of
water frontage had given ranchers control of the surrounding dry rangeland. However,
those lands furthest from the water were often lightly used, if at all, because livestock
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would have to be driven impractically long distances from range to water and back. This
was an inherent inefficiency in the open-range system. Large tracts of otherwise good
grazing land in New Mexico were simply too far away from water for stock growing and,
also, farming. The advent of wells and windmills ameliorated this situation greatly.
Drilling wells, which ranged from 125 to 400 feet in depth in New Mexico, was an
expensive proposition for sheep ranchers, as were the windmills used with them.
However, by 1900, many New Mexico sheep ranchers had installed windmills. James
Hagerman and Charles Eddy irrigated John Chisum’s old ranch area in southeastern New
Mexico in 1889.58 Mechanized irrigation opened a vast expanse of heretofore unused
rangeland. Watering livestock became much easier. Livestock could now congregate
around a water tank on a segment of otherwise dry land and utilize the surrounding dry
range more fully. Sheep could be more evenly distributed over the land, and herd sizes
could be increased. Sheep growers could concentrate more on the demands of
increasingly competitive markets and less on basic range conditions. In any case, more
efficient use of the land became increasingly necessary after homesteaders began to take
up former rangeland and natural water frontage on the public domain, cf. chap. 10.59
Wells worked effectively in conjunction with fences, since the fences could be
employed to contain a herd in the general area of a water tank. Droughts, when natural
streams ran dry, were more easily withstood, as were times of weak markets when it was
desirable to keep sheep, and their wool, on the range for extended periods during which
time natural water resources might vary considerably. In time, an irrigation system of
some sort, like fencing, became a necessity for ranchers. Those who lacked the financial
resources to irrigate their lands were subject to marginalization.
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Labor Costs
With increased demands for efficiency, and a resulting professionalization, the labor
requirements on sheep ranches became more exacting. Discussing the direction the
industry was headed in 1892, government livestock experts, echoing a widely held view,
encouraged owners to personally supervise the care of their flocks in the interest of
maximizing profits. Leaving them entirely under the care of poorly-paid herders or
loosely-supervised partidarios, as in the past, had become unwise business practice at
best.60 When Waddingham’s Bell Ranch went into bankruptcy and was taken over by
east-coast investors, they hired as on-site general manager Irish-born Arthur J. Tisdall
[1893-1898], a knowledgeable, experienced sheep and cattle grower and, apparently, also
a first-rate businessman. Tisdall, in turn, hired as “range manager” Englishman Jack
Culley, a graduate of Oxford University. During the dry winter of 1894-1895, a critical
time for the operation, they successfully introduced large flocks of sheep onto the ranch,
which they considered the optimum livestock under the prevailing conditions.
Eventually, they turned around the failing operation and put it on the road to success.61
Combining east coast money with European managerial know-how on a New Mexico
ranch proved to be a formula for success. Needless to say, such managerial talent was
not cheap. Sufficient funds were needed to pay competent managers. Conversely,
Thomas Catron, possibly in search of the easy profits once enjoyed by his Hispanic
political cohorts, did not heed this advice. Reestablishing his American Valley Company
in today’s Quemado area as a sheep ranch, he hired an incompetent majordomo, Charles
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H. Elmendorf, who in turn hired an irresponsible field boss. All the while, Catron carried
on with his busy political and law career, contenting himself with writing long, berating
letters to Elmendorf as conditions on the ranch deteriorated. Catron either did not
recognize the new realities of the New Mexico sheep business, or he was unwilling to
devote the effort necessary for a successful operation. He went bust. Eastern investors
refused to loan him desperately needed funds as his ship sank.62 The large-scale Hispanic
outfits, in contrast, continued to rely on family members, or in any case native New
Mexicans, to manage their ranches, drawing, of necessity, from a smaller talent pool than
the Anglos, a practice that undoubtedly put their operations at a competitive
disadvantage.
More demanding labor requirements were not restricted to the managerial levels. The
labor situation in New Mexico had changed significantly since the Civil War. The cheap,
skilled herders touted by the promotional literature of the 1870s were no longer so readily
available by the late nineteenth century. Knowledgable, responsible herders became
harder for sheepmen to find, particularly for seasonal employment, while labor expenses
increased.
Lambing, which lasted about a month to six weeks in the early spring was a critical
period for sheep growers that strongly affected their success in the coming year. In the
increasingly competitive economy, a high survival rate for newborns was essential.
Typically about 4% of the mature ewes were barren, while about 4-5% of them aborted
each year. And about 5-10% of the lambs born each spring died in the first three
weeks.63 Thus, typically no more than about 85%, and frequently many fewer, of ewes
produced viable offspring each year, cf. chap. 9 concerning Montague Stevens’ lambing
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experiences. Greater losses might be hard to sustain. For a successful season, sheepmen
were required to hire comparatively large temporary lambing crews on a cash basis, a
sheepmen were required to hire comparatively large temporary lambing crews on a cash
basis, a practice that became increasingly difficult as Hispanic village men, who had once
eagerly sought seasonal work in the sheep camps, chose other employment options
opening up in the expanding southwest economy. If a birthing crew was inept or
unmotivated, lamb survival could drop precipitously and cut deeply into the sheepman’s
profit margin.
The shearing of the mature sheep was another expense incurred about the same time
of year. It commenced in the spring, not long after lambing. During the SpanishMexican period, shearing was hardly an issue since little of the churros’ wool was
actually used. In the decades following the Civil War, when wool became an important
territorial export, shearing became more or less professionalized. Wool growers, large
and small, employed shearing teams on a temporary basis. By the turn of the twentieth
century, a work pattern had emerged in which teams of itinerant professional shearers,
generally Hispanic, worked their way, in an annual cycle from south to north as the
spring advanced. Their skills were essential for successful wool production. Poorly
skilled or unmotivated shearers would not obtain the full fleece weight from an animal
and their clumsy work would lead to additional mortality of the mature sheep, reducing
the owner’s profits.
While the number of herders needed decreased, ranch labor at all levels became more
expensive. Competant managers and foremen had to be well compensated as did birthing
and shearing teams. Ranchers were required to have cash on hand to pay the temporary
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work forces sufficiently to attract competent workers.
The capitalization of New Mexico sheep ranching was another process that acted to
shift industry dominance from Hispanics to Anglos. The experiences of Western Socorro
County sheepman Montague Stevens, described in the following chapter, illustrate this
development.
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Chapter 9
Montague Stevens, Capital, Risk, and Labor

Western Socorro County1 stockman Montague Stevens left a collection of letters,
spanning over three decades, to his friend and business partner, army officer Leonard
Wood, in which he discussed New Mexico sheep ranching in extraordinary detail. The
collection, housed at the Center for Southwest Research, University of New Mexico,
Albuquerque, covers a range of matters pertaining to the business, particularly the capital
requirements, but also the risks and labor issues, for sheep growing in the late nineteenthearly twentieth century time period. The letters provide, furthermore, significant insights
into a notable rancher’s life during this period. They also express his sometimes harsh
assessments of the Hispanic herders and sheepmen he encountered, assessments with
which many western Anglos would agree.2 Wood was a trained physician, a graduate of
Harvard Medical School, and later attended graduate school at Georgia Tech. He played
a prominent role in the Spanish-American War and rose to the rank of general in the U.S.
Army. Stevens employed his own and his wife’s considerable inherited wealth together
with Wood’s investment to build a large-scale, and quite innovative, ranching operation.
The story of that endeavor will be presented here chronologically, just as Stevens related
it in his letters to Wood.

Stevens Background
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Montague Stevens was born in London in 1859 to an extraordinarily wealthy family.3
His father, a general in the British Army, had spent many years stationed in India, where
he amassed his wealth. His mother had inherited a fortune of her own. Stevens attended
Cambridge University, where he received two degrees, one in mining engineering and
one in law. General Stevens had intended for his son to join his brother’s law practice in
London. However, during college Montague went on a hunting trip to Wyoming and fell
in love with the American West. Upon his twenty-first birthday, he inherited about
$100,000 ($2,000,000 in 2010 dollars) from his mother’s dowry and immigrated to
America, leaving behind forever the predictable, comfortable, circumscribed existence of
a London barrister. He also left behind an even larger fortune, as his father, angered by
his decision to forsake a law career, disinherited him.4 By 1882, the cattle bubble in full
swing, Stevens was raising cattle in the high valleys of the Mogollon Mountains and
purchasing ranches from earlier settlers in the general area of today’s town of Reserve,
New Mexico.5 Stevens was one of a cohort of cattlemen who came to the area over a
very short period and transformed it into cattle country.6 Up until this time, the area had
been sheep country, the growers all Hispanics who had never purchased or homesteaded
the lands they were using. Within a few years Stevens was running some 8,000 head of
cattle. He learned the business from the ground up, riding with his cowboys, and became
best friends with his foreman and hunting buddy, Texan Dan Gatlin, with whom he
shared many adventures that he later wrote about.7 Stevens met Gen. Nelson Miles and
his junior officer Leonard Wood in 1885, during the Apache Wars, when several
detachments of soldiers under Miles command were stationed on his range.8 Having
become fluent in Spanish, he accompanied the army into Mexico in pursuit of Geronimo
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as guide and interpreter. He was well on his way to becoming a western cattle baron
when double disaster struck. First, he shot off his left arm in a hunting accident and
almost died. Then, the horrendous winter of 1888-1889 killed 90% of his cattle.9
Stevens’ neighbor, sheepman Solomon Luna, lost about 19,000 head out of the 40,000 he
owned at the time, a serious, but less devastating loss.10 This nearly ruined Stevens
financially and probably would have been the end of his ranching career if Gatlin, who
had saved up some money, hadn’t rescued him by buying up his remaining cattle and
otherwise helping him rebuild his operation.11 Broke and despondent, Stevens ended his
engagement with his beloved English-Irish fiancé, thinking she would not want him
under the circumstances, and spent the next several years working to recover his losses.12
Due to a confluence of low cattle prices, overstocked ranges, and large mortgages in
addition to the killer winter, many of the other cattlemen in the area simply went bust
during this period.13 For her part, Stevens’ former fiancé married a wealthy, abusive
Englishman, who conveniently soon died, but not before giving her tuberculosis.14 Helen
Gordon Dill, left in poor health, and Stevens eventually reunited and were married in the
Woods’ New York City home in 1896.15 She gave up a considerable inheritance from
her first husband’s estate when she remarried, but still had about $120,000 of her own
($2,500,000 in 2010 dollars).16 Shortly after his marriage, Stevens switched from cattle to
sheep and entered a financial partnership with Wood, assuming the on-site, managerial
responsibilities himself. He succinctly summed up his reasons a few years later:
“…experience has proved that cattle raising in these parts is a failure at the best…” As
for sheep, he continued, “they have always paid to run, no matter how low wool or
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mutton might have been…”17 In this time period, Englishmen are known to have raised
sheep on a large scale in other parts of New Mexico also.18

Initial Land Acquisition
Stevens undertook sheep ranching in a very systematic manner. His experiences will
be discussed here in some detail, as they not only provide insight into several aspects of
sheep ranching, as it was conducted at the time, but illustrate many points of previous
discussion. Stevens’ first order of business was to acquire grazing land. Land was
readily available in western Socorro County at this time because so many cattle ranches
had recently failed and their extensive tracts were being foreclosed by mortgage
companies or, otherwise, being sold off cheaply by the defunct outfits. In Stevens’
words, “the whole country is one may say for sale.”19 The mortgagees were mostly nonresidents who knew nothing about the country and were anxious to divest themselves of
their ranches, now unproductive but still liable for taxes.20 Stevens identified a property
he wanted, the S.U. Ranch, and got himself appointed co-receiver for the bankrupt
operation.21 Two London-based companies held mortgages on the ranch that had gone
into default. They added up to about $80,000, largely tied up in livestock. In his new
capacity, Stevens worked closely with the mortgage companies and their high-powered
attorneys in Denver. He hoped to purchase the property, including the livestock, from the
mortgage companies for $60,000 with $15,000 down payment and the remainder to be
covered by a loan to be paid over a period of five to seven years at 4% annual interest.22
As it turned out, he was tasked with selling off the remaining cattle, 8000-10,000 head,
for the mortgage companies. He later stocked the range with sheep and did eventually
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purchase the property. His most immediate problem was in dealing with a Judge
Hamilton, a corrupt federal judge presiding over the bankruptcy, who had a scheme for
milking money out of the property and, to that end, had appointed a co-receiver he could
control, a man named Smith, who, according to Stevens could barely read. Smith was
later murdered and Hamilton then appointed a Mr. Balmey as his replacement.23 The
Judge attempted to bypass Stevens by means of a fraudulent sale - on paper only - of the
cattle below market price to a friend, a Mr. Bruton. To gain possession of the cattle, the
Judge and his friends did not plan to actually put up any money, which they apparently
did not have. The plan was for Bruton to immediately turn around and sell the cattle at
the market price to a legitimate buyer for cash at about $1.00-2.00/head above the
fraudulent purchase price. Judge Hamilton and his circle of friends stood to clear in the
range of $8,000-16,000, the difference in price between the fake sale and the legitimate
sale of the 8,000 head. The mortgage companies would be paid the smaller amount, the
fraudulent sale price, for their cattle and thus be swindled out of the money the Judge and
his friends got. This was not in Stevens’ and Wood’s best interest because a smaller
amount of the mortgages would be paid off by the sale, which they would have to make
up if they were to purchase the property at a later time. To counter this possibility,
Stevens requested Wood to put up $10,000 and, at the same time, wrote his sister in
England to send him money. Wood immediately sent Stevens a check. This would
enable him and Wood to put up real money and outbid Bruton in the upcoming courtordered sale of the cattle at public auction. A larger fraction of the mortgages would thus
be paid off, and Stevens and Wood would be able to acquire the ranch from the mortgage
companies for that much less. When the court proceeding actually occurred, Stevens
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simply presented Wood’s check for $10,000 as a down payment for the cattle. This
apparently bluffed out the Hamilton-Bruton ring, which had no cash to put up. No cattle
were actually sold at that time though.24 Instead, the attorneys for the mortgage
companies pressured Judge Hamilton to empower Stevens to sell the cattle privately on
behalf of their clients. Stevens believed he could sell off the dry cattle immediately for
about $30,000-40,000, reducing the mortgage liability correspondingly so that he and
Wood might purchase the ranch and the remaining livestock for about $40,000. It might
seem that this would be the end, but it was not. Hamilton attempted then to somehow
resuscitate his scheme and remove Stevens as co-receiver on the basis of some sort of
trumped up charges, leaving his man, Balmey, as sole receiver. Stevens countered by
requesting Wood, who was then stationed in Washington, D.C., to contact his friend
“Judge Field”25 about removing Hamilton from the bench, later reiterating the request “if
you should have another chance to talk to him [Judge Field] at the Club.” Apparently,
there had been a fair amount of grumbling about Hamilton by others in New Mexico and
elsewhere, so the request was not entirely specious.26 The situation was even more
unsettled than this would indicate. Balmey was also postmaster of Socorro, a political
appointment, and had apparently intercepted some important letters from the attorneys in
Denver addressed to Stevens, which concerned filing charges against Hamilton with
federal authorities and initiating a federal investigation of the judge.27 In a later letter,
Stevens requested Wood to report Hamilton privately to U.S. Attorney General McKenna
in continuation of his hope for a federal investigation. No action was actually taken, as it
was later determined that sufficient evidence to remove Hamilton from the bench was
lacking.28 Apparently, several New Mexicans who had had unpleasant dealings with him
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did not want to openly oppose the judge and testify against him, since he wielded
considerable local influence. This was particularly true of lawyers with cases slated to
come up before him.29 The proceedings dragged on for well over a year. But Stevens
eventually gained control of the property. If this sequence of events seems complicated,
it was. But it illustrates both the considerable ready funds ranchers needed in order to
function effectively and how New Mexico’s infamous atmosphere of political corruption
spilled into the economic arena where it could adversely affect ranchers. It also shows
the benefits of having influential friends in Washington.

Stocking the Range
Stevens next step was to stock his range with sheep. He anticipated correctly that
McKinley would be elected president in 1896, the wool tariff would be reinstated, and
wool and sheep prices, depressed at the time, would go “up at a bound.”30 So he was
anxious to buy quickly while prices were still comparatively low. He considered buying
a flock of heavy-fleeced California ewes but was uncertain whether they could tolerate
the harsh New Mexico range conditions. So instead, he shifted his attention to a flock of
Arizona Merinos, which sheared a heavy 7-8 lb. fleece. The Arizona sheep dealers were
anxious to sell at a relatively low price.31 In the mean time Stevens’ sister sent him
$3,100 ($83,000 in 2010 dollars).32 But his hands were temporarily tied, as the English
mortgage companies, concerned that the cattle sales might not cover their initial
investments, needed to approve Stevens’ proposed sheep purchases. At this point, one of
the Denver attorneys traveled to London to negotiate with his clients and to clarify their
conditions on the sale of the cattle and Stevens’ purchase of sheep to be grazed on the
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property. As it turned out, Stevens sold half the cattle to a Kansas bank president and
purchased the other half himself, deferring his sheep purchase until the fall. The cattle he
sold were to be delivered in several shipments over a period of a year and a half, and the
mortgage companies were determined to put off the sale of the land until the cattle were
completely gone. As the S.U. ranch was not to be sold for some time, Stevens managed
to lease the property from the mortgage companies and stock it with his own sheep.33 As
rent, he agreed to pay the annual property taxes, about $250 per year. With Stevens’
funds now tied up in cattle, it was agreed that Wood would put up $5,000 ($130,000 in
2010 dollars) toward the purchase of 5,000 head of sheep, the minimum number for a
profitable operation in Stevens’ assessment. To manage the sheep, he estimated further,
it would be necessary to hire “one good white man” at $30.00/month.34 In the mean time,
he delivered the first S.U. cattle shipment of 2000 head to the Magdalena rail terminal in
late July or early August. He then bought the Arizona herd, 3,750 ewes at $1.60/head,
and 100 graded rams at $5.00/head. Wood put up $5,000 and Stevens $1,500 for the
purchase.35 Other sheepmen in the area imported large numbers of sheep from both
California and Texas, where prices were depressed due to severe droughts.36 Stevens
then hired a Mr. Hayes at $30.00/month as majordomo and two “Mexican” herders for
the two herds he thus constituted.37 On the 150 mile drive from Arizona to the ranch,
Hayes died, and Stevens had to hire another majordomo quickly. 38 In the mean time,
Helen’s father visited the ranch and gave her $5,000 to invest in sheep apparently.39
Later, in November of 1896, Stevens bought another flock of 1080 sheep in Albuquerque,
apparently upgraded churros - improved Mexican sheep – that produced 5 lb. fleeces.40
By the late summer, sheep and wool prices had started their climb in anticipation of
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McKinley’s election.41 The following spring, Wood sent out another check to Stevens,
this time for $3,000.42 In late March, Stevens made another large purchase of 3,300
mature ewes, 400 yearling ewes, and 1,200 wethers for which he made a down payment
of $4,500, the balance to be paid in July when the wethers and wool were sold. He
described these as 7 lb. sheep, apparently also upgraded churros.43 This third sheep
purchase turned out to be a major headache. The dealer attempted to substitute inferior
ewes for the ones he had agreed to sell and Stevens had to go to a great deal of trouble to
get the man to live up to the original agreement. Then, the delivery of the stock was late.
Difficulties like these were routine in New Mexico and had to be dealt with by the
growers as best they could.44 When the matter was finally settled, the partners were
holding about 8,000 ewes.
Lambing, Shearing, and Sales
In anticipation of the 1897 spring lambing, his first, Stevens read everything on the
subject he could get his hands on and started building a dipping facility.45 About 5,000
lambs were born during the lambing. The survival rate after two months was an aboveaverage 85%, losses having been sustained due to dipping, blowflys after ear-marking,
coyotes, and the like.46 With lambing completed, shearing yielded 42,000 lbs. of wool.
After investigating the possibility of selling the wool through a Boston dealer, the
partners marketed it in New York City through Wood’s brother, Jacob H. Wood. Like
other large-scale New Mexico growers, Stevens dealt directly with east coast dealers,
bypassing local merchants like Charles Ilfeld and Frank Bond.
By this time operating expenses were beginning to add up. The cost of the lambing
had been $500; the cost of the shearing had been over $200; and the cost of shipping the
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wool to the rail junction in Magdalena was $250. Stevens decided to have the wool
scoured in Las Vegas at a cost of $0.01 per lb., $420 total. This reduced the weight of the
wool and, thus, the cost of transporting it east. Stevens hoped to realize $4000 from the
sale of the wool, of which $2000 was needed for the final payment on his last sheep
purchase.47 Presumably he got this. Jacob Wood sold the partners’ wool shipment in late
1897 or early 1898. It was a very successful first year.

More Expenses
A new opportunity for land acquisition arose in the spring of 1897. Apparently, prior
to declaring bankruptcy, the S.U. Cattle Company had made an $800 down payment on
two other ranches on the Tularosa, below the S.U. range. An amount of $1,200 was
coming due to finalize the purchase, but the mortgage companies were balking at this
further expenditure.48 Stevens suggested to Wood that they buy these two ranches, which
were fenced, would be excellent lambing grounds, and could be irrigated with the
existing S.U. dam. By owning these two ranches, Stevens believed that the partners
would “virtually own the heart of the S.U. range and practically prohibit anybody else
from bidding on the S.U. ranches [when they went up for sale], and I think it will
therefore enable us to make our own terms with the mortgagees for the purchase of
them.” The bulk of all these “ranches” was, in fact, dry rangeland in the public domain,
which would be controlled by the tracts owned and patented along the Tulerosa, the
essential water source for the livestock.49 By late spring, Stevens had indeed negotiated
the purchase of the two ranches, one for $450 and the other for $650, freeing the
mortgage companies from sinking additional funds in the properties.50
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Obviously, a considerable amount of planning underlay the establishment of the
sheep operation. Stevens’ experiences are revealing. A large amount of money was
required to establish a sheep ranch. It was more complicated, and expensive, than
suggested by any of the promotional literature. In the fall of 1897 before the first year’s
wool was sold, Stevens had additional, apparently unforeseen, expenses and was
squeezed for funds. He spent $50 for wool sacks, $200 for cement for the dipping
facility, $150 for burros and pack saddles, and $150 for sheep dip, all necessities. And
the monthly operating expenses for his four flocks were now running $300. He requested
Jacob Wood to advance him $3000 on the upcoming sale of the wool. And he requested
Leonard Wood to invest another $1000 in the ranch, which Wood did.51 Stevens knew he
could, if necessary, borrow the needed operating funds from an Albuquerque bank, but if
possible he wanted to avoid the 12% interest the bank would charge.52 The good news
was that sheep prices were rising rapidly, essentially doubling since the first purchases.
Also, Stevens made $1,200 on the sale of his calves from the S.U. cattle he owned, which
he invested immediately in sheep.53 In December, after dipping, Stevens moved his
sheep to a leased winter range of 5000 foot elevation, about 70 miles northeast of his
headquarters ranch.54
At this point, Stevens was faced with another challenge, the acquisition of heavyfleece rams. He had already acquired about 90 Merino rams, which he had used the
previous season, and planned to use again on the “common ewes.” Now, to boost his
wool production further, Stevens sought Shropshire rams, copious wool producers. He
needed forty or fifty, but to get the best price, $15.00 per head delivered in Magdalena, it
was necessary to buy an entire railroad car of one-hundred and fifty. Such rams
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purchased individually or in small lots were considerably more expensive. Large-scale
growers with the resources to purchase a full car load of rams thus would realize an
economy of scale. To this end, Stevens made an agreement with his neighbor, Solomon
Luna, to share a full car load; Stevens ended up with forty-seven, and Luna took the rest,
about one-hundred.55
Stevens then turned his attention back to land. In particular, he was in the market for
a lower-elevation tract to use as a winter range, about 4,500 feet as compared to the
6,000-8,000 foot elevation of the S.U. range, which had good grass but underwent a killer
winter about every ten years. During the1888-1889 winter, as previously mentioned,
Luna lost 19,000 out of 40,000 sheep on his 8,000-foot elevation range. The snow had
gotten so deep that he was unable to drive his flocks to lower elevations where the
weather was milder; they died in place.56 Hoping to avoid such a disaster, Stevens
searched extensively and found two ranches for sale, “the Blain ranches on the Baca
places,” that satisfied his requirements. He used Wood’s most recent $1000 investment
to make the down payments, $400 and $450, on the $2,500 properties. 57

Early Success
By the fall of 1897, Stevens had 10,923 sheep, divided into four flocks. He also had
80 “fine Merino bucks,” the rams constituting a fifth flock.58 A large herd, such as this,
was desirable, as Stevens reported, “Of course the more sheep we have the cheaper and
better we can run them...”59 This herd was, nevertheless, much smaller than the massive
churro herds held by some Hispanic sheepmen in years past. Anglo sheepmen tended
generally to have smaller herds of more highly graded sheep than Hispanics. Montague
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Stevens was no exception. This was, in fact, a fairly typical holding for New Mexico’s
Anglo sheep ranchers, whose herds ranged from 5,000 to 30,000 head.60
Stevens’ sheep had done well over the winter of 1897-1898 on the leased lowerelevation land. By the early spring he was in the market for his own winter pasture land.
He found some properties in foreclosure on, or near, Alamosa Creek, near the town of
Luna. The Spur Ranch, as they were called, was available at a cost of $4,500, payable in
three installments. Stevens believed the tracts could hold 50,000-100,000 head.61 Cattle
investors had paid $60,000 for them a few years earlier. One tract consisted of about
thirty patented claims of 160 acres, which controlled the grazing over a twenty-mile
square area, with houses on site that would be useful for “our Mexican herders’ families.”
The property also included 200 acres of “fine farming land” with water for irrigation.62
Stevens was prepared to obtain a bank loan to make the down payment, but requested
Wood to loan $1000 for the purchase at 6%, to be paid off when his brother, Jacob, sold
their wool in July (1898). Some time later, after he acquired the property, Stevens made
the Spur Ranch his headquarters. It was 125 miles from Magdalena, four days travel in
winter; mail delivery took from four to seven days.63 In the mean time he had sold the
partners’ remaining interest in the yet unsold S.U. cattle to Dan Gatlin, but would not
receive payment until the fall when the stock was sent to market.64 The New Mexico
sheep economy demanded that major capital assets needed for future expansion be
bought on credit. Financial commitments could only proceed smoothly upon the
successful execution of previous contractual obligations. A steady stream of income was
required if all the agreements a grower was engaged in were to be consumated. Stevens’
sources of capital ranged from small local banks to east-coast private investors to family
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funds from England. Without good credit, it would have been impossible for him, or any
other large-scale rancher, to operate efficiently and compete successfully.
Stevens achieved a nearly 100% lamb crop in the spring of 1898, his second lambing
season, for an income of $4,000-5,000 in future sales. A typical lamb crop in the area
was 70%. He proudly boasted that his was the highest percent lamb crop the area had
ever seen, and he was able to do this with only one third of the usual labor costs by
employing an innovative system of movable wire fences, which he had developed
himself. To his satisfaction, Stevens discovered that his graded sheep were easier to herd
and their lambs sold for 15-25% more than the common lambs. He proudly reported to
Wood that their sheep were so large that only 155 could be loaded onto the deck of a
stock car whereas 175 was the usual load. They were, he claimed, “the finest that ever
left Magdelena.”65 As for wool, the Arizona Merinos, which the locals had predicted
would do poorly on the open range, had in fact each produced $1.00 worth of wool, on
average, while the common “Mexican” sheep were producing about $0.40 worth. He did
concede that the common sheep would do better on the open range under “unfavorable
conditions,” which, of course, had been an important factor in the adoption of the churro
some three centuries earlier. After two years in the business, a rather overconfident
Stevens’ concluded that “…the sheep men out in this section know very little really about
sheep.” The men he was referring to were mostly Hispanic “small holders”, following
traditional practices that had never been challenged. He further wrote that the “old sheep
men out here” hold “many misconceptions.” They ran their sheep near their ranches at
the same elevation year around, while he was finding that the key to success with graded
sheep was to run them at low elevations in winter, where there was little snow, and at
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high elevations in the summer, where it was cool and shady. Unquestionably, up-to-date
sheep growing methods were slow to penetrate rural New Mexico. However, Stevens
may have been overly critical of his neighbors. The partners now had about $40,000
($1,000,000 in 2010 dollars) invested in the business, which Stevens’ believed was worth
$50,000-60,000 at the time. Wood, having served as a brigade commander during the
recently concluded Spanish American War - his command included Theodore
Roosevelt’s Rough Riders - was now a Brigadier General and Military Governor of
Cuba. He had his mind on matters other than sheep.66

Disaster Strikes
If Stevens’ reports to Wood sounded too optimistic, too self-assured, they were. With
the flocks in good order and his wife experiencing health problems, he accompanied her
back to England in December of 1898 so she could see her family’s eminent doctor.
While they were away, the worst winter in years swept through the West, causing large
sheep losses from Wyoming south into Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. In January
1899, Stevens’ weather-weakened sheep contracted scab from some diseased traveling
herds. His foreman quickly exhausted the inadequate supply of sheep-dip chemicals that
was stored at the ranch for combating the affliction, and the supplier in Magdalena ran
out. It was a month before a new shipment arrived. At that point, the foreman dipped the
flocks during very cold winter weather, causing substantial losses. Upon his return in
April 1899, Stevens, frustrated and angered by the losses and the man’s poor
management, fired his foreman. But his problems had just begun. Matters worsened
when winter was followed by “the driest spring on record.” Stevens reported that there
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was no rain or snow between February and July. There were forest fires, but no new
grass came up. And with green grass lacking, the spring lamb losses were devastating,
the weakened ewes producing only 2,500 lambs. Many of the ewes, having no milk,
abandoned their lambs. Out of 16,000 head at the start of winter, 6000 had perished by
mid-summer. During the same period, Luna lost 1,600 head from a single herd
[probably about 2000 head], Stevens reported. Next, with his herds severely depleated,
his fall wool clip was only 40,000 lbs., where he had anticipated 120,000 lbs. Overall, the
ranches suffered a $30,000 loss in sheep and wool.67 In his own words, Stevens, contrite
and under immense stress, described himself as having worried until he didn’t have “the
power to worry any more.” Resuming personal oversight, he stayed out at his sheep
camps almost every night following his return from England. In a separate short letter to
Wood in the summer of 1899, he wrote, “I have been nearly worked to death.”68 Despite
the disaster, one of his sheep sheared sixteen and a half pounds of wool, as noted above,
cf. chap. 4. He proudly sent a wool sample to Wood.69

Lessons learned
In the aftermath of the disaster, Stevens admitted to himself and to Wood that they
had not been adequately prepared for the inordinantly harsh conditions they had just
experienced. He had seen the considerable potential for profits in sheep, but now saw,
for the first time, the barriers. He stated, “I think there is no business [here] or anywhere
else for that matter that pays better than the sheep business provided you are fixed to run
it right on every point, otherwise you are always liable to serious loss.” He admitted
further that he had possessed “not the least conception at the time” of the risks in raising
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sheep when he entered the business. Stevens had identified the fallacy of the absurdly
optimistic promotional literature of the period, cf. chap.5.70 He noted that the profits in
sheep were “so great because the risks are so great, unless you are properly fixed.” It was
the failure to prepare for every contingency that keeps “everyone” from entering and
prospering in the business. A rancher might not need every one of his safeguards as
various contingencies arose, but he would never know which one might be essential. All
of them had to be in place if his operation was to be secure. And money was needed for
this. “But to be fixed for every contingency that might arise it naturally needs lots of
capital which of course we haven’t had,” Stevens wrote. In his assessment, one needed
about $40,000 to start a secure, stable sheep operation, although others had done it
successfully with “much less.” In those cases, an element of luck was involved, “shear
good luck” in Stevens words. Promotional literature presented cases of initial
investments ranging from $5,000 to $15,000 leading to a profitable sheep ranch. In
reality, by the end of the nineteenth century, running expenses had increased substantially
from a few years before. In Stevens’ assessment, those who enjoyed “a series of good
seasons combined with good prices for wool and mutton” in the first years after they
entered the business were most likely to succeed. A few men had indeed made fortunes
in sheep starting from a small scale, he conceded. Thousands of others began on a small
scale and had failed. The “principal cause” of the many failures in sheep growing in the
past was “lack of sufficient capital.” Stevens was critical of his neighbor Solomon Luna,
who attributed his own losses to “bad luck.” Luna, his family’s involvement in New
Mexico sheep extending back over two centuries, now held what might have been the
largest herd in New Mexico. He preferred, in Stevens’ view, running big risks to making
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the capital investments that would render his operation safer financially.71 For his part,
Luna was no stranger to capital investment; he was President or Vice President [sources
differ] of the First National Bank of Albuquerque for many years.72 A hands-on manager
like Stevens, Luna was one sheepman who could sustain very large losses and still
recover. Following the killer winter of 1888-1889 when he suffered the huge losses noted
above, he is known to have purchased large numbers of sheep over a period of months
entirely on credit, and rebuilt his flocks within a couple of years.73

Rebuilding
After his losses, Stevens began to address his newly appreciated need for various
safeguards. In particular, he considered growing his own winter feed, which would have
prevented the worst of the terrible losses he had just undergone. He saw this as possibly
the most important of the safeguards he had heretofore lacked. Specifically, he was
thinking of employing the agricultural sections of the Spur Ranch to grow alfalfa and
other feed grasses. The start-up cost to plant 300 acres was $1,000-1,500, money he
didn’t have.74 At this point, Stevens found himself in even more serious financial
straights than in the past. He and his wife had by this point invested over $25,000
($700,000 in 2010 dollars) in their sheep ranches. Now, he needed cash to rebuild his
flocks as well as create expensive new safeguards, but had no immediate personal
resources. Forced to take his least favored option, he borrowed money from an
Albuquerque bank, some amount over $12,000.75 It would be many years before he paid
off this loan. And Wood invested another $1,000 in December 1899, bringing his total
investment up to $10,000.76
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Stevens now also understood that he needed a better dipping facility, one that
included a building that could house over night the 800-1000 sheep dipped each day,
allowing them to dry off safely, since exposure to sub-freezing weather and cold winds
could kill the wet sheep during the night. With such a facility, sheep could be dipped any
time of year, whenever a flock became infected, scab having become a persistent problem
due to the increasingly crowded range. Scab was at its worst and spread fastest in cold
weather. The location of the dipping facility was important. It had to be accessible to
driven flocks in the harshest winters, never isolated by deep snow drifts. Alkaline water,
as ran in most lower-elevation streams in New Mexico, was to be avoided as it tended to
neutralize, and thus weaken, the acidic dip solution then in use. Stevens built his facility
at his recently-acquired ranch at Horse Springs, midway between his summer and winter
range, where the water was “absolutely pure.” It cost $2,500, which was taken out of a
total of $8,000 his wife invested in the ranch using funds she brought back from England
in April of 1899, $14,000 apparently from her father.77 He stated that a dipping facility
could be built for $500, but it would be “virtually useless,” probably an exaggeration.
Having built the most advanced dipping facility in the area, Stevens earned about $500
the first year it was in operation, dipping the flocks of other local sheepmen, including
36,000 head for Luna. This was in stark contrast with the self-destructive practice of
some local sheepmen, who refused to dip their flocks, or did so improperly, despite
recent territorial law which now demanded it on a yearly basis. Stevens expressed
considerable frustration over this widespread negligence, as did many other responsible
sheepmen whose flocks were subject to infection.78
Some of Steven’s other capital expenditures paid off relatively quickly. To reduce
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the cost of shipping wool the 90 miles from his shearing camp to Magdalena, which had
been running about $1,000 per year, Stevens purchased four large freight wagons and ten
mules to pull them for $625. Then, he was able to hire teamsters to drive his wool to the
rail depot for less than $375, so that his outfit paid for itself within a year. Wool growers
who could not come up with the necessary funds for their own transport equipment, were
constrained year after year to pay a premium for shipping.79
Summarizing their highest-priority capital requirements in a seventeen-page letter to
Wood, after their first three years in business, Stevens listed good summer range, which
included the leased S.U. Ranch [later purchased by Stevens]; good winter range, which
included the Garland and Spur Ranches, currently owned; good sheep dipping facilities,
the Horse Springs facility; and hay growing, which required a good irrigation system and
had been heretofore neglected.80 He understood now that sheep needed to be maintained
in good condition at all times, so they could tolerate any weather that came along, be it a
sudden winter cold snap or summer heat and drought. Feeding and dipping were
expensive, high-priority items to this end.
Stevens had been learning fast. He “studied every book, pamphlet, etc. that I could
possibly get hold of and besides making a very close study of conditions as they exist
here I have tried numberless little experiments in order to get at the right way of doing
things and I am pleased to say I have succeeded in many ways in doing things not only
infinitely cheaper but infinitely better than they were ever done before, at any rate in this
section.” Stevens was looking ahead to a prosperous future. Innovative Anglos, like
Stevens, with capital and knowledge not commonly possessed in New Mexico did indeed
play an important role in bringing New Mexico sheep ranching, which had, under trying
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conditions, progressed little, if at all, under Spanish and Mexican sovereignty, up to
contemporary stardards.

Ups and Downs
By the fall of 1900, things were looking up again. As Stevens described the stock,
“Our herd is without exception, the finest herd in these parts both in the quality and size
of the sheep.” With the ranches apparently flourishing, Stevens hoped to accept an
invitation from Wood to visit him in Havana, but that would have to wait until the spring
of 1901 after the “backbone of the winter” was broken.81 The trip never took place;
Stevens, perhaps spooked by his previous experience, had not become sufficiently
comfortable to take another extended leave from his ranches. With his growing
awareness of the large element of chance in western sheep growing, the gamble inherent
in the business, he shifted direction. At this time, he was devoting ever more of his
energy to developing his agricultural resources. During the previous spring he had
dammed up a stream running through his land and created a large reservoir capable of
irrigating five-hundred acres. He had dug several miles of irrigation ditches and built
flumes to carry water across the stream bed. Additionally, he put up several miles of
fence to keep loose range stock off his hay fields. It was slow, expensive work, which
he undertook despite being in debt, a source of continuing anxiety for years to come, but
a common condition among stockmen. In his own words, it was “one constant expense
and outlay for several years.”82 Farm implements, in particular, were expensive, and
Stevens had just purchased a saw mill for $300, a move to combat the high price of the
lumber he needed for his farm structures.83 In later years he dealt commercially in
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lumber. Lacking the resources to seed all his agricultural lands in the beginning, Stevens
rented out sixty acres on shares and planted only eighteen acres of alfalfa on his own. But
by the end of 1902, he had planted 250 acres of rye to be used in the following spring and
summer.84 He was making a major investment in agricultural resources.
Around the end of 1900, Stevens faced a new complication. The federal government
established a forest reserve that took up about half of his “range and ranches,” i.e. land
that he never owned but considered part of his ranches. The end result, after months of
uncertainty, was that he now had to obtain a grazing permit to run a restricted number of
sheep on the reserve, his former “ranch land,” and then only between April 1 and
September 1.85 The agricultural lands that he did own lay within the boundary of the
newly established reserve, making it almost impossible to get his sheep from outside
grazing areas to his farms for winter feeding since that would require that the flocks be
driven illegally across reserve land.
From this point on, Stevens seemed to come up against an endless sequence of
setbacks and few successes. Some of his misfortunes were beyond his control. In 1901,
drought in the cornbelt decimated the corn crop and, along with it, the market for feeder
lambs throughout the midwestern feeding region. In 1902, drought in Colorado drove the
price of alfalfa so high that it made no sense to feed it to lambs, eliminating the market
for feeder lambs in Colorado. As a result, there was little or no market for New Mexico
feeder lambs two years in a row.86 To make matters worse, it was not easy to borrow
large sums of money when they were needed to carry ranchers through hard times.
Stevens noted that capital was “naturally timid” about entering the sheep business.
Investors had not forgotten their losses in western cattle ranching in the late 1880s.
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However, he considered this a good thing, as outside investment would give rise to too
much competition, too many sheep and a decrease in profits for western growers.
In the late spring of 1903, another killer blizzard hit suddenly in Montana. In a period
of forty-eight hours, hundreds of thousands of lambs and mature sheep were lost. As
Stevens described it, “…Many sheepmen lost the results of years of toil.” In New
Mexico it was just another bad winter, fortunately, but the damage, such as it was, left an
even deeper and more lasting impression on Stevens than his many previous difficulties.
After eight years raising sheep, he understood clearly the inherent insecurity of sheep
ranching in all its ramifications. More generally, he now possessed a comprehensive
understanding of the entire business, the risks and the benefits. Once so optimistic, he
became quite pessimistic about the industry. As he described to Wood:
You may go rapidly ahead for a time (like we did at the start) and then like a thunderbolt
in a clear sky, you may get a back-set from which it takes years of patient toil to recover,
and even when you have made the recovery there is no telling when you may not have
another one from some entirely new and unexpected cause. Besides all this, when a man
feels he has got his all invested in a thing [as Stevens had] which may any day break him
through no fault of his own (except perhaps being in it!) the constant worry and anxiety
for fear of sudden calamity, even when things seem to be running most smoothly, is
beyond belief except to those who have tried it. ….Of course it is precisely because of the
huge risks and losses incidental to the range sheep business that there are also big profits
for the lucky ones…Under certain conditions there is no doubt that the sheep business is
about the best paying business out but it is much like a complicated machine which
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works well as long as each part is perfect but let even one insignificant part be missing
and the whole machine is useless.”87

Capital Investment Summary
By 1902, Stevens and Helen had invested about $30,000 in their sheep ranches, while
Wood had put up $10,000 ($1,000,000 total in 2010 dollars). Stevens believed the total
operation, the land, the capital equipment and facilities, was now worth far more than the
start-up costs. But he seems never to have had any excess cash on hand to pay the
dividends Wood had hoped for. He reinvested all his profits in the ranches year after
year, increasingly redirecting his efforts to developing his agricultural resources. He now
had five-hundred acres under irrigation. His goal was to develop a feeding operation for
raising high-quality lambs.88 He held a total of 6,000 acres of patented lands, which he
estimated were worth anywhere from two to ten times their purchase costs.89 By this
time, however, Stevens was plagued by an entirely new matter, a growing labor problem
which he had not, in the least, anticipated.

Labor Problems
By the late 1890s, Stevens was finding it increasingly difficult to hire good herders.
He lamented in his correspondence that the Hispanic sheep herders that he was now able
to hire were, with few exceptions, lazy, mean, and irresponsible. Continuing, he noted
that in his first years after entering the sheep business, he had been able to readily hire
competent, responsible herders, but “Now they will only work for a month at a time.
When they get a few dollars, they quit and go off to some plaza to drink and gamble,” he
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complained to Wood.90 This development was real and did not occur without reason.
New Mexico sheepmen were actually facing serious competition for labor for the first
time. And that was almost certainly an important factor in their views toward their
employees. Both the western railroads and mines and the Colorado sugar beet farms had
started employing Hispanic labor on a large scale. The effects seemed to have hit
western Socorro County rather suddenly. Working as section hands and repairing
washouts on the railroads and picking sugar beets in Colorado, the most common
emerging employment opportunities, were acknowledged to be tougher than herding
sheep, but the pay was better. As Stevens described the situation, these options drew the
most ambitious, energetic, and responsible men away from New Mexican villages on a
seasonal basis, leaving behind the marginal workers. In particular, the men who had been
the ablest, most reliable herders went elsewhere for employment, wherever railroads were
being built or sugar beets grown. The sheepmen simply could not match the wages being
offered elsewhere, despite the fact that the Hispanic villagers were seen by their new
employers as a source of “cheap labor.”91 Open-range sheep growing had always
depended on cheap, or even free, labor. And the supply was disappearing. Other
Hispanic men, who stayed behind, had modestly successful small farms and ranches and
were not overly anxious to hire themselves out, although many certainly had the skills to
do so. The large-scale sheepmen had to make do, to a considerable extent, with the unambitious men who stayed behind or drifted back home after they found out how hard the
new jobs were. During the first years of the partners’ operation, starting in 1895, there
had been a ready supply of good Hispanic herders, although otherwise “totally illiterate
and ignorant.” They were, Stevens observed, actually happy to be employed once again
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herding sheep after being economically marginalized for so many years by the cattle
takeover in the area. But after the turn of the century, the available labor force had
deteriorated. “Years ago there were quite a number of good Mexican herders but the
present generation as a class has all the low class white man’s vices with none of his
redeeming qualities,” Stevens asserted in 1905.92
Not only herders but supervisory employees became hard to find. In years past,
Stevens noted that he had employed a few “really good” Mexican foremen, apparently
men who demanded and received what he considered a fair amount of work from the
herders under their supervision. But now, he reported to Wood, if he had a good
foreman, the workers would gang up and “all work against him” and demand his
discharge. Likewise, if there were a particularly responsible, hard-working man on the
crew, the others would demand he be discharged. Stevens responded in frustration by
firing whole crews at a time and, as a consequence, found himself in a constant state of
hiring. He found it necessary to hire men who lived along the Rio Grande, one-hundred
and fifty miles distant, where there was still an adequate labor supply. He would then
transport them by wagon to his ranches. Many other stockmen undoubtedly did likewise.
Stevens was bitter because he believed the kindness and fair treatment he felt he had
extended to his workers over the years was to no avail. He claimed that “man after man
has quit me because he said “I worked him to death.””93
The most difficult time to hire workers was during the April-May lambing period
when extra men were needed at all the sheep ranches. During lambing, Stevens reported,
the hired hands would “wait till you were short of men and then quit you in a bunch.” To
compound his difficulties, incompetent shearers were killing 200-300 of his sheep each
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season through their carelessness, while presenting similar labor problems.94 It was
becoming necessary to contract and pay laborers in advance, and then they did not always
show up as agreed. The courts provided no recourse. “If the least little thing happens to
offend one of them [during lambing] the whole lot may go on strike and leave you in the
middle of lambing, and there were no others to be hired.” By his own account, Stevens,
always short handed at lambing, at times put in twenty-four-hour days for two or three
days running during the month to six-week period.95 During dipping, probably during the
spring of 1905, he precipitated a general strike, when he fired one recalcitrant employee.
The same scenario repeated itself some weeks later during shearing. Stevens then hired a
replacement crew of “good Indian shearers,” who competently sheared about half his
stock and then abruptly departed. He found out subsequently that the local Hispanic
shearers had threatened to kill the Indians if they did not quit. Under the circumstances
Stevens had to hire another Hispanic crew, sub-standard in his assessment, to finish the
job.96 The problem was exacerbated, as Stevens noted, because “the Mexicans were all
more or less related to one another…” If a man were fired, all his relatives would quit in
protest. What Stevens did not mention in his letters was that a significant portion of these
temporary workers, were themselves small-scale farmers and ranchers and did not depend
absolutely on the extra sheep work for their livelihood. If they found the employment did
not suit them, they could and did walk away. The contrast to the peon-patron
relationship, widespread only a half century earlier, where the peon was totally beholden
to his master, could not have been more dramatic. Sadly, the Hispanic sheep workers
seem to have left little, or no, written records describing working conditions on the sheep
ranches during this period. The basis for any dissatisfaction they may have had is
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unclear. Their untold story might have been revealing.97
Solomon Luna managed his men more successfully than Stevens. As Stevens,
reported to Wood, Luna’s men were beholden to him because many had worked for his
father and their families lived on his land at Las Lunas. And like peons many were also
in debt to him, for an aggregate of several thousand dollars.98 Longevity in the business
clearly had its advantages. In describing Luna’s modus operandi, Stevens noted that
although Luna generally “treated his men very well,” he controlled them through fear.
He occasionally would beat a recalcitrant herder.99 If a man seriously failed him in some
other way, Luna would have the man thrown in jail on some pretext and left there for a
few months awaiting trial. Then the man would, upon Luna’s order, be turned loose with
an admonishment to mend his ways and made an example for the other herders.
According to Stevens, Luna’s unopposed political power and influence in the region was
such that he could get things like this done on the quiet.100

Withdrawal from Sheep Ranching
Stevens’ problems had become overwhelming by late 1903. His incompetent herders
were losing 20-25% of his lambs before fall, severely cutting into his profits. At some
point, his Hispanic foreman, a good man whom he had employed for years, quit, fearing
for his life according to Stevens, the herders under him having become so unruly. To
make matters worse, another drought had badly hurt both sheep and cattlemen. The Rio
Grande south of Albuquerque had run dry. The spring lamb crop had been poor. Also,
sheep and wool prices had gone into a steady decline. Stevens began pulling out of the
sheep business in the summer of 1903. His letters suggest that it was primarily his labor
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problems that drove him to this action. A year later, with 400 acres under cultivation and
employing “a few pretty good men” to run his farms, Stevens withdrew entirely from
sheep ranching, selling his remaining stock and leasing his ranges, water rights, and
dipping facility to Luna for about $2,500 a year, an arrangement that continued for
several years. He used the proceeds to pay off the bank loan he had taken out upon his
return from England in 1899.101 He put a handful of his best men to work in his lumber
mill.102 His ranches now added up to about 6,300 acres, 600 acres of which was farm
land, about forty patented quarter sections in all, scattered over a 70-mile by 25-mile
area. He estimated the land was now worth at least $30,000, his saw mill and farm
machinery $4,000, and his remaining livestock (not sheep) $3,000, while taxes on the
land ran about $500 annually. In total he believed the entire operation, after nine years,
was worth something over $50,000 ($1,300,000 in 2010 dollars), at most only a bit more
than the original investment, but a considerable amount of money at the time.103
Stevens had not made the financial killing he hoped for, despite his innovations and
near super-human efforts. However, in 1909 he sold some of his land, including the two
Baca Ranches, at a considerable profit.104 He claimed in his correspondence that many
other large-scale sheepmen were also quitting the business on account of labor problems.
In any case, the practice of open-range sheep growing was coming to an end. In 1912, at
the peak of his political career, Solomon Luna’s dominance in the industry ended when
he was killed accidentally at the Horse Springs dipping facility he leased from Stevens.
The small-scale Hispanic sheep enterprises in the area persisted. They were basically
family operations, with few, if any, wage employees and, thus, not subject to the growing
labor problems. During lambing, entire extended families, both men and women, would
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work together and get the job done. Stevens concentrated on farming and continued
growing alfalfa for many years. For a short time he raised hogs. He eventually settled
primarily into his lumber business, but retained some of his ranches.105
Stevens’ experiences show just how risky open-range sheep ranching in New Mexico
could be. Although he had previous experience raising cattle, Stevens knew
comparatively little about sheep when he embarked on the life of a sheep rancher. He
learned quickly. After an auspicious beginning, he seems to have been plagued by an
endless sequence of setbacks, many beyond his control. A corrupt legal system as it
related to land negotiations, a growing incidence of scab, an evolving and uncertain
federal public lands policy, a diminishing pool of competent herders and shearers, and the
unpredictable weather were all continuing sources of frustration, worry, and financial
difficulties. He was not alone in this regard. His friends and fellow ranchers in the area,
Dan Gatlin and Ray Morley, Agnes Morley Cleaveland’s brother, also experienced
considerable ups and downs in their operations. Stevens’ later letters often allude to the
many western ranchers that had gone bust. For his part, Stevens made a decent living in
sheep ranching, but worked tremendously hard for it. He remained for decades a
prominent figure in western New Mexico, until his son moved him and Helen to
Albuquerque to live out their final years in relative comfort.106
The lives of Montague Stevens and Frank Bond provide an interesting contrast. Both
men were smart, educated, hard-working risk takers of serious demeaner and about the
same age. They both arrived in New Mexico from elsewhere and started in business with
family money. And both approached their business in a very systematic and innovative
fashion.

Bond entered the mercantile side of the sheep industry and was very successful
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financially. Stevens took up ranching, faced more extreme ups and downs, and was far
less successful financially. Their contrasting experiences point up the greater risks in
ranching than in sheep and wool dealing. Bond successfully overcame the various
difficulties he faced, flourished, and was in business for decades, while Stevens, buffeted
by more severe setbacks, moved out of sheep ranching after less than a decade.
As it turned out, open-range grazing as Stevens practiced would soon be a thing of the
past. This is the subject of the following chapter.
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Chapter 10
The End of the Open Range

In the final sentence of his seminal essay, “The Significance of the Frontier in
American History,” Frederick Jackson Turner states, “And now, four centuries from the
discovery of America, at the end of a hundred years of life under the Constitution, the
frontier has gone, and with its going has closed the first period of American History.”
Turner’s meaning is clarified by recalling that he launched his essay with a quote from
the Superintendent of the U.S. Census of 1890 to the effect that a “frontier line” no longer
existed and all the wide expanses of completely unsettled lands had disappeared.1 The
disappearance of the frontier as envisaged in the superintendent’s comments was an
irrefutable fact. But what this would mean to America when Turner’s essay was
published in 1893 was largely unknown. Of course, his implication that great changes
were in the offing has been born out in ways beyond enumeration. A clear and
comparatively immediate manifestation of the closing of the western frontier was a
dramatic transformation of the New Mexico’s livestock industry. Changes were
inevitable since stockmen no longer had the option of moving their operations further
west and continuing traditional practices when their rangeland was settled by farmers.2
Cattle and sheep raising on the open range, the tradition since Spanish colonial times and
adopted by Anglo newcomers following Mexican sovereignty, became a thing of the past
within a generation. Henceforth, livestock would be raised in fenced pastures on farms or
on leased federal lands under controlled conditions, a modus operandi that continues
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down to the present.3 This transformation was part of a complex of interrelated national
developments that gained momentum in the late nineteenth century: industrialization,
capitalization, labor reorganization, technological advances, and changing demographics.

Land Usage
Land and its usage were the immediate factors driving the transformation. Openrange herding, depending solely on naturally growing forage and natural water frontage,
required very large tracts of land for commercially viable operations. But by the late
1870s, the New Mexico livestock industry had expanded to the extent that land was
taking on an element of scarcity. In the same timeframe, as a result of technological
advances, open-range grazing no longer constituted the most efficient use for much of the
territory’s land. Writing at the turn of the century, Wright described the practice as “an
unnecessary waste” of land.4 Farming would soon surpass the grazing industry in
commercial importance, farm crops surpassing in value both cattle and sheep production
in the first decade of the twentieth century. See Fig. 5.1 for a comparison of sheep and
wool, cattle, and farm-crop earnings. Nevertheless, observing a herder tending his flock
on the New Mexico public domain in 1880 would give no hint of the changes about to
transpire. The tipping point was reached in the 1890s when an array of land-related
developments rendered open-range practices unsustainable. Competition for land
between ranchers and arriving homesteaders, small-scale nomadic herders, and national
forest allocations, with the concomitant adoption of barbed-wire fencing, all played a
role. The degradation of the diminishing public domain was an additional critical factor
pushing ranchers off unclaimed rangeland. New efficiencies made possible by fencing
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and other technological advances attracted stock growers onto privately owned tracts.
During the Spanish colonial period, New Mexico’s herders grazed their sheep on the
land grants and outlying unclaimed areas. As long as ownership of the grants remained
uncontested, the herders’ most critical tasks were to defend themselves and their hardy
flocks against Indian raiders and the sometimes harsh physical environment, major but
ultimately manageable detriments. Under the pressures of a growing population and the
concomitant need for more grazing land, first the herders and then entire communities
spread out from the Rio Grande Valley, as described in chap. 2. Any claims to the lands
by Indian tribes were disregarded by the Hispanic settlers and later negated by the
Americans. The nomadic tribes, overwhelmed by growing poblador populations, were
the ultimate losers in this early contest for land. By the time of the annexation, Hispanic
sheepmen held usage claims to large grazing tracts both within and outside the
established grants. The lands legally unclaimed under Mexican sovereignty became
public domain under the U.S. Government. The first Anglo stock growers, largely Texas
cattlemen who came to the southeastern portion territory after the Civil War, usually
found ample open rangeland for their herds on these lands. Thereafter, access to public
lands throughout the territory generally followed the western custom of first-come-firstserved, cf. chap. 5, which, among other shortcomings, led to overstocking and subsequent
range deterioration.5 For a time, sheepmen, mostly Hispanic, and cattlemen were usually
able to keep out of each other’s way. But as more Anglo stockmen arrived in the
territory, the range became heavily stocked and access to grazing areas became contested.
Cattlemen were pitted against sheepmen and large-scale growers of both cattle and sheep
were pitted against small-scale growers.6 In the most extreme cases, brutal land
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skirmishes occurred. Although, an uneasy peace usually prevailed, as evidenced by the
post-Civil War growth of both cattle and sheep interests in New Mexico, and throughout
the Rocky Mountain-Great Plains region, this would not persist indefinitely. In fact, the
situation would be totally upset by a new factor.

Homesteaders Arrive
To the land conflict was added a serious threat to both sheepmen and cattlemen: the
arrival of homesteaders. The homesteaders started taking up significant expanses of land
that had once been the sole domain of stockmen, who, as discussed above, actually
owned little of the land they used. In New Mexico, this brought about a significant
decrease in the aggregate acreage available for grazing.7 One might question how the
first farmers taking up comparatively small 160-acre tracts removed enough rangeland
from production to concern ranchers. In fact, the farmers used the land much as the
ranchers had before them. They filed homestead claims on the most desirable tracts
available, which were rarely adjacent to each other, but instead, spread out along the
water frontage and in the valleys. They then used the contiguous, yet-unclaimed lands as
pastures for their own small livestock herds. This practice had the effect of removing
from the open range possibly ten times the acreage actually claimed as homesteads.8
With the land laws on their side, homesteaders were a far greater threat to New Mexico
cattle and sheep interests than those two factions ever were to each other.
Homesteading got off to a late start in New Mexico, beginning significantly around
1880.9 This was due in part to the fact that the Spanish-Mexican land grants had long
since taken up much of the best arable land. With a conservatism forged by over two
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centuries of survival under very harsh conditions, fearful and resentful of Anglo
incursions, the pobladores maintained a precarious hold over their lands for a
considerable time after the annexation.10 As noted in chap. 5, many Anglos considered
land ownership in New Mexico undesirable because a substantial portion of the land,
some thirty-five million acres, had unsettled titles, a legacy of the Spanish-Mexican land
tenure system, which was incompatible with fee-simple ownership under AngloAmerican Common Law, the law of the land after the annexation.11 The grant system
had worked adequately in the pre-annexation, subsistence economy, but apart from legal
considerations, it could not have persisted for long in the cash and credit economic order
that came with the annexation. Title uncertainty was a deterrent to forward looking
Anglo settlers, who wished to establish farms and homes and raise families on the land.
Lands without clear title might be confiscated by a rival claimant through legal
maneuvering with the help of a skillful, well-paid lawyer. The title difficulties were
exacerbated by the inability or unwillingness of the U.S. Courts and Congress to address
them promptly or fairly. The mass of unsettled titles held land prices low to the advantage
of stockmen and their land-intensive industry.12 The inadequate land laws also appear to
have delayed certain measures in the sheep industry that would have opened up more
grazing areas.13 By about 1884, nearly every good tract of grazing land in the territory
had been claimed, legally or by custom, for sheep, cattle, or horses. Government
investigators concluded that the amount of rangeland in use peaked about this time.14
Government livestock expert E.V. Wilcox later concluded that all public lands suitable
for grazing were occupied by 1900 and that traditional open-range grazing had reached a
limit.15
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Agriculture Takes Hold.
Important developments in the late nineteenth century rendered farming more
attractive than in the past. The homestead laws together with the placement of large
tracts of grant lands in the public domain by the Court of Private Land Claims, active
during the period 1891-1904, provided additional farmland with clear title. Aside from
title considerations, mechanized irrigation opened up large areas of New Mexico for
farming. Commercial agriculture then began to take hold in New Mexico. During the
first decade of the twentieth century, the territory experienced a particularly large
expansion in its agricultural population.16
Starting in the late 1880s, areas outside the New Mexico grant periphery were
opened for agriculture by ambitious, privately-financed irrigation projects, particularly in
the Estancia Valley and the Lower Pecos region.17 Then, following the passage of the
Newlands Reclamation Act of 1902, the federal government undertook the construction
of large irrigation projects throughout the West, including New Mexico. Mechanized
irrigation converted large expanses of dry rangeland into viable farm land so that farming
penetrated areas that had once been devoted solely to grazing. The aggregate acreage
available for grazing was thus reduced.
Just as they made possible an expanded sheep and wool industry, the railroads
expedited farming by providing ever more efficient transport of farm produce to the
important markets in the Midwest and the East. They made farming in New Mexico
commercially viable, removing a barrier that had stood since Spanish colonial times.
Conversely, the increasingly recognized potential for agricultural development in New
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Mexico lead, in the first years of the twentieth century, to an aggressive expansion of the
AT&SF into the Pecos River Valley and across central New Mexico from Amarillo,
Texas to Belen – the so called Belen Cutoff, which became the line’s main freight route
to the East.18 Expansion bred expansion. Besides shipping farm produce, the railroads
provided fast, comparatively convenient transportation to New Mexico for farm families,
their livestock, and their farm equipment. The railroads also sometimes transported
winter feed from the farms where it was grown to the ranch country where it was
needed.19
Homesteaders responding to a combination of advancing technology, favorable land
laws, and the declaration of nearly 33,000,000 acres to be public domain, claimed some
of the best public grazing tracts and water resources in New Mexico, public policy
having, in effect, given them priority over ranchers.20 In the time frame 1890-1900, the
population of the territory grew by about 22%. In the following decade, 1900-1910, the
population grew explosively from 195,000 to 327,000, a 68% increase. See Fig. 3.1.
Anglo farmers accounted for much of this population increase. The number of farms in
New Mexico increased by 176% in the 1890s and by 189% in the 1900s, an eight-fold
increase over the two-decade period.21 During the Otero Administration (1897-1906),
numerous farmers took up dry farming on the eastern plains and the Estancia Valley.22
Agricultural production exploded, as shown in Fig. 4.2, while sheep population held more
or less steady at around three-million from the 1890s until World War I, cf. Fig. 3.2.23
Stockmen, already squeezed, came under steadily increasing pressure from the
homesteaders. In the words of John Clay, “Its [the open range’s] death rattle was echoed
over its broad acres in three words, “the dry farmer.” You can fight armies or disease or
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trespass, but the settler never. He advances slowly, surely, silently, like a great motor
truck, pushing everything before him.”24

Public Domain Degradation
As homesteaders claimed the most desirable lands, stockmen crowded their herds of
sheep and cattle onto the ever smaller tracts of the inferior land that remained in the
public domain.25 Overgrazing and range degration on the public lands, long a concern of
more thoughtful stock growers, became more acute. To make matters worse, farmers
often grazed their small livestock holdings on the public land near their homesteads, as
indicated above, intensifying even further the deterioration. From the early 1880s, many
Rocky Mountain ranchers had disregarded the dangers of overgrazing and placed too
many animals on the range they controlled, sacrificing long-term sustainability of the
land for short-term profits.26 Wiser growers looked on in alarm and frustration as they
saw the steady range deterioration. At a time when public domain was becoming scarce,
its stock-holding capacity on the basis of head per acre that it could support was
diminishing. Few, if any, ranchers possessed the resources to prevent their careless,
irresponsible neighbors from degrading the land in their area. At the same time, everyone
seemingly wanted and needed more land.
The crowding of livestock onto the remaining public lands was largely the work of
smaller, less affluent growers without the resources to purchase their own land. These
herders, “drifters” as landowners called them with their “tramp” or “arab” flocks, utilized
the range heavily, often trailing their small herds far to the north in the summer and far to
the south in the winter in an increasingly desperate search for free fodder. Their flocks
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denuded the unclaimed lands with overgrazing during the summer, rendering them
useless for landowning stockmen who still continued to employ some public tracts for
winter grazing.27 These marginal herders introduced a new level of conflict over land.
Many of them, with no permanent base of operations and no home range, paid no county
taxes and purchased no supplies from local merchants, rendering them despicable to
established ranchers, farmers, and merchants alike wherever they appeared. A
government publication characterized them as a “public nuisance.”28 According to the
Troy Brothers of Raton, their arab flocks were diseased and spread scab.29 Living day-today, they exploited whatever land they could find and demonstrated little concern for its
sustenance over the long term. By the early 1880s, this development had become a
serious problem for all open-range stockmen.30 The overstocking accelerated the land
degradation, long underway in some areas, diminishing the useful public range even
further [a negative feedback loop]. Although conscientious sheep growers could do little
about these invaders, cowmen sometimes ran them off at gun point, but that never
resolved the problem.31 The nomadic herders eventually disappeared when their
marginal operations became completely unsustainable. After the degraded lands were
taken out of production, as they eventually were, decades sometimes passed before they
again became productive.
Homesteading in New Mexico did not have the immediate effect anticipated by the
land laws. Many homesteaders were not able to obtain irrigated land. Dryland farming,
which many early homesteaders took up, was a disaster in New Mexico. The first wave
of immigrant farmers that found their way to the territory crested during the wet years
immediately following 1900, when prospects appeared bright. A double tragedy resulted
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when homesteaders, in New Mexico and elsewhere, discovered for themselves that they
could not build a successful dry farm on a quarter section in the semi-arid West. Many
gave up and abandoned their homesteads after a few heart-breaking years, but often not
before their plows had destroyed the underlying deep root system of the native grasses,
which served to efficiently utilize the limited natural water supply.32 These were the very
grasses that had long sustained the range livestock. The plowing furthermore opened up
the soil and released its natural moisture into the dry western air, and the winds
subsequently eroded away the loosened, dried out topsoil. When the dryland farmers
departed, as most of the first wave did, they often left behind horribly destroyed land that
would not recover, and be productive again, for decades.33 Of no use for agriculture as it
was then practiced, these lands were left likewise useless for livestock, causing further
reductions in grazing area. Needless to say, stockmen were extremely critical of these
developments.34 One unsympathetic government report described the first homesteaders
in the semi-arid regions as “poor men who have no cattle.”35 A well-intentioned
government program went awry. Some of the unsuccessful farmers took up livestock
growing and survived.36 Others with sufficient resources built their own irrigation
systems and survived as farmers.37

Farmers Crowd Out Stockmen
When homesteading did finally become well established in New Mexico, it had a
dramatic impact on ranching. Within a comparatively short time, farmers literally
crowded out the open-range stockmen. Fabiola Cabeza de Baca described the situation at
the high point of farmer immigration to the Ceja-Llano region in eastern New Mexico,
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“Hardly a day went by but some new family arrived, until nearly every inch of ground
was taken.”38 The homesteaders were taking up land that her family had long used for
growing sheep and cattle. Sheepmen found it increasingly difficult to find land open for
grazing or even for temporary sheep holding areas. Writing in 1909, Bond partner Andy
Wiest wrote: “We know of no other land this side of the Pecos [east side] where 5,000
head of sheep could be grazed, all available land is being taken up rapidly by the
homesteaders, this means that the sheep business in this section [the area north of
Cuervo] will soon be a thing of the past.”39 A few years later in 1915, Harry Kelly
expressed the extreme opinion that ewes would soon disappear altogether from San
Miguel County.40 The phenomenon was territory wide. At a more official level and
somewhat belatedly, the 1917 New Mexico Blue Book asserted:
Important changes affecting the livestock industry of New Mexico are now
in progress, the result of homestead entries and agricultural expansion. The
open range is being steadily reduced, and in time will become a thing of the
past, and in the final readjustment agricultural areas will be proved and
cultivated, and lands valuable only for grazing will become permanently
the property of stockmen. ...“small” stockraisers will become numerous in
New Mexico, and …feed lots as well as ranges will figure prominently in
the production of livestock wealth.41
By 1900, much of the better grazing land and water sources had indeed been claimed
under one of the federal programs. Both Anglos and Hispanics participated in the
homesteading process.42 The remaining public rangeland, subject to increased
competition, became ever harder for any individual stockman to occupy and control.
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Changes in land usage were going to happen in any case. While the arrival of
homesteaders was the principal factor pushing stockmen onto smaller, patented tracts,
other factors were at work. Fencing, more highly-bred smaller herds, alfalfa growing
using mechanized irrigation, and the export of young sheep to be fattened elsewhere were
reducing the acreage needed for a viable commercial sheep operation, while land prices
were increasing. For their part, the farmers who crowded out the sheepmen would
eventually bring about more efficient food production from the land. They also quickly
outnumbered them.

Sheepmen’s Response
As might be expected, the arrival of homesteaders in grazing country produced
considerable conflict. Established stockmen and merchants sometimes welcomed the
homesteaders, provided them with water rights, and otherwise helped them get started,
confident that they would probably soon fail and sell their land cheaply, providing an
inexpensive addition to the stockman’s holdings.43 Contentious interactions were more
common. As more and more farmers fenced their lands, this sometimes blocked the path
from one remaining open grazing area and to another, constricting the customary
movement of range herds, a problem since large-scale stock growers had begun fencing
the tracts they used on public land. The problem just became more acute with the influx
of farmers. Moreover, when public water frontage was acquired by farmers, it became
unavailable to stockmen. Angry sheepmen blamed the farmers for the new constraints
they faced. In time it became impossible to drive a herd from New Mexico to the grazing
tracts of Colorado or further north, as had once been common practice. Even when an
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open path remained, there could be conflict. During the drives from the1870s on,
sheepmen often combined several bands into large herds of 5,000-7,500. The frontage
along which these herds were driven was as wide as the herders could manage. Frontage
widths varied from 10-40 miles in open areas for maximum use of the lands traversed,
which could affect many settlers along the drive. Even in confined areas, along
established roads, a two-hundred foot wide front was needed. This brought sheep herders
into direct conflict with homesteaders along the road when the sheep encroached on their
fields and damaged their crops.44 Ultimately, rail shipment of their produce became the
only remaining option for sheepmen.
With their grazing lands disappearing, stockmen found themselves on the defensive
for the first time. After 1880, the sheep population of New Mexico began a long slide
from five-million, leveling off to around three-million in 1900, although there was a
multiplicity of reasons for this.45 The shrinking of the open range together with the
widespread destruction of the remaining tracts prodded sheep growers to purchase land
and use it at a sustainable level. Their survival depended on their willingness and ability
to modify their operations so as to reduce their land requirements to the tracts they were
able to purchase or lease. This was their only viable path to sustained production over
the long term. It was the only way to guarantee sufficient land and forage for their flocks
and the only way to maintain the tight control over their lands that was becoming
increasingly necessary. As early as 1880, Gordon reported that Anglo sheepmen in
Colfax, Mora, and San Miguel Counties were filing homestead and pre-emption claims to
establish their home ranges.46 The process accelerated in the following years. In the late
1880s, and continuing through the early 1890s, stock growers throughout the West, those
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with the most foresight and some available capital, began to extend their legal holdings
beyond the 160-acre tracts of water front that they had once found adequate.

Changing Sheep Growing Practices
As sheepmen moved their operations onto patented tracts, their growing practices
changed considerably. H.M. Taylor’s 1889 government report, while noting that western
sheepmen were settling on titled lands to a much greater extent than ever before, while
farmers and cattlemen were likewise acquiring titled land at a great rate, mentioned an
additional consideration. The report asserted, “The tendency of the times is for the sheep
raiser of the West to acquire range by purchase, then to gradually work towards a proper
system of stock farming, changing his methods as means and intelligence dictate.
Sometimes this causes a decrease in the flock, but it generally leads toward safety for the
investment, and more uniformity in the amount annually derived as income.”47 The
report correctly noted that raising sheep on fenced pasture land could reduce the risks and
uncertainties. The information was widespread. Going into somewhat more detail, the
Rocky Mountain Husbandman recommended to its Montana readers that they own their
own land, fence it, create pastures and meadows, grow their own hay, and build winter
enclosures, even while noting that open-range husbandry might still be profitable. And it
likewise asserted that the new methods would remove some of the risks from what had
traditionally been a high-risk business. The article was quoted in the Las Vegas Stock
Grower.48 Additional considerations included combating scab and predators and
identifying and avoiding poisonous plants, which could be addressed more expeditiously
by restricting flocks to privately owned fields. Sheepmen were not only pushed off the
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open range, they were ultimately forced to adopt recent advances in range management,
no longer just an option. The more conscientious and more financially sound accepted
the range-management goal of maximizing livestock production “consistent with
conservation of the range resource.” This was actually a major undertaking of a technical
character. It involved mapping range resources, estimating the grazing capacity and
forage production, prescribing kinds and numbers of livestock best suited to each land
parcel, and developing systems of grazing usage, fencing, salting, and irrigation.
Stockmen began, moreover, to systematically address range restoration through artificial
reseeding, burning, weed control, soil and water conservation. Such sophisticated range
management became imperative on account of the wide-ranging, distressed land
conditions of the late 1890s. Stockmen called on the federal government for assistance,
and the U.S. Department of Agriculture began to undertake scientific studies of grass and
forage.49
For the next several years, most New Mexico sheepmen, including the ricos, still only
held title to small tracts and grazed their livestock on nearby public lands.50 Their time
was limited, however. Those stockmen who would not or could not purchase land and
take up the new array of considerations, which were expensive, would be left behind. In
the words of Cabeza de Baca describing the situation she had witnessed in the Ceja-Llano
region, “The few cattle and sheep men who were left [after the arrival of the
homesteaders] and had not been foresighted [and bought land], had to diminish their
herds and they also had to live on credit from the country store. One by one, they also
disappeared…” She described the herders still running sheep on the Llano as late as
1915 as “sad people, these men, for their days on the Llano were numbered.”51 Her
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father actively purchased land to preserve his ranching operation.

National Forest Reserves
A second federal policy caused further loss of grazing lands, at least in the near term.
Congress, taking an increased interest in conservation and “reclamation” of America’s
natural resources, passed the Forest Reserve Act of 1891. As a result, substantial parts of
the public domain were declared National Forest Reserves and thus closed to settlement,
cf. chap. 9. These lands included much of the traditional western summer range, where
sheep were fattened for market or for the coming winter.52 Then in 1899, sheep were
excluded from the National Forest Reserves. The policy did benefit the flora and fauna
of these areas, as intended. But it also denied some established stock growers usage of
lands they had been using for decades. When the Cebola National Forest was established
in Western Socorro County, ranchers, including Ray Morley, were ordered to remove the
fences they had put up on the public lands. According to Cleaveland, the ranchers in the
area were shocked and incensed by the order. They felt the directive was a violation of
their “natural rights,” but they complied. Her brother took down miles of fencing.53 In
addition to fences, some ranchers had constructed various structures on the public land
that they were ordered to remove. They had considered these structures a legitimate
capital investment in their ranching operations. Having to remove their fences and
buildings constituted an additional, apparently unforeseen, expense. An Arizona
sheepman commenting on the establishment of the National Forest Reserves around 1903
asserted, “From a wool grower’s and a mutton raiser’s point of view it is a decidedly
wrong and dangerous condition of affairs.”54
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The situation for ranchers was ameliorated in 1905 when the forest reserves were
transferred to the Department of Agriculture and the federal government began issuing
annual grazing permits through the U.S. Forest Service to be used by stock growers on
national forest land.55 The fees were fairly modest. Regulatory provisions restricted the
number of animals and the months of the year for which grazing was permitted on each
leased tract, generally reducing its usage from the past. Ray Morley, like many other
ranchers, and also merchants, then obtained grazing leases on national forest land he had
once used without charge.56
The program was ultimately successful on several levels. By 1914, twenty-nine
thousand stock growers had grazing permits for 1.6 million cattle and horses and 7.6
million sheep and goats on national reserves. Under systematic federal range
management, the range in some badly overgrazed areas was restored and even improved.
The success of the federal program was such that stockmen requested its extension to the
remaining public range outside the boundaries of the national forests, which no longer
supported as many animals as in the past. The national forests became self-supporting,
grazing actually becoming a secondary resource for the federal government, as the Forest
Service had hoped.57
During the last two decades of the nineteenth century, when overgrazing was
degrading ever more of the western range, neither the New Mexico Legislature nor any of
the stockmen’s organizations took measures to curtail the practice. In this instance, the
federal government’s involvement seems to have been beneficial. Under careful
management, by 1914 the national forest land was supporting 50% more livestock per
acre than ten years earlier. The range wars had been brought to an end, ranch property
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had increased in value, forage productivity had been increased, the grazing industry had
been stabilized, and the quality of stock produced had been improved.58
By the end of the territorial period, open-range sheep growing had, in large part,
come to an end. In the future, sheep would be raised on farms or leased ranges under
controlled conditions and become essentially another farm crop.
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Chapter 11
Summary and Conclusions

By the turn of the twentieth century, New Mexico had established itself as a major
supplier of the nation’s mutton and lamb. The territory’s sheep industry had grown
tremendously since the annexation, particularly since the close of the Civil War when
New Mexico and California had the only large sheep herds west of the Mississippi. New
Mexico’s sheep population exploded in the decades following the annexation from an
estimated 377,000 head in 1846 to over a 1,000,000 in 1867 and to over 5,200,000 in
1882, a fourteen-fold increase.1 Thereafter, the sheep population fell off somewhat to
about 3,500,000 through the World War I period. Of the states and territories, only
Montana and Wyoming had larger sheep populations than New Mexico at the end of the
century, Montana with 6,000,000 and Wyoming with 5,000,000 head. At this time, about
8% of America’s sheep were being raised in New Mexico.2 The growth of U.S. sheep
production, and livestock production in general, was driven by the country’s
industrialization and the growing army of urban laborers in the East and Midwest that
were part of that process and constituted an expanding market for western mutton, lamb,
and wool.3 Between 1878 and 1888, the number of sheep received annually at the
Chicago stockyards increased fivefold from 310,000 to 1,500,000 head.4
In the same timeframe, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the United States,
with less than 5% of the world’s population, was producing about10% of the world’s
wool.5 Among industrialized countries, it was the world’s largest wool producer, by
more than a factor of two; overall it was the third largest producer, trailing only Australia
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and Argentina. The volume of wool consumed in the United States was at this time, five
times what it had been in 1860. Some 60 % of America’s wool was being produced in
nine states and territories west of the Mississippi.6 Wool production in New Mexico had
risen from about 33,000 lbs. in 1850 to an estimated 17,000,000 lbs. in 1909, a 500-fold
increase! The average fleece weight had grown to 5.5 lbs. During this same period,
New Mexico’s human population increased by a factor of five, due in substantial part to
Anglo immigration. Of the states and territories, Montana and Wyoming were, by 1900,
the two largest wool producers; New Mexico was tied with Idaho for fifth place, trailing
only slightly Utah and Oregon, and was producing about 10% of the western wool.7
America’s woolen mills were utilizing essentially all of the domestic production and
importing an additional 30% of their wool supply.8 American manufacturers chose
foreign wool over the domestic product whenever it was the cheaper commodity.9
Overall, they were consuming about 15% of the world’s production, a measure of the
nation’s extraordinary prosperity. By 1890, America’s consumption of wool, estimated
at 8.75 lbs. per capita, was the largest of any nation in the world.
The nation’s expanding rail network was the critical factor in the growth of the
western sheep industry. Western wool was shipped east by rail in great quantity, since
over half of America’s woolen manufacture was in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts. Live
sheep were shipped by rail to feeder farms in the West and Midwest as well as directly to
the meat packers in Chicago and elsewhere. America’s oldest sheep growing region,
New Mexico, recently so isolated, became a full participant in the U.S. markets and thus
subject to national and international economic forces. The conditions outlined here were
the end result of a period of rapid and transformative developments in the territory’s
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sheep industry.
For decades after the annexation, sheep husbandry generally flourished in the territory
and was widely appreciated. In 1892, federal investigators concluded “Animal Industry”
[predominantly sheep] was the “the leading enterprise of the Territory.”10 The
predictions of early observers of New Mexico’s grazing resources had been born out.
Describing New Mexico, a contemporary of sheepman Solomon Luna noted, “Some parts
of it [New Mexico] are adapted for cattle, but it is essentially fitted for sheep
grazing…This is our most profitable industry. Sheep owners are learning to direct their
breeding so that their flocks may be maintained either for wool or for mutton.”11 Seven
Rivers sheepman Thomas Gardner concurred; he regarded sheep as more profitable than
any other livestock. 12 The situation changed little through the first decade of the
twentieth century. Although other regions had surpassed New Mexico in sheep and wool
production, the territory was still widely regarded as an attractive sheep-growing region.
The New Mexico Bluebook of 1913 noted with only a little exageration, “… the breeding
and raising of sheep [is] the largest industry in our state; because the mineral covered soil
grows the best grass (Grama) known in the whole world.” This is significant because
agriculture and mining were then becoming established and growing rapidly, while
traditional open-range grazing, which had given rise to the New Mexico sheep industry in
the first place, was disappearing.13 New Mexico’s lack of surface water continued to
favor sheep growing, which, unlike farming, did not depend on abundant water
resources.14 Despite, the post-Civil War influx of well-financed cattle companies, large
portions of the territory remained devoted to sheep.
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Timeline Review
From the time of its founding in the late sixteenth century, the Spanish, and later
Mexican, outpost in the land of today’s northern New Mexico depended heavily on sheep
for its survival. The animals provided both food and wool clothing, and the pobladores
quickly observed how well they were adapted to the environment. The need for quite
large tracts of land under the open-range system did not present any insurmountable
barriers.
So successful was sheep growing in the colony that within a comparatively short
time, a few decades only, the colonists opened a commercial export trade that grew to
impressive proportions. It was characterized by churro stock and massive trail drives
down the Camino Real for delivery to Mexican markets. The industry grew, albeit at an
unsteady rate, for two centuries or more before the American annexation of the region. It
was plagued from the beginning by harsh trail conditions, considerable market
instabilities and exploitation by the Mexican merchants to whom New Mexico growers
were constrained to sell their herds. The barter economy restricted, to an extent,
economic development of the region and became a greater constraint in later years.
The ownership base was quite narrow. Although the church owned most of the herds
early on, sheep ownership eventually became concentrated in the hands of a small
number of well-connected, wealthy, land-owning families sustained by the SpanishMexican land grant system. These rico families were, from a commercial standpoint, the
main beneficiaries of the sheep industry. They grew the bulk of the colony’s sheep and
dominated the export trade. Profiting to varying degrees from their own herds, they also
marketed the produce of the small-scale growers within their bailiwicks at a considerable
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markup. Their operations were family affairs, a modus operandi that worked well under
frontier exigencies, but would become a liability in the rapidly changing, competitive,
mercantile capitalist economy of later times. They depended on skilled, but cheap or
even free, labor performed by debt peons and others who profited little from their work.
When this labor supply became inadequate, the ricos employed the partido system,
shifting much of the considerable risk in raising sheep onto their herders. They provided
also social and political as well as commercial leadership for the colony, enhancing their
authority over their dependents. Large sheep herds became the embodiment and
principal source of wealth in the colony.
During this period, a seemingly unlimited supply of good grazing land that had been
long occupied and employed as hunting grounds by the nomadic Indian tribes of the
region lay beyond the populated confines of the colony. As the population of the colony
increased and established grazing lands became inadequate, sheepmen were in the
vanguard for opening up areas outside the Rio Grande Valley for seasonal grazing and
subsequent settlement. The nomadic tribes mounted an on-going, armed resistance to the
invasion of their homelands, but the colonists sufficiently overwhelmed the Indians by
their larger, denser populations that they were able to establish permanent footholds in
several new areas. Nevertheless, Indian depredations restricted the growth of the sheep
industry significantly for many years.
In the years after Mexican independence from Spain until the Civil War,
American influence in New Mexico increased steadily, while sovereignty was forceably
transferred from Mexico to the United States. After independence, the Mexican
government relaxed trade restrictions, cracking open trade with the United States, and a
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handful of American adventurer-traders began to arrive in New Mexico. An extended
period of expanding markets for New Mexico produce in the United States ensued. The
Americans brought about changes on several fronts that set the stage for the expansion of
the sheep industry in the latter nineteenth century.
Americans first learned of New Mexico’s sheep resources when the Pike Expedition
witnessed a drive down the Camino Real, reports of which may have helped stimulate
interest in what became the Southwest. After Mexican independence, American fur
trappers and traders established their headquarters in Taos, as they exploited the fur
resources of the Southern Rockies while maintaining business connections in St. Louis.
Some assimilated into the local elite Hispanic society and under a liberalized Mexican
land grant policy became large-scale land owners by partnering with native New
Mexicans. They became, in the process, the first Anglo stock growers in New Mexico.
Lucian Maxwell, employing traditional Hispanic stock growing methods and business
relationships, was exceedingly successful following this trajectory.
On another front, Anglo-American traders opened the Santa Fe Trail to St. Louis,
Missouri, over which a modest, risky, but often lucrative, trade with the United States
developed. They established the first important commercial and communication links
between New Mexico and the United States. Santa Fe became an important trade center.
The traders exported wool over the trail as a backhaul to the United States, launching an
industry that would have great repercussions throughout the West. Hispanic merchants
joined the Santa Fe trade a few years after it was initiated, and some were quite
successful. This provided a link between New Mexico’s most influential families and the
U.S. economy. Hispanics eventually accounted for about half the Santa Fe trade but lost
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market share around the time of the Civil War when capital requirements, which they
could not meet, became more demanding.
Following the United States-Mexico War and the American annexation, the U.S.
Army occupied New Mexico and was instrumental in pacificing the nomadic tribes of the
region, ultimately opening up vast new range areas that had previously been unsafe for
livestock grazing. At the same time the army forts provided a new market for New
Mexico agricultural produce and livestock, which introduced an incipient cash economy
to the territory and expedited the rise of a community of Anglo mercantile capitalists with
extra-territorial financial resources. Sheep and wool would later be the most important
export commodities for New Mexico’s merchants. Maxwell was a particularly notable
army supplier of livestock and agricultural produce in the early years of the territory. The
monetary exchange services provided by the forts ameliorated the business climate.
In the decade before the Civil War, the California gold rush gave rise to a lucrative
new trade in New Mexico churros. The discovery of gold brought about a massive influx
of treasure seekers into the area, and a food shortage quickly developed. In a harbinger
of later sheep and wool business negotiations, well-informed Anglo speculators with
capital resources initiated the California trade by purchasing large herds of sheep from
New Mexico growers, employing skilled Hispanic herders to drive the herds to
California, and selling them at the gold fields for a considerable markup. The trade was a
high-risk endeavor, but extraordinarily profitable for the more successful practitioners
during its first years. When the speculation frenzy played out, large-scale Hispanic
growers continued the trade under the less favorable terms which for them were still
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profitable. They exported the bulk of the New Mexico sheep during the decade-long
trade. A substantial sheep trade with Colorado developed after the California trade ended.
The annexation brought little immediate change to New Mexico’s ranching
operations, which continued to be dominated by a handful of rico families running large
churro herds. The foundation of the impressive sheep industry thus remained quite
narrow. These family operations would be severely challenged in the years to come. The
impoverished general populace of New Mexico benefited little directly from the Santa Fe
trade or the California drives, although they provided employment for a considerable
number of packers and herders. In their somewhat delayed entry into both the Santa Fe
trade and the California sheep trade, Hispanic merchants and sheep growers appear to
have been rather more conservative and risk averse than their Anglo cohorts.
Despite the success of its sheep industry, commercial wool production began rather
late in New Mexico. After the Santa Fe trade opened, Anglo traders and sheepmen,
cognizant of America’s small but emerging woolen industry, began systematically
exporting wool over the Santa Fe Trail in small quantities. This was not very profitable
in the opening years of the Santa Fe trade due to high transport costs back to the
northeastern markets where the woolen mills were located. The traders employed wool
as a backhaul, the sale of which barely covered the costs of their return trip to Missouri.
Prior to the annexation, there was little demand for churro wool even in New Mexico.
Existing production was more than sufficient to meet the colonists’ needs. The churro’s
light fleece was not an issue. The over sufficiency went to waste. During the postannexation period before the Civil War, America’s woolen industry was consuming little
wool from the West. Only with the economic disruptions brought on by the Civil War,
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and the resulting national cotton shortage, did the market for wool expand, and U.S.
woolen production grew to significant proportions. Prices rose sharply for a brief period,
and wool growing in the West became quite profitable. When prices dropped in the postwar years, the western wool industry, by now reasonably well established, remained
profitable and grew because open-range production costs were low.
In the last years before the Civil War, Anglo sheepmen in New Mexico initiated
selective breeding on a small scale for heavier fleeces of the finer wool most in demand
at the time. And to that end, they imported graded, prolific wool producing animals,
particularly rams to be crossed with churro ewes. After the war, Anglo sheepmen
imported upgraded herds – Merino rams - from California on a much larger scale, a major
factor in upgrading the territory’s sheep population. Selective breeding was ultimately a
response to increased competition from other states and territories in the post-Civil War
period. It was an early manifestation of the capitalization of New Mexico sheep
ranching, since the wool-producing rams needed to upgrade the churro herds were
expensive, were purchased with dollars from extra-territorial sources, and the investment
would not be recovered immediately, but might actually take a few years to pay for itself.
Anglo sheepmen with access to some capital were far better positioned to take up
breeding than those Hispanics whose wealth was tied up in their land and livestock.
Hispanic ranchers upgraded their herds when they witnessed and became fully convinced
of the advantages.
Hispanics had not previously taken up breeding for enhanced wool production for a
variety of reasons besides the lack of domestic demand. Harsh environmental conditions,
the widespread partidario system, the cost of breeding rams and, arguably, a general
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conservativism on their part were all factors. Some cash-poor ranchers continued to run
churro herds long after the advantages of selective breeding were well established.
From the Civil War onward, both live sheep and wool were important components of
the New Mexico sheep industry. Having two, otherwise-unrelated products had a
stabilizing effect on the generally volatile industry, reducing some of the risk inherent in
open-range ranching. Wool growers, their numbers expanding, generally prospered as
New Mexico came to produce a sizable fraction of the raw material for the nation’s
growing woolen industry. The territory’s wool exports grew steadily for the rest of the
territorial period.
Starting in the years immediately before the Civil War and continuing through the
1870s, a confluence of economic developments in the East and Midwest had a profound
effect on sheep growing in the West. The introduction of rail transport, the growth of
urban markets for agricultural produce, an expansion of farming, an increase in land
values, and a post-war collapse in wool prices all contributed to a decline in sheep
growing on eastern farms. It became significantly less profitable over a rather short
period of time. In the same timeframe, the pacification of good-to-excellent grazing
lands, the availability of inexpensive skilled labor and acclimated livestock, and in later
years the penetration of railroads rendered the West more favorable for growing sheep
and wool than in the past. As a result of these conditions, which were touted in a
significant promotional campaign, America’s sheep industry shifted from the small farms
in the East and Midwest to the open ranges of the trans-Mississippi West. A wave of
Anglo stockmen emigrated west and established ranches throughout the Great Plains-
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Rocky Mountain region. Their operations were generally more profitable than the
eastern farms.
New Mexico played a somewhat unique role in this westward shift. It supplied land,
labor, and particularly livestock. New Mexico churros, mostly ewes, well acclimated to
western conditions and highly regarded for the same reasons as in the past – robustness,
ease of handling, good taste - were employed as seed stock to quickly and inexpensively
start herds throughout much of the region. The ewes were commonly crossed with wool
producing rams imported from elsewhere. From the late 1860s into the early 1880s,
massive herds raised by Hispanic sheepmen were driven from New Mexico to new
ranches in Colorado, Utah, Arizona, Texas, Wyoming, Kansas, Nebraska, and Dakota
Territory. The annual exports during this period were considerably larger than the
exports to California in the 1850s. They helped give rise to a major western industry that
came to supply a substantial fraction of the nation’s mutton, lamb, and wool. Until the
late 1880s, the primary focus of western sheepmen was, however, wool.
Sheep growing conditions in some of the newly opened ranching areas were quite
favorable, and those areas were soon giving New Mexicans substantial competition while
their production, along with that of the rest of the region, increased rapidly in response to
the growing national markets for food and clothing. The territory’s sheep industry
became one part of a greatly expanded western industry that was predominantly an Anglo
enterprise and, of course, served American markets. In time Anglos accounted for a
significant part of the territory’s ranching population, although sheep growing in New
Mexico and Southern Colorado continued to be dominated by a few wealthy Hispanic
families until about 1880. This was a generally prosperous period for New Mexico
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growers. There was little, if any, absentee investment in New Mexico sheep ranches, as
was often the case with cattle ranches.
In the years following the Civil War, a much expanded community of knowledgeable,
ambitious, and energetic mercantile capitalists, Anglos from elsewhere, recognizing or
stumbling upon opportunity, settled in New Mexico and greatly expedited trade between
the territory and the eastern United States. A handful of native Hispanic merchants with
the needed capital resources participated in this development. The merchants’ basic
operation was to import manufactured merchandise from the East and trade it for New
Mexico produce, including livestock, and some hard currency. As sheep remained an
important medium of exchange in the territory, the merchants soon found themselves
dealing in sheep and wool. These merchants served the numerous independent, smallscale growers, who had become active in sheep raising in the latter decades of the
nineteenth century. Eventually, many merchants held large herds of their own and
became, of necessity, involved in every phase of sheep growing. They managed their
herds using a modified partido system and provided the first banking services in the
territory. They eventually were marketing most of the sheep and wool produced in the
territory. Wool, which the merchants exported in increasing volumes over the Santa Fe
Trail, became in some notable cases their most important commodity.
Mercantile activities in the territory were greatly advanced by the arrival of the
railroads, which provided rapid, inexpensive, secure transport of wool and live sheep to
market for the first time. The roads were the catalyst that finally opened the vast new
markets for New Mexico’s produce. As such, they were a critical factor in the expansion
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of mercantile capitalism in New Mexico and the concomitant growth of the sheep
industry. They were also the first source of corporate capital in New Mexico.
At this juncture, capital began to play a larger, and more critical, role in the sheep
industry than it had in the past. The increased trade with the East mediated by the
merchants was first made possible by the arrival of the Army, and later sustained by the
railroads and commercial banks, through the monetary exchange services they provided,
which were essential for efficient, multi-faceted, long-distance trade. In the financial
environment that resulted, the merchants were able to control the flow of cash and credit
in the territory, while serving all the financial needs of the increasingly capital-intensive
sheep industry. They drew the numerous small-scale Hispanic growers whom they
served into national markets, while those producers transferred their allegiance from their
former patrones to the merchants.
An important activity of the merchants within the territory was to provide cash
advances for operating expenses, and possibly livestock, to their sheep suppliers at the
beginning of the growing season. Since the small-scale growers usually had no cash
resources of their own and no other sources of operating funds, they became totally
dependent on their dealers for these advances. Even if they could get a loan from one of
the small regional banks, they would have to pay very high interest rates. For their part,
the merchants initially acquired the capital that they loaned out from private extraterritorial sources or profits from their own mercantile activities. As capital requirements
increased, however, New Mexico merchants obtained loans from wool dealers in the
Northeast and meat packers in the Midwest against future deliveries, funds that they
turned around and advanced to their suppliers. They settled accounts at the end of the
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growing season when the wool and live sheep were delivered to market. The merchants
negotiated the actual sale prices the ranchers would receive. New Mexico’s mercantile
capitalists thus controlled the financial transactions with their growers at both ends of the
growing season. They had considerable capital tied up in their suppliers’ herds for the
entire season; and their suppliers were thus in debt to them for much of the year. As an
almost natural development, the Anglo mercantile capitalists took over, in large part, the
control and leadership of the sheep industry from the landed patrones who had long
dominated it, a major shift from Hispanic to Anglo dominance in which capital played a
critical role.
Mercantile operations grew with the introduction of winter feeding. In the last
decades of the nineteenth century, the practice of winter feeding swept through the
western industry in response to new market demands for grain-fed mutton and lamb
through the winter months. This occurred at a time when each region of the country had
begun to understand what it did best and concentrate on those activities. The ranges of
Colorado, Wyoming, Montana, Kansas, and Nebraska to the north and east had proved
best for fattening lambs for market, while the southern ranges, New Mexico’s in
particular, were determined to be best suited for breeding. Many New Mexico sheepmen
began to concentrate strickly on breeding and shipped their young sheep out of the
territory by rail to feeder farms and ranches where they were prepaired for market. This
became a more profitable alternative than raising the animals to maturity on the open
range. The business transactions were oftened carried out through the sheep merchants,
who became a conduit between New Mexico breeders and feeders located outside the
territory. The feeder industry was capital-intensive, as large financial outlays were
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required to acquire feeder herds, maintain them in enclosed pastures for extended periods,
and grow forage to fatten them. The feeder ranches were generally large-scale
operations, predominantly Anglo owned. Capital was typically tied up for months in
sheep being fattened for market. With this development, New Mexico sheepmen, no
longer raising their sheep to maturity, lost a segment of their operations to wellcapitalized, Anglo feeders, shifting the industry further toward Anglo dominance. In the
process, the territory’s sheepmen became linked to a network of feeder farmers and
ranchers outside the territory and, by extention, more deeply integrated into the national
economy.
The well-documented business correspondence of Frank Bond and his brother G.W.
reveal in detail the dynamics of New Mexico mercantile capitalism as it pertained to
sheep and the shift in industry leadership. The development of the Bond empire is seen to
hinge on the flow of capital. Conditions were evolving rapidly at the time, and land
ownership, a critical factor for the large-scale, sheep-growing families of the past, was,
by this time, only a secondary consideration for merchants like Frank Bond.
The Bond brothers, starting with a single mercantile enterprise in Espanola financed
with Canadian funds provided by their father, became, like many New Mexico
merchants, deeply involved in wool and live sheep dealings. Acting as middlemen
between slaughter houses and wool dealers and mostly small- and intermediate-scale
Hispanic growers in their region, they prospered from the start. They employed their
accumulated profits to capitalize several branches throughout New Mexico. Having
established good credit, they were able to finance a large volume of sheep and wool
purchases in New Mexico and Colorado as well as winter feeding operations in Colorado
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and Nebraska using short-term loans from western banks, Denver livestock dealers, and
Boston wool dealers. They maintained a tight control over all the financial transactions
with their sheep and wool suppliers and their feeder farmers. From the beginning, their
access to capital gave them control over a significant segment of the industry because
their sheep and wool suppliers, their partidarios, and their feeder ranchers were
financially indebted to them. With conservative, conscientious, hands-on management,
they became exceedingly successful in a fundamentally risky business. And they became
quite wealthy in the process.
Several added factors contributed to the Bonds’ success. They enlisted able,
unrelated managers through profit-sharing agreements and stock ownership. They
developed channels of critically important market information. Their loading facility at
Servietta enabled them to control rail shipping from their part of the territory. They
learned and understood the traditional Hispanic sheep business and, like Lucian Maxwell
a half century earlier, they were notably flexible in adapting to New Mexico customs and
conditions. They maintained good relations with their suppliers, and they stepped into
the role of patron when the occasion called for it, employing partido contracts, openrange grazing on grants and public lands, barter transactions when necessary, and flexible
loan arrangements with their suppliers.15
When George Bond gave up active management of the New Mexico-based operation
in the early twentieth century, Frank, whose role in the partnership seems to have been
growing for some time, then took over entirely the management of the empire and
presided over its continuing expansion. He possessed a thorough knowledge of the
business practices of his day and knew how to use it. His relationships with bankers,
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wool merchants, livestock dealers, and feeder ranchers strengthened his competitive
position. Smart, indefatigable, and totally dedicated to his business pursuits, Frank Bond
became a specialist in an industry of increasing complexity and provided essential
marketing and financial services that in his time few others could provide.
The magnitude of the Bonds’ dealings, the large number of growers they served, and
the financial control they maintained made them, almost by default, leaders in the New
Mexico sheep industry. Considering the long reach of their operations, they were also
important agents in drawing New Mexico into the larger national economy.
During the last two decades of the nineteenth century, New Mexico sheep ranching
adopted advancing technological developments and became capital-intensive. This was
another factor contributing to the shift towards Anglo dominance. It was brought on by
the same economic forces that contributed to the growth of mercantile capitalism: vastly
expanded markets for mutton, lamb, and wool, opened up by America’s growing rail
network. Growing markets led to increased competition. New Mexico ranchers faced
competition from growers throughout the Great Plains-Rocky Mountain region, while
contending with national and international pricing over which they had no control. It
became more important than ever for them to adopt the most efficient and profitable
methods of sheep growing, and that necessitated increased increased capital investments,
up-front costs that might not pay off for a period of years.
As public lands became scarce, New Mexico sheep ranchers were required to
purchase or otherwise acquire substantial tracts of grazing land. This included SpanishMexican grant lands formerly in the possession of Hispanic sheep growers and herders.
In their headlong quest for land, many ranchers acquired tracts, both private and public,
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either fraudulently or through questionable legal procedures, sometimes to the detriment
of Hispanic grantees.
On another front, breeding to produce the most desirable sheep and wool for
continuously evolving markets became a necessity rather than an option. Smaller,
closely-managed, graded herds proved to be the most profitable under the new
conditions. And this required growers to erect costly barbed-wire fencing, sheep-dipping
facilities, and irrigation systems, to plant winter feed crops, and to pay increasingly
demanding, temporary work forces during lambing and shearing. These investments
helped provide for steady production through a cold winter or a summer drought.
The various initial investments were large, but they made possible increased
efficiency and profits. Ranchers unable to make these capital improvements remained, as
in the past, dependent on favorable weather and range conditions, never a given in New
Mexico. They were, as a result, at a competitive disadvantage. Those with access to
capital were best positioned to enter the sheep business and prosper. Anglo sheepmen
who brought capital to New Mexico prospered to varying degrees and took over an
increasing segment of the ranching business, while many Hispanic ranchers, their assets
tied up entirely in their lands and unimproved herds, lacked the cash resources necessary
to capitalize their operations.
The rise of capitalized sheep ranching is exemplified by the activities of Socorro
County rancher Montague Stevens, as described in his correspondence with Gen.
Leonard Wood. His correspondence provides an insider’s view of large-scale sheep
ranching in western New Mexico in the years spanning the turn of the twentieth century.
The letters document the building of Stevens’ operation, including his land and sheep
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acquisitions, which was initially funded by extra-territorial resources. They provide a
detailed, unvarnished picture of what large-scale, open-range sheep ranching was like in
New Mexico at the time. They document Stevens’ often harsh assessments of the
Hispanic herders and sheepmen he encountered, assessments that were shared by many
Anglos at the time. Stevens was an extreme example of a hands-on manager, a role that
had become necessary for successful ranching. His letters show how a well-connected
Anglo, an advocate of innovation and technological advances, assumed local leadership
in the business with the outlay of considerable amounts of capital. And they point up the
inherent counteracting risks involved.
By the mid-1890s when Stevens got started in sheep, it was difficult, if not
impossible, to enter the open-range business with only a modest bankroll. He used as
seed money his own and his wife’s considerable inherited wealth brought from England
together with a sizable investment from his passive business partner, Gen. Leonard
Wood. While the promotional literature of the 1870s claimed that a successful sheep
ranch could be set up for a few thousand dollars, and some were, Stevens invested nearly
$40,000 in his operation, a considerable amount of money at the time. His innovations
included introducing a new breed of wool-bearing sheep to his region, developing more
efficient lambing procedures, building a state-of-the-art sheep dipping facility, and
shifting his herds from one elevation to another as the seasons progressed for optimal
growing conditions, all in the interests of future profits and stability. The many growers
in his area apparently took notice of his successes. His activities were made possible by a
continuing series of capital outlays that would have been out of the question for most
small-scale growers but which promised Stevens a competitive advantage. The
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management of capital was an important component of his operation, and occupies
considerable space in his correspondence with Gen. Wood. Always under stress by the
need for operating funds, he nevertheless reinvested his profits in capital improvements,
the benefits of which were usually not immediate. And although he never made the
financial killing he had hoped for, he was at least moderately successful producing live
sheep and wool during the last years of open-range grazing.
Beyond illustrating the role of capital, Stevens’ experiences show just how risky
open-range sheep ranching in New Mexico could be. Although he had previous
experience raising cattle, Stevens knew comparatively little about sheep when he
embarked on the life of a sheep rancher. He learned quickly. After an auspicious
beginning, he seems to have been plagued by an endless sequence of serious difficulties:
a corrupt legal system as it related to land negotiations, a growing incidence of scab, an
evolving and uncertain federal public lands policy, a diminishing pool of competent
herders and shearers, and unpredictable, devastating weather damage.
After about eight years, Stevens concluded that sheep ranching, at least as he had
experienced it, was not worth the trouble, while acknowledging that some few fortunate
men had, indeed, become extraordinarily successful and wealthy at it. He had come to
understand that even though sheep growing was potentially the most profitable business
in the West, that potential was not often realized. The element of chance was ever
present, and the risks were high. Ultimately, Stevens’ significant capital expenditures did
not counteract all the risks he, like all open-range sheepmen, had assumed.
Great changes came to the New Mexico sheep industry around the turn of the
twentieth century. Open-range grazing, the practice dating back over two centuries, came
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to an end over a remarkably short period of time. The loss of rangeland, resulting largely
from the influx of Anglo homesteaders who claimed the best grazing lands and water
frontage, pushed sheep growers off the public domain. The process was hastened by the
deterioration due to overstocking of the remaining unclaimed, mostly less desirable,
public rangeland. With the western frontier closed, herds were, of necessity, moved from
the vanishing public rangelands onto ranches and farms with fenced pastures or onto
carefully-managed, leased national forest reserves. With advancing irrigation technology
and barbed wire fencing, farming was proving to be a more efficient use of much New
Mexico land than stock growing. In the end, the practice of open-range grazing thus
collapsed under its own weight.
The loss of rangeland was ultimately the catalyst for the transformation of the range
sheep industry into a component of farming. Raising sheep on farms under closely
controlled conditions proved to be significantly more efficient than open-range grazing.
The capitalization of sheep growing carried over from ranch environments where little of
the range land was actually owned to fenced farm environments where all the grazing
lands were owned or leased. This transformation coincided with a rapid expansion of
farming in New Mexico starting around 1890 that resulted from a wave of Anglo farmers
entering the territory to take up some of the last lands in the West open for homesteading.
Substantial capital investments in land, forage production, irrigation systems, and
structures continued to be necessitated by the competitive nature of the sheep and wool
markets and the resulting need for greater production efficiency. Labor requirements
were significantly reduced, winter feeding became the norm, and with the construction of
shelters, dipping and lambing were conducted under safer, generally more favorable
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conditions. The risks inherent in what had been a high-risk business were significantly
reduced. Those who could made the transition. Those who could not were forced out of
business. Conditions worked particularly against small-scale Hispanic herders who had
never acquired a home range. In many cases, small, fenced herds came to constitute only
one “crop” of several, giving farmers additional income most years but other crops to fall
back on in poor years for sheep or wool. Absorbed into a growing agricultural industry,
sheep lost their particular importance in New Mexico’s economy and life in general. The
Hispanic populace no longer depended on sheep for their sustenance or their clothing.
An era extending back to the Spanish colonial period ended.

Final Summation
Momentous extra-territorial economic developments impacted the direction of the
New Mexico sheep industry repeatedly during the territorial period. The industry
underwent a sequence of dramatic changes, but perhaps most significant for the general
populace was the shift from Hispanic to Anglo dominance. Leadership and control of the
industry passed from a small cohort of wealthy, landed Hispanic families to primarily
Anglo mercantile capitalists and ranchers. Whereas the Hispanic pobladores had built a
frontier commercial sheep industry of impressive proportions that served Mexican
markets, by the end of the territorial period, Frank Bond was the largest sheep and wool
merchant in New Mexico, and he served far greater, and more stable, markets in the
eastern and midwestern United States. On another front, according to 1900 county tax
records, Charles Ilfeld had the largest sheep holding in San Miguel County, long an
active center for sheep growing. Anglos dominated the New Mexico Sheep Sanitary
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Board. At the production level, ranchers like Montague Stevens were establishing the
most technologically advanced facilities New Mexico had yet seen. And the adoption of
feeding transferred the final phase of the sheep growth cycle to the care of extraterritorial Anglos.
There are a multiciplicity of reasons for the shift. But it was primarily the result of
economic forces extending across the entire United States that favored well-capitalized
Anglos with a stomach for risk. Considerable opportunities presented themselves with
the opening of a large American market for mutton and an entirely new market for wool
combined with the low New Mexico production costs and the arrival of rail shipping.
But seed capital was needed to establish successful mercantile operations and efficient,
productive ranches. This the Anglos who came to New Mexico and rose to prominence
possessed. Their funds derived from cash they brought into the territory from elsewhere,
profits they realized from extra-territorial sales, and loans from sheep and wool dealers
outside the territory. As such, capital was the key to Anglo ascendence within the
industry. A handful of Hispanic merchants and ranchers, men like Felipe Chaves and
Solomon Luna with access to capital, participated in the expanding market opportunities,
but their numbers were never large. Some, perhaps most, rico families, their wealth tied
up in land and un-improved livestock, never amassed the significant cash reserves they
would need to compete as ranchers or merchants in the increasingly capital-intensive
business environment.
Demographic, cultural, and political factors tended to amplify the role of Anglo
capital. At the time of the U.S annexation, New Mexico had a small population, and the
sheep industry was dominated by a very small number of families, as few as five or six,
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sustained by the Spanish-Mexican land grant system and dependent on very cheap labor.
As late as 1880, U.S. government investigators concluded that the sheep industry was still
dominated by about twenty, mostly Hispanic families. But during the post-annexation
period, particularly after the arrival of the railroads, the expanding sheep industry
incorporated a broader base of participants. These were, in the most general terms,
Anglos recently arrived in the territory together with a considerable cohort of small-scale,
cash-poor Hispanics. Indeed, with the influx of Anglos to the territory, the rico class
would have become a decreasing minority in any case. The grant system that had once
sustained the elite Hispanic families had, of course, been terminated, eroding their future
prospects. To exacerbate that development, grants lands once devoted to sheep growing
ended up in Anglo ownership as result of political chicanery, unpaid tax liabilities,
bloated attorney’s fees in the form of land, breakup of estates by inheritance, and the sale
or abandonment by grant heirs. The Hispanic position was further weakened by the
tendency of prominent ricos to assimilate into the Anglo middle class. While Anglo
ranchers aggressively acquired public lands, sometimes illegally, small-scale Hispanic
ranchers more often squatted on unused tracts, only to lose them to later claimants. On
another front, Anglo merchants and ranchers optimized their business operations by
employing talented, knowledgeable men from an international pool.
Of particular but non-quantifiable significance, it appears that the Hispanic ranchers
and merchants were rather more risk-averse than the Americans. The large-scale
ranchers knew better than to risk their family fortunes on unproven schemes. Threehundred years of farming, stock growing, and surviving under exceedingly difficult
circumstances had forged an inherent conservativism in Hispanic society, which may
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have inhibited its success in the rapidly changing economic environment of the late
nineteenth century.
Ultimately, the New Mexico sheep industry became part of a large, Anglo-dominated
western industry that shifted from open-range to farm environments. Anglo dominance
within the territory developed in the post-Civil War period along with the rise of
mercantile capitalism. Considering the multiplicity of factors in force, capital and the
other secondary considerations, the end result could have gone no other way.
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Appendix A
Interpretation of Census and Tax Assessment Data

Through the nineteenth century, the science of demographic data collection was in its
infancy, and published reports must be interpreted correspondingly, at least with regard to
western livestock. The investigators who assembled the U.S. census reports every decade
were well aware of shortcomings in the data at their disposal. The explanations and
footnotes accompanying the various tables of data often contain a bewildering array of
caveats. In the words of government livestock expert, H.A. Heath, “It has been quite
difficult to obtain any reliable data from the Territorial records of New Mexico by which
the exact number of sheep owned in the different counties of the Territory can be
computed.”1

In the published U.S. census statistics through 1890, no distinction

between farm stock and range stock was made. Animals “unrestricted by any tenure of
lands,” i.e. open-range livestock, were often not counted by census takers. Animals
grazing partly on open range and partly on established farms and ranches constituted a
source of error and confusion. Furthermore, the reporting of young animals was likewise
inconsistent and confusing. Through 1880, lambs under one year of age were not
counted; thereafter they were.2 Livestock populations reported in the U.S. census reports
are, thus, for these reasons alone, unquestionably low.
It was a widespread practice for New Mexico sheep owners to conceal the true size of
their herds from the tax assessors and census takers so as to reduce their tax liability, a
situation that apparently prevailed for much or all of the territorial period. This was easy
and risk free. No practical way existed for the assessors to count livestock on range lands.
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They were reliant on the sheep owners for that information. For this reason also, tax
assessment rolls and census reports thus underreported the livestock populations of New
Mexico, at least until the turn of the twentieth century. In the 1900 Census, a first
attempt was made to revise the sheep populations reported in 1860, 1880, and 1890 to
more realistic levels, “exclusive of spring lambs wholly or in part.”3 Later estimates by
the New Mexico Department of Agriculture in cooperation with the U.S. Department of
Agriculture were made in 1962.4 The author regards this work as the most reliable source
for New Mexico sheep populations and wool production in the period under
consideration and has employed it wherever possible.
Reported wool production statistics are similarly problematic. Wool comes directly
from the sheep in a dirty, greasy state, “in the grease.” Washing and scouring the wool, a
necessary step prior to any use, results in a loss of weight ranging from 20 to 85%, with
an average around 60%. Yet the wool production was simply designated in pounds
without any distinction as to its categories, “in the greasy state, in the washed state, and
in the scoured state.”5
Nevertheless, with some interpretation, the nineteenth-century statistical data can still
be useful. It may be employed for estimating relative numbers, identifying general trends
and substantial changes with the passage of time. The data can provide such information
as sheep/cattle ratios, geographic distributions of livestock populations, and substantial
increases and decreases in the rate of livestock production, but not absolute numbers.6
And even though the quoted figures for wool production are for an unknown mixture of
the various degrees of cleanliness, if the mix is about the same from decade to decade, as
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is usually assumed, the general trend given by the reported weight of wool produced from
year to year will be meaningful.

294

Appendix B
New Mexican Sheep and Their Management

The western flocks were constituted of three types of sheep, as was common
everywhere. The females, ewes, typically constituted the bulk of a flock and were
generally valued most as lamb producers. When their reproductive years were over, they
were slaughtered for mutton or else employed strictly as wool producers. The breeding
males, the rams, were relatively few in number. Often imported from outside New
Mexico, they were the most valuable animals of the flock and the key to selective
breeding for desirable characteristics. The most common graded ram employed in the
West was the Merino. Such graded rams were often beyond the price range of smallscale New Mexico growers, in which case they ran purely churro herds. The wethers,
males castrated shortly after birth, constituted the third class of sheep. Before the wool
market developed, these animals were employed only for mutton. Thereafter, they were
valued as wool producers and sometimes kept six or seven years for this purpose. Later,
they would be sent off to fatten and then to slaughter.7

Churros
There is some controversy over precisely what breed of sheep the pobladores brought
with them to New Mexico after the Reconquest. Some believe they were high-quality
Spanish Merinos. The official 1897 governor’s report to the secretary of the interior of
interior asserted, “The original stock was of Spanish Merino, which for one hundred and
fifty years had been bred in and deteriorated in character …”8 Others, New Mexico
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sheep merchant George Bond in particular, believed the original stock were churros, the
common sedentary sheep of southern Spain, whose lineage extends back to Roman
times.9 Both breeds had thrived in Spain, which has an environment and topography
similar to New Mexico, the Merinos having been brought originally to Andalusia from
North Africa. Merino rams would, indeed, be imported to New Mexico in the late
nineteenth century for breeding purposes, cf. chap. 4. What is known is the general
character of the breed as reported by Anglo-American observers after 1821; what they
saw was unmistakably a churro. Either the New Mexico flocks were constituted of
churros from the outset, the original Merino stock had been diluted with churro blood
introduced by imported stock over the years, or the flocks were degraded over time by
inbreeding.10 Anglos referred to the churro as the common “Mexican” breed.
Whatever the case, the churro breed was a good choice for the locale. They were
small, easy to feed, and travelers of great endurance. The ewes were good mothers.
They were easily managed because of their strong herding instinct. They could forage
for themselves and withstand hunger and harsh climatic conditions well. Most important
in the semi-arid environment, they were drought resistant, needing to drink from a stream
or pond only every few days. They could survive the rest of the time on succulent plants
and the morning dew. Churros were also well known for their good taste. The churro’s
hardiness, drought resistance, and herding instinct made it well adapted to the long trail
drives to Mexico and, later, to California. It arrived at its destination in good condition,
maximizing its owner’s profits. In sum, the churro could live and multiply in New
Mexico and be profitably driven to distant markets.11 Churros were poor wool
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producers. However, wool growing was not an important component of the colonial
economy.

Field Organization
The sheep patrones employed a simple hierarchical administrative structure to
manage their large herds. Few owners actually managed their own flocks, but instead
employed for that purpose a majordomo, who functioned as a field boss or foreman.12
Directly under the majordomo were the vaqueros, each typically responsible for three or
four flocks of roughly 1000 head. The vaquero continually traveled by horse from one
flock to another, checking up on its general condition, looking for any diseases,
supervising the pastores in charge, and bringing them supplies. Significantly, most
herders in the Southwest throughout the territorial period were Hispanic or Indian,
regardless of whether their bosses were Hispanic or Anglo. Sometimes the flocks were
as large as 2000-3000 sheep in which case they were tended by two pastores, typically a
man, his boy, and their dogs.13 By the late nineteenth century, a pastor might still be paid
as little as $10.00/month plus board.14 Their compensation generally took the form of
credit, which their families might apply to the purchase of food and supplies in their
absence; accounts were usually settled annually; little cash actually changed hands. This
basic hierarchy evolved little over the years.15

The Annual Cycle
Sheep growing in New Mexico followed an annual cycle. Lambing was the most
critical time of the year. It was carried out in some valley known to have early spring
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grass (salt or alkali) and running water, as was the case in the Rio Grande, Pecos, and
Mimbres river areas. The birthing time was planned by keeping the rams apart from the
rest of the flock for most of the year. They were usually turned loose with the ewes from
around mid December until mid-January, one buck to 40-50 ewes typically, but as many
as 100 ewes for an expensive pure-bred ram. In this way the births were timed to occur
in the spring when the New Mexico weather is relatively mild and lamb survival rates
were high.16 If the ewe band was robust and adequately fed, as many as 90% of the ewes
would mate with a ram over the one-month period. Typically 65-85% of the ewes
produced a lamb, the birthing season extending from late April to early May. 17 During
this period, a temporary, expanded workforce of herders and lambers was sent out from
the haciendas to the sheep camps to help the year-around herders with the birthing. If the
weather was particularly cold and damp or if forage and moisture were scarce, the ewes
might refuse to recognize their own offspring. Unless the herder was able to intervene in
some way, a large fraction of the newborns would die. The frustrations are expressed by
herder F. Carpenter in a letter to his boss, Las Vegas merchant W.H. Kelly:
I thought I woud [sic] drop you a few lines to let you know how I [am]
getting along with the fine sheep. I have a Hell of a time with them. I
never had such a time with a bunch of sheep. I can’t get them to own their
lambs, they are hardest to make own their lambs I ever saw but of coarse [sic]
it is on account of the grass being poor.18
Conversely, if the lambs were born under hot, dry conditions, their growth would be
stunted.19 A few weeks after lambing, the new-born males would be converted to
wethers.20 About a month later, the mature sheep would be shorn for their health if not
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for their wool. After wool growing became important in New Mexico, shearing was
sometimes performed by organized bands of shearers, who worked their way north,
moving from herd to herd, with the advancing season.21
At the start of the annual cycle, the majordomo would decide on the path each of his
flocks would follow during the coming year. As the spring grass came in, each pastor
would drive his flock four or five miles a day, grazing all along the way.22 He rarely kept
his animals in the same location for more than two days at a time, and then only when the
grass was particularly abundant. Typically, the annual path would first traverse an upland
circle which might extend as far as 50 miles from the home base. In the fall, the flocks
might be sheared again; they were then driven over a lowland circle through the fall and
winter, returning to the home base in time for lambing.23
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Appendix C
Spanish-Mexican Land Grants

Private Land Grants
Private grants were awarded to influential ricos, a single individual or sometimes a
two-man partnership, but with strings attached. The grantees were legally obligated to
live on the land for a minimal period, typically four years, a condition that often went unenforced.24 Additionally they were to populate the grant and develop its agricultural,
grazing, or mining resources. This minimally involved recruiting settlers to farm and/or
raise livestock, providing them with personal plots for homes and garden crops, and
giving them access to grazing areas for their small livestock holdings. In return, the
settlers were typically required to pay the grantee rent in the form of a fraction of their
annual produce. Private grants were usually quite sparsely populated and devoted largely
to grazing.25 Establishing a private grant could entail a considerable initial investment on
the part of the grantee. The wealthy Luna family is thought to have settled some fifty
families on their original private grant, the San Clemente Grant in today’s Valencia
County.26 With his basic obligations met, the grantee was then legally entitled to sell the
property. Otherwise, when he died, the grant, and the continuing obligations connected
with it, passed on to his heirs and thus remained in the family.

Community Land Grants
Community grants were awarded to groups of men, all heads of families. Again,
minimal occupancy requirements were imposed. Each grantee received a personal plot
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for a house (solar de casa) and a separate irrigable plot for growing crops (suerte)
together with a fractional interest including usufructory rights in the common lands, the
ejidos, which made up the bulk of the land area. The common lands were, like the the
private grants, fundamentally grazing tracts. They were un-partitioned in that no grantee
could claim a specific area for his/her exclusive use, nor could a specific plot be sold.
Only the private plots along with a fractional ownership of the common lands that went
with them could be sold. When a grantee died, the property was divided among his
heirs. Although ownership was in principal distributed among all the grantees,
community grants were, like the private grants, often dominated by a leading family that
might have owned most of the livestock and, as a result, come to control the grazing
lands. That family’s patriarch assumed the role of patron for the other grantees.27 He
might have been instrumental in securing the grant in the first place and, as in the case of
a private grant, expended considerable financial resources to bring it into production.28
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Appendix D
The Sheep Herder of the Spanish-Mexican Period

Basic Routine and Minimal Qualifications
The life of the sheep herder during the Spanish-Mexican period, the tasks involved,
and the kind of person who succeeded in this line of work reflect some light on how the
industry evolved after the annexation and on labor issues that arose in the late nineteenth
century, since many aspects of the actual work of herding changed little through the
nineteenth century. The sheep herder’s life was, beyond question, hard. A pastor had to
be robust in body, since his life was, minimally, one prolonged hiking and camping trip.
A skilled outdoorsman, he slept under the stars or in a small tent year around, rain, snow,
high winds, or oppressive heat notwithstanding, usually trailing his herd several miles
every day. He cooked himself two meals a day, at dawn and at night fall. His small
supply of provisions, a frying pan and a coffee pot, a sack of flour, some salt, a bag of red
pepper, and some coffee were all packed on his burro.29

Responsibilities, Skills, and Knowledge
Beyond keeping them watered and fed, the pastor was charged with protecting his
animals, which have no survival instincts, from predators, poisonous plants, a
considerable variety of which he had to be able to identify, accidents, Indian raiders,
freezing winter storms, disease (scabies in particular later), prairie fire, and after the
annexation thieves and murderous cowboys.30 He had to be able to sense in advance the
full array of dangers and take appropriate action when needed, and he had to deal with
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field conditions that were changing from day-to-day. Isolated as it was, his life was not
monotonous. South Dakota herder Archer B. Gilfillan described the situation thusly:
the sheep rarely act the same two days in a succession. If they run one day,
they are apt to be quiet the next. They herd differently in a high wind from
what they do in a gentle breeze. They travel with the cold wind and against
the warm one. They are apt to graze contentedly where feed is plenty and to
string out where the picking is poor. Herding at one season is so different
from herding at another as almost to constitute a different job. No one
herding day is exactly like any other day, and there is more variety in them
than there is in the day spent in the office or factory.31

Theft Losses
The herder’s financial responsibility was large. Prior to the annexation, a 1000-head
flock under his care might be valued at $500-1000, four or more years of his usual
compensation, possibly $10-20/month at most. A single unfortunate incident could be
devastating. It could turn an ambitious partidario into a peon if he was unable to cover
his patron’s losses. Indian attacks were an ever-present danger. As late as about 1870,
Juan Luna, Solomon Luna’s uncle, was one of several men killed in an Indian attack on
the San Clemente Grant.32 Sheep rustling was easy and involved minimal risk because
the herder was usually alone on the open range, poorly armed and poorly mounted. With
the expansion of the Anglo population and the sheep industry after the Civil War, the
problem persisted. In 1868, the Denver press reported the case of a sheep thief, who had
allegedly slit the throats of two Hispanic herders and hid their bodies. The stolen sheep
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were identified and in his possession when he was captured by an Army detachment near
Trinidad, Colorado.33

The Herder’s Mental Disposition
The profession of sheep herder in the West demanded more than physical stamina,
skills and knowledge, and a sense of financial responsibility. A specific mental
disposition, including but not restricted to stoicism, was required. The ability to work
hard and responsibly in isolation was essential. In the words of Towne and Wentworth,
who devoted years to the study of the western sheep industry, the successful sheepherder
needed “the unique temperament which sends a man forth to live alone for weeks on end,
devoid of human contact, but weighted with full responsibility…” 34 The herder’s only
companions, besides his sheep, might be his dog and burro. In the words of one Texas
pastor:
……pastores have very lonely lives. Sometimes they go for
weeks with nothing to talk to during the day but sheep and goats. At night
there is nothing to do but sleep, or, if they cannot sleep, then to listen. At
such times the voice of the coyote is company in the night’s stillness.35
The sheep herder was not always completely solitary, since he sometimes worked
together with a boy, possibly his son, or with another adult herder if the flock was large.
And his vaquero would visit every few weeks. But his human contact was, indeed,
minimal. Ranch woman Agnes Morley Cleaveland might as well have been describing
sheep herders when she noted of her cattle ranching community in the Datil area, “We
were all uncompromisingly self-contained.”36 Considering the array of requirements, it
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appears that the best herders must have been men of a sort of mental acuity, although
they were largely illiterate. These requirements, unnecessary for the less demanding
sheep husbandry on eastern farms, were unique to the West.

Additional Shortcomings of the Herder’s Life
The sheep herder’s occupation was not just lonely, but often lacking in respect.
Hispanic herders were, in later years, a subject of derision by Anglos not involved in
sheep growing. Many cowboys, in particular, considered them subhuman. A
considerable collection of jokes and stories about crazy sheep herders, driven to insanity
by the loneliness, circulated around the West, although they had little, if any, factual
basis.37 Another disadvantage of the herder’s life was the hardships endured by his
family in his absence. His wife and daughters might have to assume, in addition to their
traditional tasks, all the family responsibilities ordinarily performed by the man of the
house, including staving off Indian attacks. Furthermore, they would be unduly subject
to assault, rape, or seduction while their men were away, according to Gutierrez, a danger
whenever men spent extended periods away from home, the case with soldiers,
muleteers, and hunters as well as sheep herders.38 Herding clearly wasn’t for everyone.
And it became less attractive when other employment opportunities for Hispanic villagers
opened up in the late nineteenth century, at which point good herders could be hard to
find, cf., chap. 9. The herding profession could, however, provide a decent living for
men possessing the required attributes.
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Appendix E
Alfalfa

According to a late nineteenth-century government report, “Alfalfa is the most
valuable and most important plant known to Western agriculture.” It is “unsurpassed as
feed for sheep.”39 The qualities of alfalfa are indeed almost too good to be true. And the
feeding industry drew heavily from the development of alfalfa farming in the West.
There was a New Mexico connection in that the important Colorado feeder industry, the
earliest and by the mid-1880s well-developed, traces its origin to 1863 when Col. Jacob
Downing brought the first alfalfa seeds into the territory from New Mexico.40 Alfalfa is
extraordinarily prolific; as many as three crops per year, i.e. three mowings, could be
grown on irrigated land. It was a good protein source for animal growth and was a
particularly effective feed when used in combination with corn. Comparatively cheap to
produce, it promoted fast growth and heavy fleeces; and the sheep liked it. Its influence
on the New Mexico sheep industry was largely indirect. Readily grown, it opened up
expanses of previously unused farm land on the Great Plains for growing feed to fatten
sheep on site. The grass develops a large, deep root system, is drought resistant, stands
up to harsh climatic conditions otherwise, and is generally well-adapted to the high
plains. Once established, it becomes a perennial, requiring little care. It produces more
feed value per acre than most other crops.41
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Appendix F
The Homestead Act of 1862

The Homestead Act of 1862 was intended provide free farmland in the public domain
for settlers willing to take up lands in unsettled areas. Its importance as an agent of
change in nineteenth-century American life cannot be overestimated, although its
effectiveness in bringing successful small farms to the Southwest was severely
compromised by its shortcomings.
Under the Homestead Act, for a fee of $10, a U.S. citizen or an immigrant who had
declared an intension to become a citizen, man or woman over the age of twenty-one,
could claim a quarter section [160 acres] of public land that had been surveyed. Final
title - a patent - was to be secured by cultivating the land, improving it with the
construction of a house or barn, residing on it for five years, and paying a few modest
additional fees. Alternatively, one could purchase the homestead outright after six months
residency for a minimum fee of $1.25 per acre.42 An additional quarter section of public
land could be purchased for $1.25 per acre under the Pre-emption Act of 1841 without a
survey.43 A quarter section was a sufficient amount of land to support a typical farm
family in the humid East, but not west of the 98th meridian. By judicious use of the Preemption Act, the Homestead Act and its later amendments, the Timber Culture Act
(1873) and the Desert Land Act (1877), it was possible to legally acquire 1120 acres of
public land at minimal cost but with added provisos that were hard to satisfy in the
West.44
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After a homestead claim was filed, the land became free of any government
intervention until final title was awarded. Even if a claimant did not satisfy the
conditions required by the laws, he was assured sole use of the land for at least seven
years, and possibly longer if no one else filed on the land when it was reopened for
entry.45 A total of 80,000,000 acres in the West were homesteaded after 1862.
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Appendix G
Monetary Comparisons

Historical accounts of economic matters face a technical problem concerning the true
value of dollar amounts taken from primary sources. The United States has experienced
a general inflationary trend dating back to colonial times. Thus a dollar in 1850 was
worth far more in purchasing power than a dollar in, for example, 2010. Throughout this
work, contemporary dollar amounts for various goods and services during the territorial
period of New Mexico have been quoted. To sensibly understand the full meaning of
such quotes, these historical dollar amounts, designated “current” dollars in the technical
literature, have been converted to 2010 dollars, an example of “constant” dollars. This
provides the reader with an understanding of the various monetary values under
discussion in terms of today’s values, while giving a constant standard for comparisons of
monetary values at different times during the historical period under discussion.
The procedure employed here uses the Consumer Price Index (CPI) published by the
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, which has been extended back to the late
eighteenth century. The CPI is a measure of the cost in dollars of a bundle of goods and
services of constant value for any given year compared to the cost in a base period. This
is discussed in detail in John J. McKusker, How Much Is That In Real Money? Similar
information is also available on the Web site, http://www.measuringworth.com.46
Using the CPI to restate “current” dollars into today’s dollars proceeds thusly.
Considering a restatement of 1850 dollars into today’s dollars, the CPI for 1850 is 7.57
and the CPI for 2010 is 218.06. One dollar in 1850 would buy as much as 218.06/7.57 =
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28.81 dollars in 2010. Thus, one hundred dollars in 1850 would buy as much as $2,881
in 2010 and so on. The dollar amounts quoted in the text and employed in graphs have
been similarly converted to 2010 dollars and have been designated as such.
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Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” in Frontier and
Section, Selected Essays of Frederick Jackson Turner, Introduction and Notes by Ray Allen Billington
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1961), 37, 62.
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James I. Culbert, “Cattle Industry of New Mexico,” Economic Geography 17 (April 1941): 166.
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Westphall, Public Domain, 120.
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Report of the Governor, 1897, pp. 367-368.
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Taylor. “Conditions of the Cattle Interests,” 331-332. See also Clay, 338.
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a fairly small scale. See James D. Shinkle, Fifty Years of Roswell History (Roswell, NM: Hall-Poorbaugh,
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land laws, New Mexico sheep owners were not building reservoirs or drilling wells, which would have
brought more land into production. See Carman et al., “Special Report,” 926.
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Taylor, “Cattle Interests,” 331-332.
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New Mexico Blue Book, 1913, p. 25. This was part of a larger process in which homesteaders took up
lands in the semi-arid West, the last public lands still available for homesteading by that time. See Hicks,
74.
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Westphall, Mercedes Reales, 271. Mechanized irrigation, as it affected ranchers, was discussed in
chap. 8. Its influence on farming was even greater.
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Keith L. Bryant, Jr., History of the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railway (Lincoln and London:
University of Nebraska Press, 1974), 191-196.
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Remley, 193.

20

Large tracts of land placed in the public domain by the courts had been the common-land portions
Spanish-Mexican community grants. Converting this land to public domain was a massive injustice to the
grantees on the part of the federal government. See Westphall, Mercedes Reales, 272.
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Westphall, Mercedes Reales, 271. These data were compiled by Westphall from the census reports of
1890, 1900, and 1910. For a more complete discussion of the growth of farming in New Mexico in this
timeframe, see New Mexico Blue Book, 1913, pp. 24-26.
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L. Bradford Prince, A Concise History of New Mexico, 2nd ed. (Cedar Rapids, Iowa: The Torch Press,
1914), 213. The Estancia Valley is located in today’s Torrance and southern Santa Fe Counties.
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New Mexico Agricultural Statistics, 44-46.
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Clay, 228. World War I brought about a further reduction of grazing areas in New Mexico when it
created a soaring demand for agricultural products. Prices increased correspondingly, and New Mexico
farmers responded by increasing production dramatically. Between 1916 and 1918, the acreage devoted to
wheat production nearly doubled; that devoted to beans quadrupled, and that devoted to other crops,
particularly corn and potatoes, likewise increased considerably. See New Mexico Blue Book, 1919, p. 94.
25

Meinig, 66-67.

26

According to one report, Wilson Waddingham, founder of the immense Bell Ranch, placed a large
number of cattle on his range that was later considered over twice the optimal number for sustained
operations. See Remley, 4-5, 100, 106.
27

Wilcox, 86-87. This scenario as it played out in Wyoming some time after 1880 is described briefly in
Clay, 36.
28

Taylor, “Cattle Interests,” 350.

29

Troy Brothers, quoted in Heath, “Condition of the Sheep Industry,” 317.

30

Taylor, “Range Cattle Industry,” 106-107.

31

Kupper, 87-88.

32

Meinig, 67.
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See Cabeza de Baca, 152-153, for a personal account of this scenario in the Ceja-Llano country of
eastern New Mexico.
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Clay, 23.
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Taylor, “Range Cattle Industry,” 106.
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Westphall, Public Domain, 46; Meinig, 67.

37

A second wave of immigrant farmers arrived ten years later as conditions on the Great Plains once again
appeared favorable. They were better prepared and more successful than their predecessors.
38

Cabeza de Baca, 152.

39

Andy Wiest, quoted in Grubbs, 36:239.

40

Harry Kelly to unknown, August 11, 1915, FBC, 84:384.

41

The New Mexico Blue Book, 1917, 41-42.
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A list of recent New Mexico homestead patents published in the Las Vegas Stock Grower in 1889
includes many Spanish names. See Stock Grower, April 28, 1889, p. 8. See also Carlson, “Long Lots,” 56.
Deutsch, 31, describes the downside of homesteading from the Hispanic standpoint.
43

Westphall, Public Domain, 45-46. Cabeza de Baca, 152-153, gives a personal account of this scenario.

44

Towne and Wentworth, 174.

45

New Mexico Agricultural Statistics, 44-46.

46

Gordon, 992.

47

Taylor, “Conditions of the Cattle Interests,” 330. The report, furthermore, described the area once
available for grazing sheep as “now very much curtailed.”
48

Quoted in the Stock Grower, June 8, 1889. See also Wilcox, 98.

49

C.H. Wasser, “Early Development of Technical Range Management ca. 1895-1945,” Agricultural
History 51, Agriculture of the Great Plains, 1876-1936: A Symposium
(January 1977): 63-65.
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Carman et al., “Special Report,” 923.

51

Cabeza de Baca, 133,153.

52

Wright, 638; Annual Reports of the Department of Agriculture For The Year Ended June 30, 1915
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1915), 46; see also Sypolt, 156.
53

Cleaveland, 320-321. See also chap. 9 for an account of Montague Stevens’ experience with Cebola
National Forest Reserve.
54

Mr. Morgan, quoted in Frank D. Reeve, “The Sheep Industry in Arizona,” New Mexico Historical
Review 38 (July 1963): 246-247.
55

Wasser, 67.

56

Cleaveland, 321.

57

Annual Reports of the Department of Agriculture For The Year Ended June 30, 1914 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1914), 9-10.
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“The National Forests,” Annual Reports of the Department of Agriculture For The Year Ended June 30,
1915. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1916), 46-47.

Chapter 11
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Van Ness and Van Ness, “Introduction,” 6; U.S. Census, 1850, lxxxii, 1007; New Mexico Agricultural
Statistics, 44.
2

U.S. Census, 1900, Vol. V, Part I, cciv, ccvi, 326; Towne and Wentworth, 181.

3

James Wilson, “The Cattle Industry of the United States,” Eighteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of
Animal Industry, 1901 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902.), 268.
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4

The Stock Grower, February 2, 1889.

5

277,000,000 lbs. for the fall 1899 and spring 1900. Twelfth Census, 1900, Vol. V, Part I, 679.
330,000,000 lbs. [in the grease] in 1909; Cherington, 340; Stock Grower and Farmer, August 19, 1893.
6

U.S. Census, 1900, Vol. V, Part I, 326.

7

U.S. Census, 1850 , 1008; New Mexico Agricultural Statistics, 56. U.S. Census, 1900, Vol. V, Part I, 326.

8

The Stock Grower, March 30, 1889, p. 9; U.S. Census, 1900, Vol. IX, Part III, 88.

9

Wright, 623.

10

Carman et al., 925, 929.

11

Quoted in Pittman, 78-79.

12

Carman et al., “Special Report,” 931.

13

The New Mexico Bluebook, 1913, p. 42.

14

New Mexico had the smallest water area of any state as of 1943. See Christine A. Heller, “The SpanishAmericans of New Mexico and Arizona.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
225 (January 1943): 49-51.
15

Conversely, Montoya attributes the general lack of success of the Maxwell Land Grant subsequent to its
sale to the inflexibility of the European owner-investors, who understood and cared little about New
Mexico and its traditions and insisted on running their ranching operations strictly according the modern
practices of industrial capitalism. See Montoya, 142-143.

Appendices
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H.A. Heath, “Condition of the Sheep Industry,” 314.

2

U.S. Census, 1900, Vol. V, Part I, cciv.

3

U.S. Census, 1900, Vol. V, Part I, ccxiv.

4

New Mexico Agricultural Statistics, Vol. I.
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U.S. Census, 1890, Part III, 29.

6

Robert A. McGuire, “US Agricultural Statistics: State Estimates, 1866-1914,” Agricultural History 54,
(April 1980), 336-342.
7

The distribution in a typical New Mexico herd in 1880 has been estimated as 1.25% rams, 62.13% ewes,
21.78% wethers, and 14.84% lambs under a year old. See Wentworth, 233, 413.
8

Report of the Governor of New Mexico, 1897, p. 373; see also T.B. Miller, quoted in Carman et al.,
“Special Report,” 919.
9

Carman et al., Special Report, 21, 919; Baxter agrees with Bond and believes that Coronado, Onate, and
de Vargas all brought churros into New Mexico. See Baxter, 20.
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10

Carman et al, “Special Report,” 918.

11

Like churros, and unlike some other wool-bearing breeds, Merinos were also strong long-distance
walkers in compact flocks. See Kupper, 31.
12

For a full description of Spanish ranch management structure, see Wentworth, 401. A few large-scale
sheepmen acted as their own majordomos, notably Solomon Luna. See Pittman, 30, 46. And several largescale Hispanic sheepmen participated in the California drives, as described in chap. 3.
13

Gordon, 980-981; Sypolt, 33.

14

Rocky Mountain News, July 13, 1873.

15

Documentary evidence of a drive of 25,000 New Mexican sheep to Kansas in 1895, owned by the
Charles Ilfeld Company, indicates that the drive was under the general direction of Max Goldenberg and
foreman P.D. McElroy, who were accompanied by two mayordomos and 14 pastores under them. See
Parish, Ilfeld, 130-131. The job titles differ somewhat here, but the basic hierarchy appears to be
unchanged.
16

Escudero, writing in 1849, describes a situation where partidarios tended herds of 1000 ewes and 10
breeding rams never separated from the rest of the herd. In this way there would be two or three births a
day year around, which the herder could easily handle by himself. See Escudero, in Carroll and Haggard,
40-42. It is unclear when this practice was superseded by the more systematic practice described here.
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Carman et al., “Special Report,” 923.

18

F. Carpenter to W.H. Kelly, May 5, 1898, GKC, Series II; Sypolt, 280.

19

Sypolt, 283.

20

The castration was a quick, two-man process, optimally performed 4-6 weeks after birth, at which time
losses were light. See Stock Grower, April 13, 1889.
21

Towne and Wentworth, 298-299.

22

Lehmann, Forgotten Legions, chap. 5, states that the Texas sheep of the Rio Grande Plain were trailed 710 miles/day.
23

Rocky Mountain News, April 16, 1873. The flock might, for example, be driven, during this period, into
the eastern valleys and Llano Estacado, grazing eastward until year’s end and then back toward the
mountains along the Gallinas and Mora Rivers. See Wentworth, 396-397.
24

Westphall, Mercedes, 10-11, 18.

25

Westphall, Mercedes, 12.

26

Pittman, 3.

27

Leonard describes the situation in the village of El Cerrito on the San Miguel del Bado Community Grant
in which usage of the common lands was dominated by two or three large-scale, stock-owning families.
Leonard, 125-126; see also Erna Fergusson, 316.
28

The case of a single family’s attempt to take over the Tierra Amarilla Community Grant legally is
described in Westphall, Mercedes, 127-131.
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Sypolt, 276.

30

Pittman, 11.

31

Gilfillan, 37-38.

32

Pittman, 11-12.

33

Rocky Mountain News, April 7, 1868.

34

Towne and Wentworth, 269.

35

Edgar B. Kincaid, quoted in Towne and Wentworth, 257.
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Cleaveland, 255.
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Sypolt, 269.
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Gutierrez, 215.
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Carman et al., “Special Report,” 928.

40

Towne and Wentworth, 171.

41

I.D. Graham, “Alfalfa for the Growing and Fattening of Animals in the Great Plains Region,” TwentyFirst Annual Report of the Bureau of Animal Industry for the Year 1904 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1905): 242-244.
42

Billington, 606; Hine and Faragher, 333-334.

43

Billington, 323-324.
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Westphall, Public Domain, 43.
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